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This thesis is based on seven case studies from a wide range of industries. It 
challenges the traditional paradigm of control in production management practice 
and literature, proposing a revised paradigm bringing together the control and 
improvement processes and integrating them with corporate competitive strategy.
The traditional paradigm leads to two possible states; 'in' and 'out of' con­
trol'. Which state is attained is dependent on the balance between the difficulty 
of the manufacturing task and production management's competence to exercise 
control; when the difficulty is greater than the competence production becomes 
'out of control'.
In the traditional paradigm production management seeks to maintain stability. 
The research shows that competition frequently leads to increases in the d iffic­
ulty of the manufacturing task, which disturb this stability. I show that senior 
management does not adequately recognize the consequences of this difficulty on 
the state of control.
The fieldwork demonstrates that production managers exercised control in 
terms of compliance to standards, with improvements being left to staff special­
ists, who tended to concentrate on new systems, or major revisions to existing 
practices. Neither group gave significant priority to making small incremental 
changes to the existing technology /  systems.
A revised paradigm is developed showing that control of production can be 
maintained in line with competitive pressures, by involving production manage­
ment and workers in the improvement of the manufacturing system. At its best 
production then becomes a source of competitive advantage. The improvements 
are achieved via a programme of strategically directed continuous incremental 
changes executed on the shop floor. They come from analysis of 'shop floor' 
information used to reduce the complexity and uncertainty of the manufacturing 
task. These improvements complement the 'discrete' system changes accomp­
lished by functional staff. The paradigm requires high levels of learning and 
problem solving skills by production management and workers.
Three elements are identified within the revised paradigm which affect a 
company's rate of improvement; the existence of clear strategies for manufact­
uring, a coherent formal improvement plan and the provision of information to 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Two major influences stimulated this research. Firstly, my experience 
working in industry and later as a management trainer. Secondly, mounting 
evidence of relatively poor performance by a number of British (and American) 
manufacturers, which led to the development of criticisms of the traditional, and 
provision of alternative, paradigms of production management. These criticisms 
have resulted in the specific call for research into the control of production by a 
panel of leading American teachers of production-operations management.
The critical stimulus for this thesis came when I observed the tangle of 
control systems used in the production function of a major British manufacturing 
company. The Production Manager was responsible for equipment costing over 
150m. and had a substantial workforce under his authority. He worked within a 
hierarchy of many control systems; some designed to assist his control, many 
others to monitor his level of control over the department's performance. Yet, 
despite, or possibly because of, these many control systems, he faced problems of 
late delivery, variable quality and adverse cost variances. I became increas­
ingly aware of the high level of diffuseness in the managerial control of product­
ion. A substantial part of this control of production was formally instituted 
outside the hands of the Production Manager. Reflecting on the above, and on 
my other experiences within manufacturing industry, I became increasingly 
aware that such phenomena were not uncommon and began to question v-hether 
in some way their familiarity might mask their significance. I was also aware 
that the classical management control and production management literatures 
did not offer adequate answers to this type of question.
The need for such research has been recognized as an important area by 
Miller dt Graham (1981), who report the findings of a panel of leading American 
production management teachers, as claiming thati
"An important research need of the 1980s is the integration of operat­
ions control with the firm's competitive strategy."
2They -suggest a number of areas where such research is considered to be 
important. Of particular relevance to this thesis is their call for research which 
advances the 'integration of operations control decisions with the competitive 
strategy' and which similarly leads to improvements in the 'design and implemen­
tation of manufacturing control systems.' They also call for further research to 
be undertaken in the field of operations policy, thus recognizing the important 
'linkage between the policy and control' areas of interest. Voss, at the U.K. 
Workshop in Productions/Operations Management (1983), similarly argued for 
greater research into the area of manufacturing policies which could link 
operational and senior management. Abernathy et al. (1983) indirectly support 
this theme when they argue that much of the Japanese competitiveness in the 
automotive industry has been based on '...diligent control of the whole system of 
production'. Similarly, Jaikumar & Bohn (1984) and Bohn (1984) have highlighted 
the need for developing a 'dynamic approach to production management' and for 
increased rates of 'systematic learning' within the production function.
The fundamental question arising from my observations led me to the general 
hypothesis that:
The paradigm of manufacturing control in the U.K. literature and practice 
represents a restricted, (often unitary), perspective of the wider range of 
choices that exist. The traditional paradigm, which is generally practised 
in the absence of a manufacturing strategy, significantly underemphasizes 
the importance of systematic incremental improvement, as part of the 
production managers' role in the control process. Production managers 
need to take a more proactive role in achieving control of production. 
This role should emphasise the importance of achieving control through 
improvement of the design of the operating system in ways which rein­
force the firm's long term goals.
The issues raised by the above hypothesis have extensive significance for 
both the practice and teaching of Production/Operations Management. The aim 
of my research was to develop a framework of the processes of controlling and 
improving production performance, to identify the roles of senior managers, staff 
and production managers and to reveal the factors that influence the movement 
of a plant from lower to higher levels of the framework.
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 THE PLACE OF CONTROL IN MANAGEMENT LITERATURE
Control has occupied an important place in production operations management 
(POM), since at least the era of Scientific Management. Using the term both in 
the sense of power and authority and of control systems, Taylor (19<*7) advocated 
taking!
"...the control of the machine shop out of the hands of the many work* 
men, and placing it completely in the hands of the management, thus 
superceding 'rule of thumb' by scientific control".
Giglioni 4  Bedeian ( 197*»), reviewing the developments in the theory of control 
between 1900-1972, show control to be a continuing theme in the wider manage­
ment literature. The interest in control is so diverse that only a brief review of 
its more immediate influences on production management thinking are covered. 
Although a long running theme, the interest in control has varied, with particular 
interest being expressed in the 1920s, 1990s, 1960s and early 1970s. The 'general 
management' theme of the immediate pre and post war periods was si^nmarized by 
Brech ( 19*»8), it in turn being replaced by the 'management process' school, in the 
1960s 4  70s as exemplified by Koontz 4  O'Donnell (1972), who sought to identify 
sets of principles for the overall management process. Control, although only 
one of five principles to be followed, has according to Child (1977), 'generally 
received the lion's share of attention'. Although all five steps were linked, 
planning and controlling were represented as two sides of the same issue, with 
planning referring to future events and control, to correction to the plans.
Additionally a number of papers appeared in the l960-70s proposing concepts 
of control, Jerome (1961), Bonini e t al.(ed.) ( 196*»), frameworks of control, 
Anthony (1963), Woodward (ed.) (1970), detailed principles of control, Koontz 4  
O'Donnell (1972), and mechanisms of controlling, Mockler (1972). Anthony's 
(1963), classification of control, into three levels, strategic planning, management
control and operational control, has become widely adopted, in decision support 
systems. Keen 4  Scott-Morton (1978), and accounting, Kaplan (1982). 
Woodward's (ed.) (1970) view oi the relationship between control processes and 
the separation of design and execution of controls, has been used by social 
scientists such as Storey (1983). Anthony's and Woodward's frameworks both 
enlarged the meaning of control, to embrace much of the 'planning' component of 
the management process school.
Only limited evidence is available of the direct impact of behavioural science 
on production management concepts of control, Thompson (1967), Ouchi (1977). 
Other indirect influences have been via work design and accounting, Perrow 
(1967). From the industrial relations perspective Storey (1983) makes important 
links between Etzioni's (1969) 'power 4  authority1, and the mechanisms used by 
management to control plants, and thus with industrial engineering and account­
ing. However, the decision was made not to develop this theme. That this 
places the thesis on the side of management, rather than worker control, is 
accepted as a consequence of this choice.
The thinking of a number of the workers in the field of control has in turn 
been influenced by developments in systems theory and cybernetics on both the 
concept and mechanisms of control. The diversity of backgrounds of those 
studying control has added a wide variety to the approaches adopted and sign­
ificant differences in the conceptual frameworks used.
The link between accounting and control has at times been so strong that 
control has on occasions been treated as being synonymous with accounting, 
Giglioni 4  Etedeian (1979). The traditional interest in budgetary systems, Argyris 
(1932), Stedry (1960), Hofstede (1968) has, in recent years, been expanded by 
Hopwood (1976), Kaplan (1982, 1989a), and Macintosh ( 1983) to take into account 
ideas from a wide variety of the earlier schools of thought.
5The wide scale recognition of the concept of manufacturing strategy, as 
advocated by Skinner (1978) and the upsurge of interest in Japanese manufact­
uring by the West, has led to a change in the essentially Taylorian perspective, 
derived from scientific management, the latter's concentration on procedures and 
mechanisms of control being what Drucker in Bonini et al.( 1964) termed 'controls 
not control'. Skinner and subsequent authors, Hayes (1981), Wheelwright (1978, 
1981), Hayes 6c Wheelwright (1979a 6c b, 1984) and Hill (1980, 1983, 1985) have 
widened the debate. Similarly, Japanese oriented literature, Schonberger (1982), 
Hayes (1981) has reflected a number of important differences in the concept of 
control of production. Some limited transfer mainly at a conceptual level has 
occurred from systems /  cybernetics, Constable 6c New (1976), Wilson et al. 
(198 3), Chase 6c Aquilano (1981) into the production management literature, but 
there has, in general, been little  interchange from the wider research and discuss­
ion into the POM literature.
2.2 DIFFERENCES IN THE MEANING OF CONTROL
The variety of contributors to the debate has led to a diversity of meanings of 
control. These range from Fayol's (1949) monitoring, Etzioni's (1964) power 6c 
influence, Jerome's (1961) directing 6c coordinating, Mundel's (1967) control 
systems. One of the major distinctions has been between 'control over subord­
inates through the direction of their activities', compared with 'control in the 
evaluation of the outcome of an activity and the making of corrections when 
necessary', Giglioni 6c Bedeian, (1974).
Drucker in Bonini e t al.( 1964) drew a distinction between control and controls. 
He argued that control was concerned with the state of an (operating) system in 
relation to its environment and purpose, and controls were the means of manipu­
lating the performance of an (operating) system. This led him to emphasise the 
importance well oesigned (operating) ..ystcms as important elements in ach­
ieving a state of control. He also claimed that a number of the difficulties in
control arose from an undue emphasis on control systems. Thus, in Drucker's 
terms, control is associated with the ends sought by managers, while controls are 
to do with their means of achieving these ends.
Mockler (1972) claimed that in addition to the ambiguity arising from the 
variety of meanings of the term control, the sub|ect lacks a coherent 'body of 
theory and principles to which executives can turn for guidance'.
2.21 Systems Theory/Cybernetics and the Control of Production
Mockler's view that 'control' lacks theoretical underpinning contrasts with 
that of the cyberneticians. They claim that cybernetics offers a framework for 
the study of
"...all forms of behaviour in so far as they are regular, or determinate , or 
reproducible", Ashby (1956).
He also claims that it affords a basis for dealing with
"...complex systems, where the complexity is too important to be ignored".
Beer ( 1969) makes the direct claim that theirs is a science of control dealing 
with large integrated systems. He considered that 'the same fundamental princ­
iples of control apply, and the same control mechanisms work' (within animate and 
inanimate systems). While large, these claims need to be examined, as they bear 
directly on the forms of control problem commonly faced by production managers. 
This is reinforced by the recognition by leading POM writers who recognize the 
importance of, and difficulties arising from, the complexity of production systems, 
Constable & New (1976), Hill (1985). Wilson et. al. (1983),reporting the findings 
of N.A.T.O .'s Advanced Research Institute’s conference on 'The Efficiency of 
Manufacturing Systems', seek to demonstrate the practical value of systems 
research for the management of production. Checkland, in Wilson ( 1983), argues 
that the critical systems' issue in production is linking the production sub-syitem 
with the other sub-systems in the firm. This view is consistent with that of
6
Constable & New (1976). One 'systems' concept particularly relevant to modern 
production management is that of 'homeostatic control'. This refers to a cond­
ition, whereby the system retains its state (of stability), while adjusting to 
changing environments, Ackoff (1971).
2.22 Social Science Research and the Control of Production
Social scientists have adopted a wide range of perspectives about control. 
Two of their areas of interest are particularly relevant to this study, the concepts 
of control and the means of achieving control. The important theme of social 
control falls outside the remit of this work. Much of the work in the field of 
control has been conducted in the manufacturing arena; Woodward's (1965, 1970), 
in itial study of the association between technology and organization structure, 
and the later studies of control systems. The Aston studies in the 1960s were an 
attempt to test and expand Woodward's earlier work. The insights of another of 
the 'technology' school of theorists, Thompson ( 1967), have had an impact on the 
formulation of the thinking of production management authors. His emphasis on 
uncertainty and the need to protect an organization's 'technical core', have been 
incorporated in the framework of control in some parts of the POM literature, 
Adam A Ebert (1978), Wild (1980).
Woodward et al.'s (1970) examination of control processes in a variety of 
manufacturing companies provided a number of important insights into the process 
of controlling production. Reeves A Woodward in Woodward (ed.) (1970) ident­
ified as a key factor the impact of changes in the nature of the control process on 
the progressive separation between the staff functions who design control 
systems, and line managers who execute the controlling act. Thus, as the 
control process moved from personal to mechanical, the separation grew. 
Another member of this research team, Klein in Woodward (ed.) (1970) considered 
that this differentiation would grow 'as modern management techniques develop 
and become more widespread'. She identified three different significant manag-
7
e ria l a c tiv itie s  for operating and contro lling , as:
"(a) the setting up of a workable system for production or service;
(b) the maintaining of the system, planning the work, coordinating the 
materials and services needed, keeping quality and cost within acceptable 
limits, and so on;
(c) improving the performance of the system and improving the system 
itself."
She maintained that 'the real challenge lay in improving the system itself. 
Efforts in this area, it was contended, were likely to be seen, (by management), as 
less urgent than those in either group (a) or (b). Klein's theme of improvement 
(or at least adaptation) has a more central place in organization theory and 
sociology than in manufacturing literature. A link can be made with controls via 
their use as instruments for learning or for establishing compliance, Jerome 
(1961), and Newman (1975),. Jerome in particular emphasised the need for 
increased attention upon the use of control systems as a means of learning how to 
improve performance.
Mintzberg ( 1975) revealed that managers typically spend a major part of their 
time acquiring and filtering information, as part of their exercising control. This 
information was typically gathered from a wide variety of sources and contained a 
considerable proportion of 'soft' data, obtained in informal discussions, meetings 
and rumours.
2.23 Accounting and the Control of Production
Accounting has many links with control, which cannot be explored in this 
thesis. This review is limited to a small, but growing sub-section of the wider 
accounting literature on control. Earlier writers have tended to treat manage­
ment control as synonymous with financial control, Kaplan (198<»b). He contends 
that such perspectives reflect the nature of competition in an earlier period, 
when price, and thus costs, were perceived to be the critical factor. While not 
rejecting the value of 'financial* measures of performance, in the process of
control, he recognises the need to embrace a wider set of competitive factors, 
which also need to be the subject of control, and thus are subjects for information 
systems. Such changes in approach, he predicts, will be difficult to accomplish 
because they are based on perspectives which have been practised for sixty years 
and have thus become institutionalized into 'professional' thinking.
Additionally, much of the accounting literature has been concerned with the 
control of plants and/or divisions by corporate executives. This topic lies outside 
the domain of this research, which is limited to control within the plant by its 
local senior management and the subordinates responsible for production. 
However, it is interesting to note that the ratios concerned with production, in 
the well established system of interfirm comparison, are restricted to measures of 
efficiency.
Behavioural scientists such as Argyris ( 1952) have undertaken a number of 
early studies into budgetary control systems, which have become integrated into 
the accounting literature. Arising from his research into budgets in a number of 
manufacturing plants, he concluded that budget supervisors were:
(a) operating the control system in a policing mode of control, and since 
being primarily concerned with 'adverse' variances, looking for things that 
were 'wrong'.
(b) reporting these 'errors' via the chain of command to their superior, 
with the foreman in whose department the adverse variance occurred 
eventually being informed of his 'mistake' through his own superior.
Argyris concluded that this system led to conflicts between foremen as they 
sought to put the blame for adverse variances on other departments. As a 
consequence, the plant manager's role became one of controlling the degree of 
inter-sectional conflict.
2.3 EVOLVING CONCEPTS OF CONTROL IN PRODUCTION LITERATURE
The impact of manufacturing strategy, Skinner ( 1978), Hayes & Wheelwright
(1984), Hill (1983), Japanese competition, Shingo ( I 981 ), and the 'new paradigm'.
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Abernathy et at.(1983), on the Taylorian concept of control of production in the 
POM literature, was noted earlier. The concept of managing production that is 
emerging, has not yet been welded into a coherent framework. The impact on the 
approach to controlling production is similarly incomplete, although seven facets 
of the changes from the traditional to revised paradigm of control can be ident­
ified. They are changes from:
(a) tactical to strategic perspectives
(b) a static to dynamic view of production
(c) managing complex systems to managing the system's complexity
(d) fragmented to integrated control
(e) quantitative to managerial perspective of production
(g) a low to high emphasis on knowledge and learning within production
(f) adding stepped to incremental improvements
The changes in concept, outlined above, are highly integrative, and need to be 
considered as a whole. Nevertheless, their individual complexities force them to 
be initially considered as separate, if sequential issues.
2.31 From Tactical to Strategic Perspectives
Short term operational issues have historically dominated manufacturing 
management, leading to reactive responses to strategic issues, Skinner ( 1978), Hill
(1985). Hill (1985) discusses the effects of a lack of a suitable language and set 
of concepts, on manufacturing managers taking a more proactive response. He 
argues that manufacturing's inherent complexity and the growing pressure to 
compete lead firms to adopt strategic short cuts within manufacturing. Recogn­
ition of the need for a strategic response from manufacturing has grown, mainly 
stimulated by the work of Skinner from 1966 onwards. Subsequently, maior 
developments of the concepts have been made by Hayes (1981), Wheelwright 
(1978,1981), Hayes & Wheelwright (1980) and Hill (1980,198 3,1985).
Although some similarity in the manufacturing strategies of companies in the 
same type of industry can be seen in "Manufacturing Future's Study", Meyer in 
Voss (1986b), the essence of strategy is tailoring a company's approach to its own 
circumstances. Processes for formulating a manufacturing strategy have been
devised by Skinner (1978), Hill (1980, 1985). Supporting this is Hill's (1983, 1985) 
'profile analysis' which provides a way of examining the coherence between the 
facets of the manufacturing system and the strategy and also checks for incon­
sistencies between the functions. Both Skinner's 1978, 'key manufacturing tasks' 
(KMTs) and Hill's 1985 'order qualifying criteria A order winning criteria', (OQC 
A OWC) provide a basis for linking the process of control with corporate prior­
ities. Both approaches help avoid the danger of 'simplistic measures of perform­
ance' warned about by Skinner (1978), and help overcome the 'excessive concern 
with short term measures by both line and corporate managers', Hill (1985), New
(1986). Some of Skinner's (1966) earlier ideas implied a retreat from mass 
production, in the face of increased competition, suggesting that American 
producers should:
"...replace the techniques, skills, facilities and even managers of an 
already outmoded concept of production."
This was subsequently countered in later publications on manufacturing 
strategy, where he demonstrates that firms could adopt a proactive approach to 
manufacturing by harnessing their production into a 'corporate weapon, as 
distinct from a corporate liability ', Skinner (1969, 1978). Manufacturing strategy 
links corporate strategy and operational systems, by concentrating the total 
manufacturing system on the company's key manufacturing tasks, Skinner (1978). 
A critical factor in the way manufacturing strategy affects control is through the 
integration of the specialist functions to achieve coherent goals, which support 
the firms' competitive priorities. Hayes A Wheelwright ( 198U> claim that:
"Again and again we have found that the root cause of a 'manufacturing 
crisis' has been that a business's manufacturing policies and people - 
workers, supervisors, and managers - have become incompatible with its 
facilities and technology choices, or that both have become inconsistent 
with its competitive needs. Even more subtly, facilities may still be 
consistent with policies, but the manufacturing organization that attempts 
to coordinate them may no longer be doing its |ob effectively."
The absence of an effective manufacturing strategy leads functional managers 
to make decisions, which although individually small are collectively significant 
for the future direction of the company, Twiss A Weinshall (1980).
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Manufacturing strategy affects the controllability of a plant by reducing the 
level of complexity via simplification through the 'plant within plant' and 'focus' 
concepts, Skinner (1978), Hayes *  Wheelwright (1979a & b, 198«*). Hill (1985), in 
particular, links focus and complexity, claiming that although some complexity is 
unavoidable in manufacturing, appropriate forms of 'focus' can significantly 
reduce its level. He argues that most plants do not recognize the extent to which 
complexity can be avoided and improve their costs and reduce their level of 
bureaucracy. The 'focus concept' thus suggests that the state of control and 
level of performance of a manufacturing system can be influenced by manipulating 
the product/process matrix, Hayes & Wheelwright (1979a & b). In some circum­
stances an effective route to control will stem from the design of the 'techno' and 
'infra' structures of the manufacturing process. The same authors also discuss 
the influence of the 'matrix' on the type of control system measures required. 
Manufacturing strategy also inf luences controllability through the issue of change 
and continuity. Manufacturing strategy recognizes the inevitability of change; 
both in direction and in level of achievement. Based on this recognition, it 
facilitates companies' abilities to exploit changes to achieve greater competit­
iveness. Changes in direction arise in order to meet new opportunities, and 
changes in level arise either in response to, or in anticipation of, competitive 
pressures. Thus, where protection of the technical core has led production to 
adopt the static concept of control systems used by Lockyer (1983), they would be 
at a disadvantage in bringing about these changes.
Maidique & Hayes < 198**) pose the question of how companies should balance 
their efforts between continuity and change. Continuity which is consistent with 
the steady state model, is easier to control and to support with control systems. 
It is, however, more difficult to achieve a state of control or to devise suitable 
controls, in periods of change. They suggest that at the corporate level, success­
ful firms tend to interface periods of stability with periods of '...tension, action 
and excitement...'. This implies a stepped change model of control and improve- 
At the operational level, however, there is clear evidence that thement.
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Japanese seek continuous, if rather small scale improvements, based on high levels 
of professional skill by their production managers, Schonberger (1982). Hayes it 
Wheelwright (198<*) reflect this requirement in their emphasis on the ability of 
production to achieve improved performance over time. They reinforce Skinner's 
earlier warning that control and improvement in production should not be seen 
simply in terms of cost control /  reduction. Instead it should be understood in the 
context of all the ways in which production performance can influence corporate 
success in the market place. Voss (1986a) similarly found that the 'dominant 
mode of managerial control was related to cost reduction and output maxim­
ization', despite the businesses having more market oriented goals. It follows 
that the state of control required to meet these criteria is both strategic and 
dynamic. The stepped and continuous incremental models of 'control and 
improvement' are not necessarily in conflict, with the latter being in between 
more capitally intense 'steps'.
The implications of manufacturing strategy are important for both the state of 
control and the design of control systems in production. In terms of 'control' the 
following issues arise. Wide differences in the type of control required by 
directors and foremen are revealed. Similarly, there are important differences in 
the control requirements between functional staff and line managers. In addition 
to those differences which can be attributed to the role of the manager concern­
ed, there are, as Meyer in Voss (1986b) showed, differences due to the type of 
problem faced by the company in its particular economic and social contexts. 
This is reflected in the degree of deviation from standard that can be tolerated 
and the speed of response required if deviation occurs. The controls need to 
reflect long term improvement in production performance, Hill (1983). It would 
seem appropriate that senior management should monitor the rate and direction of 
improvement achieved within production. Similarly, at the operational level, the 
manufacturing control system should enable routine control to be exercised and 
improvement accomplished. Hayes A Wheelwright (I9S<*), in their model of the 
four levels of manufacturing strategy, particularly emphasise the critical role
played by lower level management in accomplishing improvements in production 
performance. These improvements have to be monitored both for their direction 
and rate of progress. The managers achieving these improvements themselves 
need information in order to accomplish these goals. Hayes & Wheelwright also 
identify the difficulties of excessive use of short term, financially dominated, 
measures of performance. They claim that this directs attention to the near, 
rather than long term, performance. There is also a growing recognition by 
accountants that an organization's 'health* cannot be measured solely by its 
performance in terms of financial figures. Although individual manufacturing 
strategies have to be evaluated in terms of the needs of specific firms, there are, 
as Ferdows et al.(l986) show, significant differences in patterns between manu­
facturers in different continents. Ferdows et al. suggest that these differences 
reflect the extent of development in manufacturing strategy and manufacturing 
competences between these societies. Of particular significance to this research 
is their view that the current Japanese strategy emphasis on 'low cost' is the 
consequence of successfully managing to achieve high quality and good delivery 
and to implement process change. They contrast this strategic view of 'low cost' 
with the more immediate goal of 'low cost' found in European and American 
plants.
Ferdows e ta l.( 1986) imply that the Japanese have had differing manufacturing 
strategic priorities over the post war period. Abegglen & Stalk (198 5) give 
strong support to this perspective. Yet, in each of the phases, Japanese strat­
egic priority has relied on accomplishing a high level of manufacturing perform­
ance which is effectively integrated with the corporate strategy. It follows that 
managing directors require appropriate control reports, which enable them to 
evaluate the critical elements of manufacturing's support of corporate competit­
iveness.
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2.32 From a Static to Dynamic View of Production
The traditional model of production is based on high efficiency in an artific­
ially stable environment, created by the organization protecting it from the 
vagaries of the market, Thompson (1967). The traditional POM literature does 
not describe things in systems' terms, but it clearly implies seeking efficient 
performance by achieving a 'state of control', while avoiding the investment 
needed to counter the effects of uncertainty and complexity. This emphasis on 
stability in production, when combined with a Taylorian concept of the 'one- 
best-way', tended to lead to control systems reinforcing compliance to static 
levels of performance, Jaikumar *  Bohn (1986). In order to meet the changing 
requirements of the market place, major upheavals to the production system and 
its controls are made at irregular intervals. This can be either as a reaction or in 
anticipation of external factors. If the latter, the approach is similar to that of 
Maidique & Hayes (1986), who discuss major changes in a stepped manner. The 
emphasis in the traditional POM concept of attempts to maintain stability, and 
thus the use of static controls, can be seen in parts of the work of Constable & 
New (1976), Wild (198*0 and Lockyer (1983). All these authors exhibit a variety 
of approaches in their material, yet they all, at various times, reflect the need for 
stability in ways which can reinforce static controls. Wild (1986), and Lockyer
(1983), in particular use models of control taken from electrical and mechanical 
engineering. Lockyer, a proponent of the Watt regulator model of control for 
production, illustrates his view of control using a quote from Ewing on steam 
engines which emphasised their running at a steady, almost continuous pace. He 
states:
"This comment on steam engines applies with equal validity to industrial 
organizations."
Also
"Industrial organizations today are just as much in need of governors as 
were the machines in the beginning of the Industrial Revolution,"
(my emphasis).
Lockyer's mechanistic approach emphasises controls not control, and stability
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rather than change. Despite his mechanistic perspective, Lockyer also recog­
nizes the significance of 'a state of control', as implied in Tocher's (1970) defini­
tion of control, which he recommends:
" A production manager considers he has control over his works when he 
knows what w ill happen as a consequence of his actions and when he has 
sufficient choice to enable him to create the happening he wants."
The advent of increased competition in manufactured goods, and the develop­
ment of manufacturing strategy as a means of responding to this requirement, had 
led to change rather than continuity being seen as the dominant requirement of 
the production function, even though the dominant paradigm is static. Increased 
competition in manufactured goods requires a greater emphasis on effectiveness 
and improvement, Abernathy et al. (1983). They consider that the traditional 
goal of efficiency was so wide spread by the late 1960s and early 1970s that:
"With increases in size and technical complexity, it becomes more difficult 
to exercise d irect hierarchical control. Production management can no 
longer have an intimate knowledge of the various specialized and complex 
processes that are intrinsic to the manufacturing task. To avoid the 
danger of losing control of the task, management builds into the organiz­
ation impersonal processes of control to influence and regulate the work 
behaviour of those it employs."
Jaikumar (1989) and Wheelwright & Riggs (1983), also critic ize  these'static 
controls'. The latter categorize firms into polarized groups, either adopting 
'static' or 'dynamic' models. They claim that:
"...most organisations end up close to one extreme or the other, and few 
find themselves in an in-between position for any extended length of 
time."
This polarization is attributed to the organization structures and control 
processes adopted by most companies. As noted above, the change in emphasis 
from static to dynamic, reflects an awareness of production's potential to contri­
bute directly to corporate competitiveness. The traditional 'mechanistic' models 
of control are simply required to achieve planned performance, unaffected by 
competition. Abernathy et al.(1983), show that improved levels, and at times 
changes in direction, of performance are required from production systems. Thus 
static controls become inapplicable in competitive contexts.
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The emphasis on the need for production systems to improve their performance 
and, as necessary, change their priorities, has hidden the important principle 
outlined by Thompson. Even in periods of dynamic change, stability within the 
production system is required. The problem is with the transformation of system 
stability into static controls. The 'systems' concept of dynamic homeostasis is of 
relevance here. It shows changes in performance can occur, and where necessary 
internal restructuring take place, without destroying the essential internal 
stability. Japanese systems of production appear to incorporate a number of the 
elements necessary to enable the joint pursuit of stability and improvement. The 
goal of s tability , however, has not relied solely on protecting the production 
system from the uncertainties, within and without manufacturing. Rather they 
come from engineering the production technology and procedures so that all 
unnecessary complexity and uncertainty are removed.
We noted earlier that improvement in manufacturing performance can be 
achieved by either step or incremental changes, Hayes & Wheelwright (I98<*). 
Step changes generally come from major investments in the process technologies 
or infrastructural system. Incremental changes come from small scale manipul­
ation of the existing technologies or infrastructure. The two approaches can be 
complementary, with incremental improvements being accomplished in between 
the step changes. Indeed, Ferdows et al.(1986) appear to suggest that the 
Japanese emphasis on incremental improvements helps them develop better 
process technologies 'in house'. However, the conditions necessary to accomplish 
a significant level of incremental improvements, are not consistent with those 
under the sta tic  control model, discussed in texts such as Lockyer (1983), and Wild 
(198<*). The step and incremental routes to improvement require different 
sources of information. Similarly, senior management need to monitor different 
aspects of performance. Major step changes are likely to strengthen the position 
of staff groups as they liaise with equipment designers and suppliers. Incre­
mental improvement, however, can be more strongly linked with line management.
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Two forms of the incremental model have been considered. The first is a 
theoretical framework by Jaikumar 6c Bohn (198<t), in which they propose a series 
of experiments to be conducted as a basis for improving the rate of learning and 
thus knowledge about the processes. The second form is much more empirically 
based, being derived from Japanese manufacturing practice.
The principles of how this has been accomplished are explained in the follow­
ing sections, dealing with complexity, trade-offs, organization and knowledge / 
learning.
2.33 From Managing Complex Systems to Managing the Systems' Complexity
The traditional model of production is based on recognizing the complexity of 
the production system. Starr (1971) considers complexity to be a critical factor 
in the management of production:
"The core of operations difficulties is that there are so many different 
problems encountered each day and so many reasonable arrangements 
(billions, trillions) for meeting quality, quantity, schedule and cost with 
differing kinds of satisfaction."
The traditional model of the production manager's task recognizes a trade-off 
between coping with complexity and performance levels. Where the task compl­
exity exceeds the capability of the production system, a trade-off in performance 
is, at least temporarily, inevitable. This may lead production management into 
'fire  fighting* their problems in the short term. Hutton 6c Lawrence ( 1978, 1979), 
Daly et al.(!985) have noted that British production management are more likely 
to adopt this response, than their Continental counterparts. A number of altern­
ative approaches exist. One discussed in the organizational literature is to use 
standard rules and procedures to restrict the e ffects of uncertainty, and thus 
complexity, Galbraith (1973). This could take the form of customer queues, 
restrictions on the rate of product development, product /  component standard­
ization etc. Where competition is e ffective, these devices to restrict complexity 
work against the needs of the market place. The result is often expensive
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redesign of the production system and management procedures. The classical 
case of this is the year long delay to Ford's production, when they eventually 
responded to General Motors' product innovation, Abernathy (1978). The tradit­
ional POM paradigm is reactive. It seeks to manage in a complex world, with 
little  emphasis on proactively changing the conditions that led to the complexity. 
Thus, in order to handle the prevailing complexity, management are forced into 
developing increasingly sophisticated information systems. Ferdows et al.(l986) 
found that American manufacturers were significantly more disposed towards 
using advanced MIS than were their Japanese counterparts, who preferred to 
emphasise greater simplicity.
An alternative, more proactive approach, is via manufacturing strategy. 
There the emphasis might be on the focus concept, plant-within-plant concept and 
/  or building the capability of the techno and infrastructures to respond to the 
market place requirements. Part of this process may lie in explaining to others, 
(e.g. marketing and financial staff), the significance to production, when high 
levels of complexity are demanded. This includes helping them to recognize the 
likely effects on the level of performance. Hill (1980), while accepting the 
complex nature of production, argues that:
"...operations managers have failed to explain the complexity they control 
in a way which helps others to understand the issues and trade-offs 
involved."
This view reinforces the idea that the design of the manufacturing task 
provides a critical and possibly overlooked vehicle for accomplishing the desired 
state of control within production.
Skinner's (1978) '..the outmoded concept of ... mass production* and 
Abernathy's (1983) '..the de-maturation of production', both discuss the idea that 
the conventional paradigm of large volume manufacturing of standardized prod­
ucts, with its high complexity, is under challenge.
A third highly proactive approach to the management of complexity is found in
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the Japanese system of production management. Their emphasis is on reducing 
the factors that lead to complexity, so that the system can be managed effect­
ively. This enables them to combine internal stability in the production function 
and to accommodate the need of the market to be dynamic. The Japanese also 
place considerable emphasis on the reduction of uncertainty, which takes many 
forms. These range from plant maintenance systems that ensure reliable machine 
availability, quality systems that provide predictably high quality products to the 
next work station (as well as the customers), to employee absenteeism /  turnover 
levels which ensure a constant availability of skilled workers to meet the evenly 
loaded production schedules. The JIT and KANBAN systems also aim to provide 
predictable performance, within the plant and from suppliers. A link can be made 
between these efforts to reduce complexity and the small scale incremental 
changes discussed above. Many of the improvements have come from either 
observation of problems on the shop floor or from deliberately exposing the line to 
increased difficulty to discover its next weakest link, Schonberger (1982). As 
will be discussed below, this radically d ifferent approach to tackling complexity 
has significant implications for the way problems are resolved, the information /  
knowledge required in the production system and for the relative roles of the 
members of the staff functions in the firm. The critical characteristic of the 
Japanese system of POM, in terms of its effect on control and controls, is the 
(implied) emphasis on 'the state of control' through engineering the technical and 
managerial systems. This, in turn, simplifies the task of the control systems. 
Ferdows et al.(l986) observe that the Japanese manufacturers place greater 
importance on seeking improvements in performance via the role of 'simplicity' 
than do their European and American counter parts. The latter still place much 
greater emphasis on the design of MIS, w ith the stress on controls rather than 
control. Their comparisons show that while all the groups acknowledge product 
quality as a critical component of competitiveness, it is the Japanese who prior­
itize process yields etc. Such achievements are closely linked with development 
of simple and robust manufacturing systems.
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2.3*» From Fragmented to Integrated Control
A further consequence of Taylor's (1911) attempt to remove '..control., out of 
the hands of the ..many workmen ,.in..(to) the hands of management..' has been 
the growth of staff specialists.
We noted the view by Checkland in Wilson et al.(l983) that specialists lead to 
conflict between organizational sub-systems, and that optimization of one sub­
system could lead to sub-optimization of the overall system. Checkland consid­
ered this to be the critical issue affecting systems' theory in production manage­
ment. To limit this e ffect, restrictions can be placed on the extent of changes 
made to these sub-systems. This constraint is important when coordination of the 
whole is becoming more critical than the maximization of any one of the sub­
systems, Constable A New (1976).
Woodward ( 1970) showed that as control systems become more mechanistic, 
there is a tendency for functional staff to take over their design and operation. 
The result may be the isolation of production management into users, rather than 
initiators of control systems for their own functions. It may also lead to a 
growth in 'controls' as staff seek to prove their value to the organization. 
Abernathy et al.(l983) support this view, claiming that, where organizational size 
is large and complexity high, line managers become increasingly distanced from 
the processes of control.
Among the many providers of control information, three manufacturing 
functions, industrial engineering, production control and quality control, are 
particularly relevant to this thesis. Accountants provide a fourth specialist 
function critical to the control of production, but do not form part of this study. 
Generally, they act outside the umbrella of the manufacturing structure, even 
when providing internal 'operating' information. As Argyris( 1932) highlighted in 
the 1930s, staff specialists, (in his case budget supervisors), are likely to report to
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senior management variances between performance and budget as 'mistakes', thus, 
not only triggering line and staff conflicts, but also line -  line conflicts as the 
pressure to avoid these 'mistakes' occurring on their reports leads managers to 
'blame' other line managers for the conditions that 'made' the variance inevitable.
The line and staff structure is so ingrained into the fabric of manufacturing 
organizations, that, despite acknowledging the problems that occur, most writers 
still, if reluctantly, support the status quo. Constable 6c New (1976), while 
generally reflecting the traditional line and staff structure, advocate the import­
ance of operations managers acting as synthesisers of the overall system. Similar 
views are expressed by Hill (1983), who, although generally taking a strong 
production emphasis, still supports the line and staff approach arguing that:
"In order to control this relatively large system, the POM tasks are broken 
down in functions each with their own set of activities."
Discussing the question of analysis, he comments that:
"This is often best accomplished through specialization, which is currently 
used by most organizations as the basis for controlling their activities."
He balances this by warning of the danger of specialists who perceive the 
organization's interests from their own, often narrow, point of view. Thus, like 
Constable 6c New, he calls for the operations manager:
"..to build back these functional views into the total system in order to 
ensure the overall system's performance is improved."
Hill's approach is best understood in the context of his advocacy of manufact­
uring strategy. Without the support of such a strategy, few production managers 
are likely to take the proactive stance he recommends. The development of 
manufacturing strategy has stimulated a re-examination of the role of specialists 
and the control systems they tend to dominate. In particular, the infrastructure 
component of manufacturing strategy has led to a new level of clarity about the 
role of specialist staff. Hill (1983) points out the need for specialists to have:
"..a shared awareness of what is required in manufacturing, if it is to best 
support the current and future needs of the business."
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He points out that this shared awareness often does not exist, as staff funct­
ions have grown in size and power and no longer (in some cases) report to senior 
manufacturing managers. He considers this has led to a loss of integration at the 
strategic level, which cannot adequately be made up for at the tactical and 
operational levels. Should this be so, it suggests that this reporting to higher 
organizational levels, outside the manufacturing hierarchy, leads from the provi­
sion of information to support the line manager towards information which reports 
on the line manager's performance. There is little  doubt that the majority of 
accounting systems report on the efficiency, rather than effectiveness, dimen­
sions of the manufacturing manager's task. This emphasis on efficiency is in 
general inadequately countered by other staff specialists' control reports reflect­
ing the wider competitive criteria discussed by Skinner (I97S) or Hill (1983).
Hill (1985) builds on Skinner's (1978) earlier theme of enhancing the infra­
structure to ensure that all functions integrate with the manufacturing task. He 
is particularly concerned that the staff functions and resulting control systems 
recognize the complexity of the manufacturing task:
"Firms need the function and specialist capabilities to make sense of the 
complexity. Without these inputs, firms cannot reach the level of effect­
iveness necessary to meet today's competitive pressures."
Schonberger (1982) gives an alternative to the traditional POM perspective, 
when he outlines the Japanese approach to the respective roles of line and staff 
managers. He states that:
"...the Japanese rely little  on staff specialists. The worker and managers 
are the focal point, and innovations concerning productivity and quality 
management are nurtured on the shopfloor, not in someone's office."
He contends that Western countries emphasise the staff role, leading to '...a 
closed ended approach to improvements in performance.' He considers this has 
led to one-time 'step changes' in productivity. This is contrasted with the 
Japanese system, with its greater emphasis on small incremental changes, which 
tends to trigger other rounds of improvements. Hayes & Wheelwright (198«*) 
support this perspective.
The dominance of technical experts is considered by Skinner (1978) to be a 
maior source of distortion in firms* firstly through over emphasis on the tactical 
at the expense of the strategic issues, and secondly from adopting narrow funct­
ional perspectives of the firms' activities. He contends that:
"For 50 years management relied on efficiency experts trained in the 
techniques of Fredrick W. Taylor. Industrial Engineers were the kings of 
the factory."
He also discusses the adverse effects these industrial engineers had on 
manager-worker relations which at that time were not adequately recognized.
Increases in the number of, and sophistication of, the staff based control 
systems has generally led to concern over high ratios of total employees to direct 
operatives. This has come from reductions in direct labour numbers and increases 
in staff levels. While not intrinsically wrong, such phenomena, taken in conjunct­
ion with evidence that British ratios are generally higher than those obtained by 
competitor nations, N.E.D.C. (1978), and a lack of evidence that such ratios have 
provided a competitive advantage, led to a questioning of the emphasis on staff 
based controls. Not only are there difficulties associated with measuring and 
controlling indirect and staff costs, compared with direct labour costs, but as 
Skinner and Hill showed, there are very real risks that these staff functions can 
mis-direct the control efforts.
2.35 From a Quantitative to a Managerial Perspective of Production
The growth in complexity of manufacturing systems, combined with Taylor's 
emphasis on scientific management and the expansion of staff specialization, is 
reflected in the use of the quantified methods used by the industrial engineers, as 
noted by Skinner (1978). The development of work study and later operational 
research led in an integrated form to industrial engineering, which sought to 
adopt the more routimzed quantitative techniques of the operational researchers 
to recurring problems in production. This strengthened the quantitative orient­
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ation in production management, Barnes (1963), Mundel (1967). The industrial 
engineering and operational research approaches tended to dominate the content 
of courses in production (management). Delmar ( 1985) reports that even as late 
as the 1960s American Colleges and Universities based their production manage­
ment courses on 'a combination of Industrial Engineering and Business topics'. He 
contends that even this was approached from a staff perspective and often taught 
by those versed only in theory. This emphasis on quantification reflected 
American perception of production operations management as an amalgamation of 
industrial engineering and operations research, Bohn (1984).
An example of the use of simple quantified methods in examining recurring 
problems of control is the 'economic order quantity' model, Harris (1915). It 
seeks to optimize the trade-offs in performance between two or more conflicting 
factors. This approach' eventually led to the modern systems in production 
control. Subsequently in the late 1920s and 1930s major developments in quality 
control arose, reinforced in the immediate post war period by 3uran (194 5) and 
Deming (1950). Increases in complexity from company size and the need for 
higher performance led, over the years, to the development of increasingly 
sophisticated quantitative methods. This led in some cases to 'Operational 
Research' groups being the primary teachers of production management.
The early developments in work study were most significant in terms of the 
control of labour, through work measurement and in terms of management's ability 
to stipulate the means of accomplishing the prescribed task, Taylor (1911), 
Gilbreth (1911). More recently, under the influence of manufacturing strategy, 
the emphasis has moved to the managerial rather than the quantitative perspect­
ive, Constable 4  New (1976), Hill (1980, 1985). The American literature tends to 
seek an amalgamation of the quantitative and managerial perspective, Buffa
(1983) , Chase 4  Aquilano (1981), Delmar (1985), Schroeder (1985). Similar 
quantitative emphasis can be found in some British texts, Lockyer (1983), Wild
(1984) . One factor influencing American texts in adopting a more quantified
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emphasis is the need to meet the criteria of the Collegiate validating POM 
programs.
Manufacturing strategy has widened the perspective, from optimising trade­
offs at the operational level to consideration of the effects of these 'infrastruct­
ural techniques' on companies' abilities to compete. It remains a trade-off 
concept, but at a strategic level. The staff functions, designing and operating 
these planning and control systems, are now required to achieve compatible goals, 
focused on supporting manufacturing's efforts to satisfy the corporate strategy.
Japanese manufacturing practices reflect a different perspective on theuseof 
quantitative techniques. This is illustrated in a comparison between EOQ, to find 
the minimum combined ordering costs and holding costs, with JIT, which minimizes 
the size of batches. JIT does not deny the mathematics of EOQ, rather it 
challenges the assumption of a fixed setup time, in order to accomplish the 
smaller batch sizes wanted by the Japanese. Attention is directed to reducing 
setup times, rather than mathematically optimizing the existing setup and carry­
ing costs. The focus is thus shifted to the manufacturing process and the shop 
floor as the basis of control. Similarly, modern quality control has put emphasis 
on the design of the process as the basis of control and improvement, Ford 
( 1984a,b Sc c). This is not because the Japanese are unskilled in the quantitative 
techniques, but because they put their emphasis on production systems which lead 
to greater simplicity, and thus less complexity. As a consequence they do not 
require the same reliance on quantitative techniques, Schonberger (1982).
2.36 From a Low to High Emphasis on Knowledge and Learning within Production
The above has revealed a distinction between the American and Japanese 
approaches to learning. Abernathy et al.(198 3) claim that American manufact­
urers find it difficult toi
"...(build) ..and guide an organization that is altogether responsive to an 
ongoing process of learning - about markets about technology, about 
production systems and about linkages among them."
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Conversely, Hayes & Wheelwright (I98<») note that the Japanese place consid­
erable emphasis on continually building the skills of the workers, who are trained
to:
"... continually search for new ways to eliminate potential disruptions and 
improve overall performance."
They also report a similar difference in skills between North American and 
German production management. The Germans are considered to put much 
greater emphasis on achieving a high level of technical competence in the lower 
levels of the plant's hierarchy. Daly et al.(l985) support the same perspective 
with their comparative study of German and U.K. foremen, with the former being 
primarily technically skilled, although also having some managerial training. The 
emphasis on developing the skills of low level members of the organization helps 
to bring about a different form of control, because these skills contribute to 
reductions in the complexity and uncertainty within production, thus reducing the 
need for controls. The priority in the U.K. appears to be historically the reverse 
of the German and Japanese approaches. The shop floor skills are treated as less 
important than staff skills. It can be argued that this lack of emphasis on skills 
in the U.K. creates a self fulfilling situation, where staff become essential. 
However, this lack of skills in U.K. manufacturing has received renewed attention, 
suggesting that 'training', at least in a few plants, will be given much greater 
attention than previously, Goodndge (1986).
Not only is the Japanese approach based on learning, but, like the German 
model, improvements are sought lower down the hierarchy than in the American 
model. Hayes (1981), in a now famous observation, reveals that the Japanese 
'..pursue the last grain of rice', indicating that they seek to learn and improve 
beyond the point considered economically |ustifiable by American manufacturers. 
This commitment to continual small scale improvements is supported in his refer­
ence to them as '...smart and industrious - and never satisfied.' To support this 
commitment to learning, Jerome's (1961) view that senior management must treat 
variances as a source of learning and not simply as mistakes, is likely to be a
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critical factor. Hayes *  Wheelwright (1989) claim that the Japanese differ (from 
American managers) in that they are more supportive to workers who report 
'mistakes'.
Learning needs to be linked to knowledge about the critical issues and not 
sought for its own sake. Hayes (1981) and Wheelwright (1981) report different 
views on Japanese practice. Hayes considers that they« '...regard all problems as 
important', while Wheelwright considers that they:
"...pay a great deal more than lip service to the goal of making production 
and strategy mutually supportive."
Much less emphasis on learning is found in Western based production manage­
ment literature. Some recognition of the need for improvement is given in 
Schmenner (1981), Chase & Aquilano (1981); the latter considering 'updating' 
indicating learning leading to periodic discrete step changes in performance. 
Conversely the Japanese emphasis is on continuous learning and improvement. 
These improvements are reported to arise from a combination of mastery of 
traditional knowledge and the development of new knowledge to overcome the 
traditional limitations upon performance, Shingo (1981).
The importance of knowledge and learning in bringing about improvement is 
not new. Taylor (1911) promoted increased knowledge via scientific management 
and Jerome (1961) emphasised its importance in executive control, advocating the 
design of control systems which enhance management's ability to learn. Similarly 
Rosenberg (1982), claimed the 'capability to use technical knowledge' was the 
distinguishing characteristic between static and dynamically oriented firms. 
Technology in this context is not necessarily sophisticated machines and comput­
ers, but is used in Perrow's (1967) wider sense, which embraces knowledge.
The training given to production managers and workers in control and improve­
ment is critical to the acquisition of knowledge and thus learning. Studies reveal 
considerable differences in the levels of supervisory training used in theU.K. and
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West German companies, Hutton & Lawrence (1978, 1979), Sorge *  Warner 
(1980), Daly et al.(1983). Taken collectively their work supports the view that 
supervisory training in the U.K. receives substantially less emphasis, both in terms 
of engineering skills and managerial practice. The view of a German plant 
manager, as reported by Daly et al.(1985) is considered significant in this context.
"Three quarters of all improvements in productivity are achieved through 
ensuring an adequate documentation of exact machine-setting; ensuring 
that all parts are available and are of the right dimensions; that all 
drawings and measuring devices are available; that all involved know how 
to do the |obs; that the product design is appropriate; that the manufact­
uring and operation sheets are well prepared before work begins, and that 
no corrections will be necessary as production proceeds. This clear work 
method has to take place within a clean factory with clean machines and 
in an atmosphere of order and discipline. These are the responsibilities of 
the Meistcr and engineers; if unforeseen interruptions take place, these 
men are sufficiently well trained to know how to analyse the problem and 
act accordingly."
Much of that quoted by the German plant manager might be simply described 
as establishing good practice. However, such statements should not be lightly 
dismissed unless there is clear evidence that such 'good practice' is already 
clearly and effectively followed inU .K . plants.
The new emphasis on learning represents a challenge to the conventional view 
of Thompson's (1967) concern to protect the technical core. New knowledge 
destroys the capital invested in old knowledge and skills, Hayes A Wheelwright 
(1989). The static model is of controls protecting existing capital and knowledge, 
but at the cost of reduced learning, and thus limiting production's capability to 
compete in new ways.
A common theme in manufacturing strategy, the new paradigm and Japanese 
manufacturing techniques is the importance of knowledge and learning. Skinner 
(1978), and Hill (1980,1983) both showed that improvements need to support the 
critical manufacturing tasks if they are not to be simply changes.
Norman & Bahiri (1972), reporting the earlier work of Swan in 1966, show that
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West German companies, Hutton 6c Lawrence (1978, 1979), Sorge *  Warner 
(1980), Daly et al.(198)). Taken collectively their work supports the view that 
supervisory training in the U.K. receives substantially less emphasis, both in terms 
of engineering skills and managerial practice. The view of a German plant 
manager, as reported by Daly et al.(1983) is considered significant in this context.
"Three quarters of all improvements in productivity are achieved through 
ensuring an adequate documentation of exact machine-setting; ensuring 
that all parts are available and are of the right dimensions; that all 
drawings and measuring devices are available; that all involved know how 
to do the jobs; that the product design is appropriate; that the manufact­
uring and operation sheets are well prepared before work begins, and that 
no corrections will be necessary as production proceeds. This clear work 
method has to take place within a clean factory with clean machines and 
in an atmosphere of order and discipline. These are the responsibilities of 
the Meister and engineers; if unforeseen interruptions take place, these 
men are sufficiently well trained to know how to analyse the problem and 
act accordingly."
Much of that quoted by the German plant manager might be simply described 
as establishing good practice. However, such statements should not be lightly 
dismissed unless there is clear evidence that such 'good practice' is already 
clearly and effectively followed in U.K. plants.
The new emphasis on learning represents a challenge to the conventional view 
of Thompson's (1967) concern to protect the technical core. New knowledge 
destroys the capital invested in old knowledge and skills, Hayes 6c Wheelwright 
(198<*). The static model is of controls protecting existing capital and knowledge, 
but at the cost of reduced learning, and thus limiting production's capability to 
compete in new ways.
A common theme in manufacturing strategy, the new paradigm and Japanese 
manufacturing techniques is the importance of knowledge and learning. Skinner 
(1978), and Hill (1980,198)) both showed that improvements need to support the 
critical manufacturing tasks if they are not to be simply changes.
Norman 6c Bahiri ( 1972), reporting the earlier work of Swan in 1966, show that
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a lack of knowledge, at executive level, about modern techniques and suitable 
information, had been a major contributing factor in 50% of business failures in 
the Yorkshire /  Humberside region. Fourteen years later Lockyer et al. in the
Bradford study (1980) showed that there was still a substantial shortfall in 
management knowledge on this topic.
2.37 Adding Incremental to Stepped Changes in Performance
Hayes A Wheelwright (1989) discuss '...an inherent bias against small incre­
mental improvements..' in the way general managers evaluate changes in their 
manufacturing systems. They argue that general managers need to recognize 
that much of the improvement in technology depends on making a large number of 
relatively small changes in working practices, and much less from a few major 
technological breakthroughs. Such progress requires a series of small steps based 
on knowledge within the firm rather than from without.
The specialist field of quality control affords powerful insights into the basis 
of control. Although it identifies the necessity of achieving compliance with 
standards, it places great significance on process control as the means used to 
achieve the results. The emphasis in effective quality control is ensuring that 
the productive system is in 'a state of control', by linking this with the concept of 
'fitness for use', which is a dynamic, customer oriented approach. There is the 
implicit recognition that to be 'in control* the productive system has to respond to 
external changes in requirements. Thus, it must be capable of control by comply­
ing with the transient standards and 'in control' through adapting to higher 
requirements.
As noted above the Japanese companies place considerable importance on 
improvement and attention to detail, Abernathy et al. (1981), Hayes (1981), 
Wheelwright (1981) and Schonberger (1982). Three elements can be identified in 
the Japanese approach. The first is seeking radical solutions to traditional
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production problems, such as JIT, KANBAN, Total Quality Control, Shingo (1981). 
The second is exercising traditional production skills such as improving setup 
times, plant layout, equipment design, and quality procedures, at exceptionally 
high levels of professional competence. The third is seeking improvements 
beyond the level considered economically justified by many Western companies, 
Hayes's ( 1981) '...the last grain of rice.'
One of the exceptions to the general lack of emphasis on learning as a com­
ponent of the production manager's task is Chase & Aquilano ( I 981). Using a life  
cycle approach to POM they argue that it is important to 'update' the production 
system during its 'steady state' stage. Even here, however, the emphasis is on 
periodic reviews, which are implicitly staff led:
"...the implementation of major revisions of the productive systems in the 
light of changes in demand, organizational goals, technology and manage­
ment."
Even this relatively proactive stance appears to operate on a Taylorian 
premise that the current production system is correct for the current circumst­
ances. They discuss updating only in terms of reacting to changes in circumst­
ances. There is no evidence that such updating is seen as a means of initiating a 
competitive advantage through a superior capability. This view of adaptation 
contrasts with that of Klein, discussed earlier. Not only did she advocate smaller 
more frequent improvements, but she looked for amore proactive response within 
the production function.
2.9 EVOLVING PRACTICES OF CONTROL
Many of the changes in the concepts of control discussed earlier stem from 
advances in industrial practice. The following section examines the competitive 
pressures that have led to these changes, the form they have taken and the impact 
they are having on the practice of control.
32
2.*»I The Competitive Pressures for Change
The implications of increased competition in manufactured goods has been 
widely recognized, Abernathy et al. (1983), Hayes & Wheelwright (198**) Schroeder
(1985), as a major threat to existing practices of production management. The 
progress achieved by these emergent manufacturing societies is not a new phen­
omenon; the newness is the awareness of the challenge. The significance of this 
build up in competitiveness lies in the skills and competences that support the 
achievements, Hayes (1981). The recent wave of study visits to Japan reflect its 
progress in competitiveness and these have shown the depth in infrastructural 
effort needed to sustain such achievements.
Adachi et al.( 1982) show that Japanese concern for quality and improvement 
pre-dated their rise as a world class competitor, after the second world war. 
They instance the effort in the 1920s of Mr.Ezoe of N.G.K. spark plugs to achieve 
American standards of performance. This included removal from the market of 
the company's entire output, in a period when '...a  few defects were spotted.' So 
resolute was this pursuit of quality, that Mr. Ezoe was eventually removed from 
office by the military command for refusing to compromise quality to achieve 
higher output, during the second world war. While he might not have been 
representative of pre-war Japanese industrialists, there is little  doubt that his 
modern counter parts would share some of this approach. This is not to claim 
that the Japanese have not harnessed technological and managerial transfer from 
the West. Adachi et al.(l982) trace many of the efforts at technological transfer 
in the automotive assembly and component industries and these include Graham- 
Page in 1937, Austin in 1952, and Rootes in 1952-3. They report a change in 
emphasis in technological transfers in the late  1950s, switching from products to 
equipment. Similar 'managerial' transfers have taken place particularly in the 
field of quality. The effect of Shewhart, Demmg etc. has been extensively
recorded elsewhere.
The search for knowledge from overseas sources was stimulated by powerful 
internal competition, Adachi et al.(l982), who reported the severity of price 
competition being so intense that the price of a Nissan Blue Bird in Japan declined 
from 700,000 to 500,000 yen in the period 1959 to 1965. Similarly, Shingo (1981) 
reports a long period of commitment to improvements and more effective control 
by Toyota, dating back to 19<*5.
The concrete levels of achievement of Japanese manufacturing have been 
documented in a number of sources. Abernathy et al.(1983) report new entrants 
to the 'pump' market developing products at 50% of the previous market price and 
thus over a five year period driving Ingersoll-Rand out of the Japanese market; 
similarly, they had shown (1981) Japanese cars being landed in the U.S.A. at 30% 
below American costs. Clarke & Banks (1983) support this latter perspective. 
Haydon (1980), a Ford executive, reported Toyota being able to achieve 'first run 
capability of paintshops at 95%, compared with Dagenham's 50%.' British 
Leyland (1985), five years later, claim to achieve a 90% capability. Haydon also 
reported inefficiency level comparisons of *»9% at Ford and 20% at Toyo Kogyo.
2.<»2 The Forum of New Practices of Control in Production
Many of the changes introduced by the Japanese production systems can in 
retrospect be linked to the process of control. C ritical characteristics are 
reductions in the operating system's complexity and removal of unnecessary 
uncertainty. Shingo (1981) outlining the 'improvement of process', highlights the 
multi-functional attack of the Japanese and identifies both the value analysis and 
industrial engineering as central vehicles in improving manufacturing processes. 
It should be noted that his reference to industrial engineering is closer in practice 
to British 'production engineering' than work study. Although reference is made 
to Gilbreth and use is made of the American Society of Mechanical Engineering 
symbols, the technological nature of the conversion process changes discussed are 
closer to production engineering than work study.
2 A 3 Aims and Mechanisms of Executive C ontro l o f Production
Executive control of production has been strongly influenced by the 'profit 
centre' model. However, a number of accountants consider this model to be 
inappropriate as a basis for the evaluation of production, as many of the factors 
determining profit fall outside the compass of production management. Cost 
centre consequently plays a more critical role in this context. Yet, as De Coster 
& Schafer (1979) discuss, this is an incomplete approach, as it only recognizes the 
efficiency and not the effectiveness of production. They advocate supple­
mentary cost data, with other measures, which indicate the value to the plant 
from production's performance. We already know from quality control, Juran 
(197a) that value is assigned by the customer and is changeable through time. 
Constable it New (1976) discuss the evaluation of production's performance by 
senior plant management. They do not explicitly link evaluation with strategy, 
but instead they concentrate on a series of trends and ratios.
A consensus has emerged, however, in the manufacturing strategy and the new 
paradigm literatures, that production can and should form a major ingredient in 
many firms' corporate competitiveness, Skinner (1978), Abernathy et al.( 1983), 
Hill (1985). Implicit in this recognition is the assumption that senior executives 
will seek to link the evaluation of production with their corporate objectives. 
Thus, the evaluation of production could be expected to include an explicit 
strategic perspective. Hill (1985) is clearly aware of the need for investments in 
manufacturing to be linked to the corporate and manufacturing strategies. He 
also identified a need to link the manufacturing task and the assessment of 
current performance. His criticism of the contribution of conventional account­
ing data to evaluating production performance is heavily based on the observat­
ions of Kaplan ( 198aa).
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2.5 CONCLUSIONS
The literature review has revealed three approaches to the process of control 
in production. The first approach is more strictly a state of a 'loss-of-control', 
more commonly referred to as fire fighting, Hutton 6c Lawrence (1979), Daly et 
al.(l985). It occurs when production, failing to achieve necessary levels of 
performance, undertakes strenuous efforts to accomplish its immediate obiectives. 
However, in doing so it moves from problem to problem, without resolving the 
underlying causes, resulting in the same cause giving rise to similar problems in 
the future. The second approach, represented by Lockyer's mechanistic models 
based on the Watt regulator, is known as the 'control and command model', 
Jaikumar (1984). It seeks to maintain stability of the production function and in 
doing so it resolves most of the recurring problems faced by the 'fire  fighters'. 
However, because many managers perceive the production function to be complex, 
and in many instances do not see it as a strategic vehicle of competitiveness, they 
seek to maintain an essentially static level of performance, in between changes 
induced by staff groups. These step changes in production's capability to 
perform can lead to improved production performance, either through more 
advanced technology in production or through more sophisticated, often computer 
based systems of control, (i.e. MRPll). The third approach is based on the 
Japanese model of production management, in which small scale incremental 
improvements are made by production management and its staff to the manufact­
uring processes and control systems. These improvements are complementary to 
the larger, step changes in the second approach. They frequently lead to reduct­
ions in the level of difficulty in the manufacturing task, by reducing the level of 
uncertainty and complexity. The reduced level of difficulty is in turn taken back 
up in seeking to accomplish either revised tasks or higher levels of performance, 
which add to corporate competitiveness.
Although these approaches can be detected in the POM literature, there is 
little  recognition until recently that alternatives existed to the lower level
approaches. Implicit within the progression through these approaches is that 
control is accomplished jointly through the mastery of the production process, as 
well as through the more commonly recognized control systems. While this was 
clearly recognized in the early period of scientific management, it has largely 
been neglected until the Japanese restored its application. Thus, production 
management theory has not adequately addressed a number of important issues:-
(a) What is the link between manufacturing strategy and control?
(b) What are the roles of managing directors and production managers in 
bringing it about?
(c) What, if any, differences in information are needed in the alternative 
approaches to control-improvement ?
(d) What, if any, differences in analysis are required between the 
approaches?
(e) What is the significance of training levels in production in successfully 
operating the higher level approaches to control-improvement ?
Thus, as Twiss ( 1986) suggested in an editorial looking forward to the future
of Production Management in the 1990s, we are in a period of change in which
the traditional paradigms are under challenge. The extent and means to which
changes actually occur are examined below.
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3. METHOD OF STUDY
3.1 PROBLEMS OF DESIGNING THE RESEARCH
The design of the research process was based on consideration of three issues. 
The first was the balance between techniques and the philosophy of control in 
production. A bias towards techniques would have facilitated challenges to 
specific mechanisms of control, while a bias towards philosophy would have 
facilitated challenges to the process of control. Second was the choice between 
a tightly consistent approach across all research sites, compared with a sequential 
development of the research process. The former would have enhanced the 
comparison between sites, while the latter offered scope for greater insight into 
the process of control, as I increased my understanding of the problems involved. 
The third issue was the choice between a narrow versus wide spread of research 
sites. The former would achieve greater depth in a few situations but would 
increase the difficulty of finding suitable examples of the expected variety of 
practices.
3.11 Techniques versus the Philosophy of Control
The control of production embraces both techniques and philosophy: both are 
important. Historically research in production management has tended to empha­
sise quantitative techniques such as Economic Order Modelling, Scheduling, 
Quality Control etc. Research concerned with the philosophy of control and with 
human behaviour and even strategic considerations, although equally important, 
has received less attention directly from production specialists. The develop­
ment of manufacturing policy and the success of the 'Japanese philosophy' of 
production management has led to renewed interest in the philosophies and 
concepts underpinning the techniques of control.
Easterby-Smith in Chapman (1985) argues that different research strategies 
are needed for these approaches. He has labelled them 'hard' and 'soft' research. 
An important distinction between hard and soft research processes is the emphasis 
in the hard model on 'facts and figures', compared with the emphasis in the soft
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model on the interpretation of facts and the role of the 'knower'.
This research adopted a bias towards the'soft' approach in order to emphasise 
the managerial framework of control. Advancing the techniques of control, while 
recognized as important, was considered less significant than developing a 
framework within which the many approaches to the control of production could 
be understood and a path to the more effective approaches identified.
3.12 Consistent versus Developmental Research Processes
The aim of developing a framework encapsulating the various approaches to 
the control of production required that the data collection methods reflected both 
consistencies and differences in practices of control. The collection methods 
needed to reflect factors that were common and which differed between the cases 
in respect of their approaches to the control of production.
Adopting an entirely consistent approach would have led to three difficulties. 
Firstly, it would hide or minimize the impact of any differences in circumstances 
affecting the sites and thus their control process. This would be particularly 
noticeable in terms of the differing competitive goals set within the various sites. 
Secondly, a number of the concepts, noticeably those of the 'key manufacturing 
tasks' and the 'order winning criteria ' had been designed to be used in prescrip­
tive ways. These techniques had not been used or tested for use in the type of 
context to which they were now being put. Thus caution was required in their 
use. It was recognized that as these techniques were applied some learning 
would take place which would enhance the means of identifying the firms' com­
petitive goals. Thirdly, there was the desire to progressively enrich my under­
standing of the nature of the problems involved and the desire to avoid missing 
new strands of the argument by a premature formulation of the research methods.
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These objections were resolved by using a two stage research process in which 
the method of investigation was reviewed after the initial investigations. I was 
enabled to simplify the identification of the competitive goals by substituting the 
'order winning criteria ' technique for the 'key manufacturing tasks'. This was 
done with the permission of T.3. Hill, who showed me this approach in 198<*, prior 
to its publication in 1983. The second stage of the research placed an increased 
emphasis on the knowledge base of the production managers and their means of 
acquiring updating. The emphasis was upon increasing the extent to which 
learning took place and the role of the control process on this learning.
3.13 Data Collection: Wide v. Narrow Spread of Sites
The choice between a wide or narrow set of research sites concentrated 
attention on the option of surveys versus case studies. Surveys have been widely 
used by industrial economists, Cold (1971), management scientists, Eilon et 
al.(l976), but less frequently by operations management researchers, with some 
notable exceptions, New (1976), Lockyer et a l.(l980) and the INSEAD studies 
(198<*, 1986). Surveys are very effective in identifying broad based issues, where 
widespread phenomena are under consideration, (e.g. patterns of labour product­
ivity, use of particular operations techniques etc.). The large number of sites 
that can be covered with such techniques enables statistical techniques to be used 
in weighing the influence of various factors. They thus are valuable for invest­
igating the importance of various elements in a set of industries etc. Against 
these strengths needs to be set a loss of detail and context from the individual 
research sites. Case studies offered greater scope for detail, which was of value 
in theory formulation. These benefits, however, were likely to be at the cost of 
fewer sites, as the time taken to collect case data is longer than that for surveys. 
Cases, however, offer a rich source of information, in which the interconnections 
between the different aspects of control within a company can be more clearly 
understood. They also afford a basis for theory formulation, Kaplan (I9S<»c). He
argued that observations and descriptions using case studies are a maior and 
important starting point for managerial research. He contended that they 
represent a suitable building block for initial classification, measurement, theory 
building and testing the generality and limits of any theory.
One of the dominant characteristics of managing production is the complexity 
of the production system. It is therefore critical that both the control systems 
and any research processes used to examine them are capable of reflecting this 
complexity. Case studies facilitate  detailed observation and description of 
complex phenomena, which can be considered in the specific contexts. They 
enable the collection of data from multiple sources within a site, as distinct from 
data from more sites, but almost inevitably less widespread within each site. 
Given the aim of the research was the development of a framework of the diff­
erent approaches to control, the case method was selected for the richness of the 
data that could be obtained and the relationships it could reveal.
3.2 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The central objective of the research was to develop a framework enabling 
corporate and production management to recognize the variety of paradigms of 
the managerial control of production. One aim of the framework was to facil­
itate understanding about the path of progression from the 'out of control' 
condition to the higher level condition of control and eventually to the 'contin­
uous incremental improvement and control' state. A second aim was to identify 
the factors influencing the adoption of a particular paradigm of control within a 
company and thus by understanding this relationship enable management to 
improve their decisions.
A schematic representation of the traditional and revised paradigms of control 
and the key factors influencing their adoption are shown below in Figure I.
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Advancing forms of the paradigm of control in production 
Figure l shows the development from the 'out of control' condition to the 
revised 'control and improvement' condition. This sequence, however, is 
unsuitable for the presentation of the thesis, as it implies that firms move 
sequentially through these three stages to achieve progressively higher levels of 
control. Instead, I start my analysis with an examination of the traditional 
paradigm when it results in a state of control. I next show how the traditional 
paradigm can lead to the loss of control when it fails to adequately match the 
dynamic pressures of the competitive market. I then propose the revised 
paradigm which brings together control and improvement into an integrated 
activity for production management and workforce.
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The seven case studies were unevenly distributed between the three conditions 
outlined in Figure I above. Six of the cases fell into the traditional paradigm, 
while only one, and that in part, adopted the revised paradigm. Of the six 
traditionally orientated cases, two were clearly in the 'out of control' condition, 
with a further case being partly in this same state. Table I below sets out the 
state of control in the case studies and identifies the industries involved.
Table A Summary of the States of Control in the Case Studies
TYPE OF CASE STATE OF CONTROL
Brake Manufacturer out of control
Kitchen Furniture Manufacturer out of control
Clutch Manufacturer partly out of control
Ceramic Manufacturer in control
Pump Manufacturer in control
Medical Products Manufacturer in control
Food Processing Company control and improvement
Although the paradigms of control, outlined above, tend in terms of concepts 
and systems to be discrete, in terms of performance they form a continuum. This 
continuum is likely to entail substantial overlap in the level of performance 
achieved. The research investigated the cases to identify the factors influencing 
the three sets of outcomes and to establish the factors that led to their adoption.
3.3 SAMPLE OF FIRMS - CHOICE OF INDUSTRIES AND SELECTION OF SITES
The adoption of a two stage research process, collecting data viacase studies, 
determined a number of factors in the selection of the research sites.
It was anticipated above that the use of case studies would result in a rich, but 
complex, set of evidence. In order to constrain the resulting variety to practical 
limits, it was decided to restrict the first three cases to a single industry. The 
automotive components industry was chosen, both because of its location in the
West Midlands, and because it was clearly experiencing strong competition and 
was more likely to be concerned with its approach to the control of production. 
These cases involved one plant concerned primarily w ith original equipment 
components and two plants primarily making replacement parts. The subsequent 
cases were drawn from a wide variety of industries covering: kitchen furniture, 
ceramics, food processing, and medical products. This was in order to test the 
paradigm more extensively under a wide variety of different conditions. In 
addition, by using a number of cases in a variety of industries, the existence of 
different paradigms was considered more likely to be revealed.
To reduce the large number of factors that could a ffect the findings, it was 
decided to examine only plants that met the criteria set out below:
(a) Between 200 and 5000 full-time or full-time equivalent employees.
(b) Not less than 30% of its employees engaged in either direct or 
indirect manufacturing tasks.
(c) Not less than 60% of the plant turnover from involvement in the 
selected industry.
The sites were selected by initially identifying companies, that appeared to 
meet the above criteria, from the 'Kompass' publication. This gave the nominal 
minber of employees, a code indicating the general nature of their products and 
the name of their chief executive.
In each of the stages initial letters were sent to chief executivesoutlining the 
nature of the research and requesting a meeting with them to discuss possible 
cooperation in the project. 25 letters were sent in the first stage and 72 letters 
in the second. Replies were received from <*2 companies, of which 18 agreed to 
an in itial interview. Of these, ten agreed to support the research. Initial 
investigations were made in these cases. However, in three situations it was 
found that the evidence available was too similar to data from other cases to 
make further investigation necessary. One of these 'abandoned' cases was in the
automotive components industry. It followed the traditional paradigm, which led 
to the 'out of control' condition to the extent that data collection was very 
difficult, as very few records were maintained. Of the other two 'abandoned' 
cases, one was in the material processing industry. Its system of managing was 
such that the only identifiable 'production management' activity was control of 
its small direct labour force. As its approach to control most closely approx­
imated to the step phase of the traditional paradigm, which was well represented 
in the other cases, it was decided not to pursue the investigation at this plant any 
further. The remaining case, an engineering firm, was another example of the 
step phase. After the commencement of the research a change in the managing 
directorship led to a loss of cooperation and the eventual abandonment of the 
research site.
It was recognized that the above methodology, using seven case studies, 
inevitably placed a restriction on the extent that the fieldwork can be used in 
making statements about the overall population of British manufacturing industry. 
Yet, the problems revealed were far from unique to any one industry. Accepting 
the limitations of coverage, inevitable in a Doctoral submission, it is hoped that 
this research will stimulate other researchers into examining the applicability of 
its findings in other parts of U.K. manufacturing.
3.0 HOW THE RESEARCH WAS CONDUCTED
Semi-structured interviews were held with the managing directors and all 
senior functional heads of departments to establish how the companies attempted 
to compete. Samples were collected of all non accounting and selective costing 
written control reports received by the managing directors and production 
management. These were examined and the recipients interviewed to ascertain 
how, if at all, they were used in the process of controlling production. Based on 
an analysis of these reports and the managers' descriptions of their use of the
reports, I classified each report on a five point scale, in terms of its ability to 
contribute to the managerially identified KMTs. I developed a system for 
evaluating the customer service and resource efficiency dimensions of 
performance and linking them with the KMTs in the respective plants. I also 
devised a complementary scoring system which evaluated the individual reports in 
terms of their contribution to the recipients' identification of good and poor 
performance. The interviews with production management and supervision 
established any other means they used to obtain information to help control 
production. This was reinforced by the use of questionnaires which established 
the managers' preferred sources of information, their educational background and 
any training they had received in production management. Interviews were then 
held with all levels of production management to ascertain their approach to 
controlling production and to establish whether they considered they had any 
specific role in bringing about improved performance. If they did consider that 
they had such a role, the particular form that it took and the means they used in 
attempting to accomplish it, were identified.
The heads of the main staff functions, providing information to general and 
production management, were also interviewed to establish the roles played by 
the functions in the control of production.
The contents of the control reports were compared with the competitive goals. 
The performance of production in customer service and resource efficiency was 
evaluated using a series of scales reflecting firstly the importance of the 
dimension of performance and secondly the value of the report in controlling 
performance. Scales were also developed for 'improvement'. These classified 
the levels of strategy, integration, continuity and incrementalism of the plant. 
Investigations were undertaken to establish whether production performance 
could have been improved by the exercise of more effective means of control» for 
example in the level of quality achieved or delivery accomplished.
Details of the research process are provided in Appendix A.
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0. THE ’ IN CONTROL' CONDITION OF THE TRADITIONAL 
PARADIGM OF CONTROL IN PRODUCTION
0.1 THE 'IN CONTROL' STATE IN PRODUCTION
The literature review showed the nature of the traditional paradigm of control 
proposed for senior and production management. The perspective was, in the 
main, that of regulation within prevailing conditions rather than creating condit* 
ions which were more likely to lead to a state of control. In essence the model 
reflected a reactive rather than proactive approach on the part of the production 
management team. The development of manufacturing strategy has offered scope 
for a more proactive approach to the control of production, via reductions in the 
complexity of the manufacturing task and the creation of the pre-conditions 
needed for an effective state of control.
In sections •* A 5 I examine the way in which six plants, all of which followed 
the traditional paradigm, practised control of and over their production functions. 
Although all followed the traditional paradigm, albeit in differing forms, their 
performances differed significantly. For the sake of a clearer analysis, I divide 
my presentation of evidence into two sections, the first concerned with instances 
where the plant was in a state of control, the second where it was not. It is 
important to recognize, as shown in Figure 1, that both the 'in' and 'out of 
control' conditions can arise from adopting the traditional paradigm of control. 
Although, for the sake of exposition I separate my reporting of these conditions, 
they need to be considered as opposing ends of a continuum, with the case studies 
spaced along it. Classification of a plant as 'in', or 'out of', control was for some 
a matter of degree rather than of an absolute state.
This section is concerned with plants that had achieved a state of control at 
the time of the fieldwork, while following the traditional paradigm. This 
represents the basic model which literature on the traditional paradigm promotes 
as the solution to the needs of manufacturing plants.
Proposition
The traditional paradigm is composed of two alternating phases« long
<*7
periods of stability, interspersed with short periods of 'stepped' changes 
when production performance is raised to meet new requirements in the 
market. When competition is intense, larger and /  or more frequent steps 
are taken to meet the market's requirements. Even while maintaining a 
state of control, the absence of a strategy for production can lead to the 
step changes being inconsistent with each other and the market. This 
may lead to the manufacturing task becoming very difficult to control.
The four 'in control' cases covered a wide range of the condition. At one end 
of the scale was a plant producing automotive clutches. The maiority of the 
plant was in a state of controls however, because its assembly department was 
'out of control', its overall performance was unsatisfactory. At the other end of 
the scale was a plant producing medical products, where production was well 
under control following a recent set of stepped improvements.
<».l l Defining the Phases of the 'In Control' Condition
Section 2 showed that much of the literature reflecting the traditional para­
digm is concerned with maintenance of the 'static state' phase of production 
performance. The paradigm predicates that the production system remains for 
long periods in the 'in control' phase. During this phase production management's 
role in the process of control is typically accomplishing cost and output goals. 
While in this phase, the production system must be able to withstand the natural 
range of variations and disturbances associated w ith its particular industry. This 
emphasis can lead to inadequate recognition of the linkages between the two 
phases. This linkage is shown below in Figure 2.
Figure 2 The Traditional Paradigm of Control in Production
Performance
(N.B. Not to scale, steady state 
periods are longer and stepped 
improvements less substantial)
Stepped change phases 
(in production processes 
and procedures)
Maintenance of stability 
p flM II
(in production system) Time
<*8
The balance between the two phases is most clear in respect of technological 
innovation, particularly when this involves major capital expenditure. However, 
a more subtle form of separation exists during the so called 'long run' or 'steady 
state' phase. This is the separation between the usually smaller step improve* 
ments to the processes /  procedures brought about by staff functions. Production 
management's role in these steps is predominantly as adopter, rather than as 
leader of the innovations.
The number and significance of these intermediate level steps varies signif­
icantly between firms adopting essentially the same 'traditional' paradigm. This 
reflects the continuum between the 'out of control' and 'continuous improvement' 
conditions. Plants near the 'continuous improvement' condition made a number of 
these smaller steps, while those at the lower end of the continuum generally made 
less. This latter state of affairs varies considerably between those plants which 
make determined efforts to escape from the near 'out of control' condition and 
those that slide gently into a loss of control. I retain the term 'steady state’ for 
plants where such improvements occur, for two reasons. The first is because the 
production managers still follow the traditional perspective of maintaining 
stability, leaving the leadership of change in the hands of staff functions. The 
second reason is to help distinguish between these 'intermediate' stepped impro­
vements and the continuous improvement found in the revised paradigm.
M 2  The Limitations of the Traditional 'Steady State of Control* Paradigm
Three weaknesses can be identified in the traditional steady state paradigm, 
which can lead to movement from the 'in' to 'out o f  control condition. The first 
is the maintenance by production management of 'stability' when continually 
higher performance is required. The second is the use of step changes to restore 
competitiveness which can also lead to mis-matches between products and 
processes which result in the manufacturing task becoming too difficult to
<*9
control. The third is when production management's attention is focused on 
artificially restricted sub-sets of performance criteria, rather than on the full 
range of ways in which production needs to support competitiveness.
Figure 3 below demonstrates the relationship between the required and actual 
levels of performance and how a deterioration in this relationship can lead to the 
'out of control' condition.
Figure 3 An Illustration of the Comparison between 'Stable' Production 
Performance and Adaptive Market Requirements
N.B. The extent to which the 'out of control' condition occurs is a function of the 
relative positions of the 'actual' and 'required' levels of performance.
Actual Performance • Required Performance : — — — — —
Production can cease to be in a state of control during either the 'stability' or 
the 'stepped' phase. In the stability phase, the loss of control is likely to arise 
from failure to react to changing requirements and /  or only regulating limited 
aspects of performance. In the stepped change phase, errors in the design of the 
system can lead to unnecessarily complex tasks or tasks which are not well linked 
with the way in which the firm intends to compete.
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0.2 THE IMPACT OF, AND RESPONSE TO, COMPETITION IN THE CASE STUDIES
Proposition
The traditional paradigm of control leads to firms making step changes to 
their manufacturing systems and processes to meet growing competitive 
pressures. In the absence of manufacturing strategies a number of these 
changes will lead to unintended increases in the difficulty of the manu­
facturing task.
The plants in the 'in control' cases were examined to identify competitive 
pressures they experienced and how they adapted their manufacturing systems / 
processes to respond to these challenges. I also identified whether they poss­
essed manufacturing strategies to guide their design of the manufacturing system.
<>.21 Competitive Pressures in the 'In Control' Case Studies
Interviews with senior management in the various 'in control' case studies 
revealed competitive pressures faced in these plants. The individual pressures 
are identified below.
In the clutch case, the Manufacturing Director and Marketing Manager both 
stated that their plant faced strong competition from other producers. The 
Manufacturing Director said,
"We are in for a hell of a fight (for survival) over the next two years 
unless demand outstrips supply and we can raise our prices. ...we really 
ought not to be able to survive, we can only do so because we are quick on 
our feet. If our competitors knew what we were planning to do, we would 
be finished."
Interviews with the Manufacturing Director and Marketing Manager showed 
that they considered that the firm's strongest challenges were to its product 
quality and manufacturing costs.
In the medical products case the plant had been taken over three years earlier, 
after it had nearly ceased trading. The Managing Director reported that, at that
time, over half the product range was not recovering its full costs and the plant 
as a whole was losing money.
The plant in the automotive pump case started off in a stronger competitive 
position than the other 'in control' cases. However, its senior management 
identified that it too faced competition, mainly from overseas producers, offering 
low priced alternatives.
Competition in the ceramics case was from two sources, with sophisticated 
producers in Europe making high added value products and third world countries 
making simple, low added value products.
<i.22 The Absence of Strategic Frameworks to Direct Manufacturing Management
I discussed above the use of manufacturing strategies to constrain the comp­
lexity of the manufacturing task and as a basis for a more proactive approach to 
the control of production. Two strands of argument were evident in this 
approach; focusing and product /  process analysis. In Western plants the main 
form of 'focus* is a narrowing of the product range, while for the Japanese the 
emphasis has been at a micro level focus, looking at generic processes and operat­
ions. The focus approach reduces the complexity of the task and thus eases the 
costs associated with its control. Process /  profile analysis provided the basis 
for coherence between the manufacturing infra and technostructures and in the 
way the plant competed in the market place. Neither of these approaches is part 
of the traditional paradigm. However, as their presence would have affected the 
approach to control, I identified whether they were or were not used in any of the 
cases.
I established in interviews with the Managing Directors and Senior Production 
Managers that in none of the case studies did management have a written strategy
for manufacturing. In the clutch and pump cases the Managing Directors respons­
ible for the plants confirmed that they were unfamiliar with the concept of 
manufacturing strategy. The timing of these investigations in 1981-2, could 
partly account for this lack of knowledge about manufacturing strategy. In the 
medical products case, where the data was collected in 1985-6, the Manufacturing 
Director was actively seeking to establish such a strategy. However, in the 
ceramics case, where the data was collected at the same time, there were no 
attempts to form a manufacturing strategy.
«».23 The D ifficulty  of the Manufacturing Task dc Controllability of Production 
Proposition
When manufacturing faces strong pressure to compete, yet lacks a strat­
egy to guide its techno and infrastructural design, the manufacturing task 
is likely to become over complex and difficult to control.
The d ifficulty of the manufacturing task differed between the cases; it was 
strongest in the clutch case and least in the medical products case.
In the clutch case the difficulty of the manufacturing task grew as a result of a 
number of corporate level decisions; expansion of the 'aftermarket' product 
range, entry into the original equipment market and a major improvement in 
quality.
The entry into the 'original equipment' product sector, combined with the 
planned expansion of the replacement parts market, led to a serious conflict in 
terms of product design and type of manufacturing facilities required. The 
original equipment target was 10-15% of current output. This was sought via
contracts w ith a major vehicle assembler for two clutches, based on some of the 
plant's current top 10 best selling lines as the basic design. Replacement parts 
were expected to grow by 50% over two years, in selected outlets. The Market­
ing Manager, but no one else, discussed increasing the sales of commercial vehicle 
clutches from 3% to 15% of plant volumes. Based on company data for average 
monthly sales, I calculated the figures shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2 Estimated Changes m Monthly Demand for the Top and Bottom 




























3-2«* 3-36 nil 3-36
Maximum increase in output of top 10 items 2<*3%
(Covers) 900 







1-20 2-30 nil 2-30
Maximum increase in output of top 10 items 313%.
N.B. (b) = (a) plus the planned 50% increase in demand.
The values in the table show the largest and smallest demand per month in 
each of the top and bottom selling lines.
The assumption of an across the board increase in sales for replacement parts 
was unlikely. I established via the Marketing Manager that the marketing 
channels selected for expansion all concentrated on high volume product lines. 
He subsequently agreed that this was likely to lead to a proportionally greater 
increase in demand for the high volume 'aftermarket* lines. This change in
emphasis in product mix was additional to that in Table 2 above. He confirmed 
that he had not discussed the implications of such a shift with anyone from the 
plant, arguing that, in his view, there was no change, as all the items were 
currently being produced and therefore production did not need to do anything it 
was not currently doing. Thus, the implications for production of changes in the 
product mix were not signalled to the plant. Yet, at least two important implic­
ations existed. Firstly, the emphasis on higher volumes increased the importance 
of cost performance as these products competed directly with those of the much 
larger original equipment producers. Secondly, the shift in volumes combined 
with a different balance in the 'order winning criteria ' was leading to a product /  
process mis-match.
Additionally the current product designs were based on achieving economies in 
tooling costs through using a two piece design, which enabled common components 
to be used in a number of end products. The Chief Designer confirmed that this 
configuration was more expensive for high volume products but, with the current 
product mix, gave a lower overall cost. Retaining this strategy for original 
equipment products would make them more expensive than those of their main 
competitors. If a new one-piece design were introduced for high volume lines, as 
well as for original equipment products, the volume in the remaining product lines 
would be too small to achieve acceptable cost levels.
In order to highlight a further dimension of the conflict, a comparison of the 
competitive factors influencing sales of original equipment and replacement parts 
was undertaken in conjunction with the Marketing Manager. The results are 
shown below in Table 3.
Table 3 Rank Order Comparison of Factors A ffecting Sales
ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT PARTS
Quality ^ Must meet minimum Price
Reliable delivery \ specifications Delivery service (speed) 
Range
Price J Availability 
Ease of ordering 
Quality of product 
Presentation of product
The main variable in winning orders in the original equipment market is price, 
with quality and reliability of supply acting as an order qualifying criterion. In 
the replacement market many items could affect winning an order, but the largest 
single issue remained price.
In the other 'in control' case studies, the impact of decisions taken outside 
manufacturing had significantly less impact on the complexity of their manufact­
uring tasks. The pump case faced similar conflicts between a planned increase in
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original equipment sales and replacement parts. However, as the plant had a 
much larger penetration of the replacement market, its volumes were generally 
higher and thus less sharply in conflict with those of the original equipment 
market. The conflict in market criteria remained. Thus the balance in KMTs, in 
terms of rapid response versus low cost, was adversely affected. In the medical 
products case the product range had been initially pruned to remove unprofitable 
lines. The new products replacing unprofitable lines were largely consistent with 
remaining 'older' product lines. In the ceramics case there was a movement 
towards more 'specials' and away from standard products, which added to the 
complexity and uncertainty.
The above evidence, particularly from the clutch case, supports the view that 
seeking to respond to competitive pressures without the guidance of a manufact­
uring strategy can lead to a growth in the complexity of the manufacturing task, 
making control of production more difficult to accomplish. Thus on occasions, 
this may lead to achieving less than the expected benefits and /  or a worsening of 
the mis-match between the manufacturing task and manufacturing process /  
procedure. The significance of process mis-match can be heightened by the 
central role of production in corporate competitiveness. This is demonstrated by 
the growing importance attached to achieving both higher quality and lower 
priced products, similarly in achieving high flexibility and low inventory levels. 
Where these joint goals are sought as separate entities, there are likely to be 
serious instances of mis-match in the processes and systems used to seek their 
attainment. The importance of manufacturing strategy and the achievements of 
the Japanese approach to manufacturing provide examples of where these 'manu­
facturing based' achievements have been accomplished.
<».2** The Use of Stepped Changes to Restore Competitive Performance 
Proposition
To meet increasing competitive pressures, management implements step 
changes to the manufacturing system. Although many of these increase 
competitiveness, others, in the absence of a manufacturing strategy, lead 
to a loss of control as a consequence of the process mis-match pheno­
menon.
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original equipment sales and replacement parts. However, as the plant had a 
much larger penetration of the replacement market, its volumes were generally 
higher and thus less sharply in conflict with those of the original equipment 
market. The conflict in market criteria remained. Thus the balance in KMTs, in 
terms of rapid response versus low cost, was adversely affected. In the medical 
products case the product range had been initially pruned to remove unprofitable 
lines. The new products replacing unprofitable lines were largely consistent with 
remaining 'older' product lines. In the ceramics case there was a movement 
towards more 'specials' and away from standard products, which added to the 
complexity and uncertainty.
The above evidence, particularly from the clutch case, supports the view that 
seeking to respond to competitive pressures without the guidance of a manufact­
uring strategy can lead to a growth in the complexity of the manufacturing task, 
making control of production more difficult to accomplish. Thus on occasions, 
this may lead to achieving less than the expected benefits and /  or a worsening of 
the mis-match between the manufacturing task and manufacturing process /  
procedure. The significance of process mis-match can be heightened by the 
central role of production in corporate competitiveness. This is demonstrated by 
the growing importance attached to achieving both higher quality and lower 
priced products, similarly in achieving high flexibility and low inventory levels. 
Where these joint goals are sought as separate entities, there are likely to be 
serious instances of mis-match in the processes and systems used to seek their 
attainment. The importance of manufacturing strategy and the achievements of 
the Japanese approach to manufacturing provide examples of where these 'manu­
facturing based' achievements have been accomplished.
U.2U The Use of Stepped Changes to Restore Competitive Performance 
Proposition
To meet increasing competitive pressures, management implements step 
changes to the manufacturing system. Although many of these increase 
competitiveness, others, in the absence of a manufacturing strategy, lead 
to a loss of control as a consequence of the process mis-match pheno­
menon.
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Table f» The Main Forms of 'Stepped Change' 
Tn thè"^teadrState ' Cases
Case Studies Nature of Stepped Improvements
Re-design Re-layout Investment Investment
product plant in prodn. in systems/
range processes procedure
Ceramics Minor Medium Medium Medium
Clutches Major Minor Minor Maior
Medical Major Medium Minor Minor
Pumps Minor Minor Medium Major
*>.2<f I Improvement via redesign of products
I noted in section 2 that a typical 'Western' response to competition was to 
increase the product range, even at the cost of increasing manufacturing compl­
exity.
The clutch case Manufacturing Director reported the Board's decision to 
strengthen the plant's in-house design capability, in order to widen its product 
range and improve product quality. These moves were expected to lead to a 
substantial increase in sales.
In the medical case, the takeover was followed by a major emphasis on rede­
signing the product range to improve the 'attractiveness' of products and reduce 
their costs. The total range was cut by approximately one third. Of the remain­
ing range over 50% of the products were new or redesigned. This was followed 
by a re-modelling of the production system to reduce costs of assembly. The 
company planned to maintain its new found profitability by sustained product 
innovation, with the declared goal of one third of its product range being less 
than 2 years old.
The production literature generally recognizes the link between product 
design and complexity of manufacturing. Two case studies involved ma|or 
redesign of product ranges; clutches and medical products. In both of these the 
management reported that the redesign exercise was intended to serve the dual
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purpose of making products more attractive and reducing the costs of manufact­
ure. The cost savings were only discussed in terms of production and tooling 
costs. No reference was made to the impact on the administrative systems and 
therefore on overhead costs.
In the pumps case the redesign exercise was comparatively minor in terms of 
the number of items affected, but the potential impact was large in that it was 
intended to achieve economies of scale by increasing the degree of standard­
ization of the most expensive components. The clutch case involved similar 
attempts to cut production costs as well as improve product performance through 
better designed, lower cost components.
k.2<*2 Improvement via re-layout of plant
In all four 'steady state' cases work study /  industrial engineering departments 
were used to redesign the layout of substantial parts of the plants in attempts to 
raise performance and improve the control of production. In the clutch case 
study the main re-layout occurred in the assembly department. Unlike the 
changes to the product designs, the re-layout of the plant was intended, in 
conjunction with the limited use of some new machinery and inspection equipment, 
to reduce the complexity of manufacturing as well as to help raise the quality of 
the assembled clutches.
In the pumps case an experimental group technology cell was developed to 
machine bodies for a selected range of pumps. The Industrial Engineers rede­
signed the system from a traditional 'batch' layout to a cell reducing the handling 
of the products and speeding up throughput times. In the medical case the 
assembly lines were redesigned, reducing them from long chains w ith 15-20 
operatives, to a mixture of small teams of 5-6 operatives and, in some instances, 
single operatives. In both case studies the redesign of the plant layout assisted
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manufacturing by reducing the complexity of the workflow. However, even after 
detailed questioning of the Industrial Engineers and Production Managers invol­
ved, I was unable to be certain that these gains were intended or whether the 
exercises were based on achieving the simpler goals of reduced lead times.
<*.203 Improvement via investment in production processes
Investments in the production processes in the clutch case were limited to 
investment in one dedicated machining centre. However, it was intended to 
expand the proportion of the product made 'in house', by producing some of its 
own components. This was expected to lead to major investment in new 
processes. The pumps case involved investment in one major new machining 
centre and the replacement of several traditional lathes with CNC lathes. In the 
medical case the major expenditure was the purchase of a new sterilization unit 
and small scale changes to the flow lines. The ensuing discussions with Industrial 
Engineering and the Accountants revealed that these investments were made on 
the premise of savings in costs in manufacturing and that reductions in complexity 
had not been advanced as a reason for them.
*».2<**» Improvement via investment in systems and procedures
Both the clutch and pumps cases spent approximately L250,000 on new MRP II 
production control systems. The quality control systems in both cases were also 
improved. In the clutch case this led to the expenditure of a further L250,000 on 
inspection and testing equipment. In the medical case the emphasis was on work 
measurement of the entire plant using a predetermined motion time system (PMT). 
The changes in the supplier quality assurance (SQA) systems were demanded by 
the original equipment product customers. The change in the work measurement 
system was triggered by the inconsistencies in earnings and the lack of adequate 
data for planning.
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«».295 Benefits and limitations of stepped improvements
It can be seen from the above examples that in all 'in control’ cases efforts 
were undertaken to adjust the production system, both at a technological level 
and in terms of systems and procedures. As has been identified above, these 
changes are necessary to maintain a state of control in a changing set of environ­
ments.
It will have been noted, however, that the step changes identified above were 
all based on staff initiatives. Production management's role was that of imple­
mentor, rather than innovator. Further, it was evident from extensive discuss­
ions with line and functional staff that there was no systematic plan to reduce the 
complexity of the manufacturing process in order to achieve more effective  
control of performance.
*».3 SENIOR MANAGERS' USE OF LINE AND STAFF IN THE CONTROL OF 
PERFORMANCE
The following section examines the senior plant managers' use of lineand staff 
managers in controlling production performance. The clutch case Managing 
Director exhibited the strongest inclination to use staff rather than line for the 
control of production. This pattern is shown below in Figure **.
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Figure U The Managing Director of the Clutch Case's Expectation of 
Contributions to Competitiveness from all Plant Functions.
DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE
N.B. ---------  current contribution ■ -  expected contribution
Production was expected to make the smallest contribution to corporate 
competitiveness of all functions, both currently and in the future. The Managing 
Director was unable to place the expected contribution on the five point scales 
provided. He classified production as 3.5 on the scale. (This was recorded as 
such, rather than attempting to constrain his choices into the classification 
system.) The significant points about production that emerged from the subse­
quent discussion were:
(a) it had the lowest rating of all functions, in its perceived contribution 
to current competitiveness.
(b) it required the largest increase in raising its contribution to compet­
itiveness over the next five years (2 to 3.5).
(c) even with the achievement of the new competitive levels, it was still 
expected that production would be slightly less important as a competitive 
function than the plant average for all functions.
Analysis of the current and expected contributions anticipated from the 
different departments suggests that the Managing Director placed more import­
ance on the 'office' based functions than on those close to production.
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*»•31 Comparing the Expected Departmental Contributions and the Markets' 
Requirements.
The rankings of departmental contribution to competitiveness in the clutch 
case, as shown in Figure k above, were compared with the tasks the Managing 
Director had identified to be performed by the individual functions. The results 
of this comparison are shown in Figure 5.
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It will be noted that the principal theme for all functions was cost reduction, 
followed in selected departments, by a widening of the product range and improv­
ement to product quality. Even these goals were adopted in order to reduce unit 
costs, by increasing the level of activity. The Managing Director explicitly 
declared that he did not expect the plant to gain significant cost reductions from 
experience curve effects.
The emphasis on cost control shown above highlighted the omission of attent­
ion to other key aspects of performance. Control of 'delivery' was split between 
the plant and stock planning. Stock planning was responsible for determining the 
ordering of products on the plants and the level of finished stocks. They placed 
so-called firm orders on the plant for the next three months and tentative orders 
for three further months. Despite these 'firm ' orders, stock planning was able to 
operate a 'back-order' system which took precedence over all firm orders. This 
included the 'right' to first use of any machinery and of any material, even if this 
material had been set aside for a 'firm ' scheduled order. Firm orders could also 
be cancelled by stock planning even if manufacturing had commenced.
The back-order situation in the clutch plant was serious but had shown 
significant improvement. Back-orders for manufactured items had declined in the 
previous three months from i 1 63,000 to 153,000. Analysis of back-orders 
revealed that for items over L 1 ,000, the average time in arrears was <>.5 weeks. 
Orders for factored items in back-order had declined from L82.000 to 172,000. 
Despite these significant levels of failure to meet the customers' orders, there 
was no examination of the means of achieving delivery performance. The only 
effort to overcome this problem, that could be detected, was pressure by the 
Managing Director on the Assembly Superintendent to improve his section's output 
and to monitor the output of selected machines in the machine shop.
It was seen above that the manufacturing functions placed their emphasis on
the control of cost performance. Although an important factor in the company's 
survival, it was only one element of competitiveness. Not only did the manage­
ment of the clutch case lack a strategy for its manufacturing function, which 
might have enabled it to compete more fully via manufacturing, it also failed to 
exploit the other dimensions of competitiveness identified earlier by the Managing 
Director. Thus it can be seen that staff were perceived to be the control vehicle 
through which competitiveness was to be accomplished. It is also evident that 
despite statements by the Managing Director and the Marketing Manager, the 
critical issue, as far as actual attention was concerned, was cost control.
<».32 Staff Based Control of Production
Evidence of a bias towards staff based control was found in the pump and 
clutch cases. In both cases it was decided at corporate level to revise the 
production control systems to the more sophisticated MRP based systems. In the 
pump case the system was run by a production control function which reported 
directly to the plant Managing Director. In the clutch case, however, the shift to 
staff control, was countered by a reorganization of the structure so that the 
Production Controller reported directly to the Production Manager. The 
Managing Director advised me that he made the change...
"...in order to reduce the Production Manager's excuses for failing to meet 
the planned level of output and to reduce the level of work-in-progress".
Under the new structure the Production Manager was intended to exert 
greater influence on the work load of the plant.
However, the impact on production of the system of production control in the 
two plants was different, as a result of moves in the pump case to make greater 
use of small flowlines, CNC cells and machining centres. These technical 
changes resulted in a growing part of the work of the production control system 
being devoted to loading the front end of cells, rather than detailed processing of
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work between individual machines. The impact of these individually small 
changes in the roles of production managers and functional staff tended to 
steadily shift the organisations into a position where the real power to control lay 
in the hands of the staff. The line managers still carried the formal respons­
ibility for what was achieved but lacked the capability to determine what solu­
tions were sought. Such a situation is bound to lead to conflict It is unlikely 
that such conflict will lead to a constructive dialogue and thus better control.
<».33 The Approach Staff Used in Seeking Control over Production Performance.
I have shown above that the Managing Director in the clutch case relied 
primarily on the staff functions to control the plant. This was demonstrated 
particularly clearly in the ways in which the step changes, discussed above, were 
achieved. As I showed above, the way in which 's ta f f  in the four control cases 
carried out this control was not based on reducing the uncertainty /  complexity in 
the manufacturing system. Instead they tended to seek to overcome the comple­
xity of the manufacturing task by building powerful means of controlling (control 
systems).
The industrial engineering /  production engineering functions in the four 'in 
control' cases were primarily responsible for the selection of plant and machinery, 
as well as for the layout in the plants. This role was reinforced by the systems 
for capital expenditure approval used. The submission of detailed 'project 
proposals' required full costing figures which could currently only be achieved via 
industrial engineering. This became formalised with the industrial engineering 
department becoming the authorised function for project proposals.
Production management in the pump and clutch cases had previously been 
responsible for the selection and layout of plant. Both retained a role in the 
layout of the plant, but the responsibility for producing the plans, carrying out
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the changeovers etc. was officially that of the staff groups.
A number of other manufacturing decisions were examined to establish their 
impact on the level of complexity and uncertainty of the manufacturing task.
The importance of creating a simple, non-complex solution with low inherent 
uncertainty was recognized in terms of the functional performance of product 
design in all case studies. This logic was not, however, applied to the manufact­
ure of the products. The strategy in the medical case was based on achieving 
superior performance through simple designs, which were attractive in the market 
and economical to produce. In the pump case a ma)or programme of component 
standardization and product improvement was based on analysis of the warranty 
claims. The Managing Director confirmed that seeking improvements in product 
design was an essential component of his approach to controlling the plant.
Reductions in the complexity /  uncertainty of the manufacturing processes and 
procedures were detected in some of the improvements. These improvements 
were examined and the managers responsible for them interviewed in order to 
identify the thinking behind their application. A word of caution is, however, 
necessary. The following improvements give an unrepresentative impression, in 
that they re flec t the few major changes made to the system over extended 
periods.
The industrial engineering function in the pump case was the most innovative 
function in the 'in control' cases, in terms of seeking to reduce complexity. They 
simplified the manufacturing process by moving, in a few trial areas, from conven­
tional machining and assembly to two small cell systems. Machining operations 
were cut from seven to three stages, using multi-functional tooling. The conven­
tional benefits of reduced lead time and reiection levels were accomplished. The 
paperwork system used to control the flow of production was reduced to a
seventh, without any attempts being made to reduce the number of carbon copies 
sent to the various departments, (i.e. accounts, stores, PPC etc.).
The plant in the medical case was working on similar lines to reduce the 
complexity of its assembly operations. This involved changing from long 'assem­
bly lines' which had entailed up to 20 workers to a combination of single work 
stations and small groups of 2-3 workers per product.
Assembly in the clutch case was reorganised reducing the seven mini lines to 
three flow lines, which exploited the commonality in the assembly of most of the 
products.
While these programmes of reducing uncertainty /  complexity were important 
in the plants, it is necessary to recognize that they were phases or programmes 
which were being undertaken at the time of the research. I interviewed all the 
heads of the staff functions in these cases seeking to identify whether they had 
approached these problems with any particular philosophy or conceptual frame­
work to guide their activities. Almost universally their initial responses were in 
terms of the closer monitoring of production performance, rather than changing 
the way in which the system worked. These responses appeared to me to conflict 
with the actions set out above. When probed about the nature of the solutions 
adopted, the heads of the functional departments defended the techniques or 
approaches as isolated events. I concluded that they did not have any explicit 
philosophical approach towards these issues, aimed at the reduction of complex­
ity. The gap between their initially expressed views and the practices in some 
staff departments raised the possibility that they tend to articulate the textbook 
answer, but intuitively sought to accomplish solutions which are closer to the 
revised paradigm of control in production.
The maior exception to this view was the Chief Industrial Engineer in the
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clutch case. He emphasised control over, rather than control via, the process 
view when he declared that,
"Production management just want to be everyone's friend. We (indust­
rial engineering) have to come in as the police force."
This type of view was consistently rejected in the pump case. There, both the 
Chief Industrial Engineer and the Quality Manager identified the design of the 
production process as critical to the control of performance. The unusual 
forthrightness of their view made their perceptions noticeable. I concluded that 
some of the heads of staff functions in the 'in control' cases were intuitively 
aware of the means of achieving better control in, and of, production, via reduc­
ing the uncertainty /  complexity. However, they only adopted these approaches 
in a relatively few instances. The majority of times they relied on the traditional 
paradigm standard approach of increasing the sophistication of the mechanisms of 
control.
U.U SENIOR MANAGEMENT'S CONTROL DURING THE '5TEADY STATE' PHASE
I showed above how the form and level of competition found in the 'in control' 
plants was identified. I also showed that they did not possess manufacturing 
strategies which linked their marketing and production systems into coherent 
controllable wholes. Additionally, I dealt with how the Managing Directors 
assigned the roles between their line and staff functions for the two phases of the 
traditional paradigm.
In turning to the maintenance of control during the so called steady state 
phase, it must be recognized that the level of difficulty experienced in the 
control of production is significantly affected by the nature of the preceding 
stepped changes. Two factors have been shown to be particularly important. 
The first is the extent to which changes introduced in the step phase are consist­
ent with the corporate strategy and the second the extent these changes affect
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the complexity of the manufacturing task. Neither of these problems can be 
adequately overcome in the steady state phase, as both require resolution prior to 
it. However, the monitoring system, (as distinct from control), can be designed to 
detect the occurrence of such difficulties.
I now examine the way in which the Managing Directors controlled production 
during the critical 'long run1 stage in which production's key role is traditionally 
perceived to be the maintenance of stability.
9.91 Attempts to Control the Complexity of the Manufacturing Task 
Proposition
The strategy of control and the reports received by senior managers do 
not reflect the complexity of the manufacturing tasks demanded of 
production. They are particularly ineffective in dealing with internal as 
distinct from external complexity.
I showed above, in sections <*.29 to <*.292, that the manufacturing task in the 
automotive component cases had grown significantly more complex, as manage­
ment sought to improve the companies' competitiveness. This also occurred, to a 
lesser extent, in the medical products case. However, in the latter, the effects 
of increased complexity were mitigated by the simplification of the product 
range.
9.911 Approaches towards reduction of complexity in the manufacturing task.
In the clutch and pump cases I found two sets of actions which countered the
effects of the growing complexity of the manufacturing task. Firstly, was an 
increase in the degree of component standardisation. (As I have discussed this 
earlier in the step phase I do not propose to deal with it again here.) Secondly, 
the Managing Directors sought to restrict the variety of products produced per 
month. Neither action was intended to make the manufacturing task easier, but 
was made in order to reduce costs. Yet to achieve this goal both of these actions 
had to restrict variety, and thus complexity, within the system. These actions
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accorded with the 'law of requisite variety', in that the restrictions limited the 
variety that needed to be controlled as an alternative to increasing the control 
capability of the regulating system. Both Managing Directors were interviewed 
to ascertain why they adopted these approaches. They each confirmed that they 
were unaware of the 'law of requisite variety' or the concept of 'focused manu­
facturing'. The Managing Director of the clutch case, a graduate engineer, did, 
however, recognize the principle when it was subsequently explained. I therefore 
concluded that both of them adopted the responses of variety reduction from 
empirical rather than theoretical bases.
The control reports received by the Managing Directors, in the clutch and 
pump cases, helped them restrict the complexity of the manufacturing task by 
limiting the range of items scheduled per month by systematically monitoring the 
orders placed on their plant. An example of the report used in the pump case is 
shown below as Figure 6.
Figure 6 Reporting Scheduled Range of Products per Month in the Pump Case 





A 32 8 (25) 7 (22) 7 (22) 11 (39)
B 382 29 (8) 98 (13) 82 (2 1 ) 81 (2 1 )
C 219 II (3) 33 (16) 95 (2 1 ) 32 (15)
The figures in brackets show the percentage of the range scheduled per month.
As the approach above ran counter to the practices emerging from Japanese 
industry, I investigated the topic in greater depth. The Managing Director in the 
clutch case claimed that as a consequence of his interest in restricting the 
variety scheduled, the Plant Accountant had undertaken a special investigation 
which showed that plant costs could be reduced by 10 %. I subsequently inter­
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viewed the Accountant who stated that his estimate was based on very broad 
brush' figures. He said that if the variety were restricted to only 25% of the 
current monthly variety, it could save between I and 8% of the works costs. Of 
this 2/3rds would come from changes in production methods, rather than from 
variety reduction itself. The reduction to 25% of current scheduled range would 
have meant that the drive plates were made once every 7.5 months and the drive 
covers once every 5.3 months. The result would have been large stocks at the 
finished goods warehouse. Yet, these company costs were not included in the 
estimate. A further criticism of the figures was that they did not make any 
allowance for savings in the overheads, through the reduction of staff, which 
would have been possible from the smaller number of orders to be transacted. 
Thus, the whole basis upon which this particular approach to uncertainty reduct­
ion was based, was built on a very inadequate level of analysis. The figures 
produced by the Accountant compare unfavourably with the estimate by Abegglen 
& Stalk (1986) that total costs could in general be reduced by 30%, as a conse­
quence of a 7 5% reduction in range.
<>.<*12 Inadequate control of 'internal' complexity.
I have shown that, however ineffectively and unintentionally, the Managing 
Directors in two of the cases took actions which had the effect of constraining 
the complexity of the manufacturing tasks in their plants. As discussed above 
this was done in order to control costs that arose as a consequence of the comp­
lexity of the manufacturing task.
As noted above, the approach adopted in these cases departed significantly 
from that advanced in both 'manufacturing strategy' and 'Japanese' based 
approaches to controlling manufacturing. These suggest that the control of 
uncertainty /  complexity is accomplished by reducing the internal complexity of 
the manufacturing system. They seek to combine greater certainty within
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production and low finished goods inventories. This combination is achieved by 
improving the quality produced, reducing setup times, making labour and machin­
ery more reliable etc.
The goals of smaller inventories and higher quality were particularly important 
in the automotive component cases, as they were predominantly in the 'replace­
ment parts' market. This market is characterised by wide product ranges with 
relatively low volumes. If the problem had been examined from the manufact­
uring strategy perspective and some of the Japanese orientated techniques such 
as small batch production and total quality control (TQC) adopted, both goals 
would have been achieved. These approaches would have, in turn, led to reduct­
ions in uncertainty and probably complexity in the manufacturing system.
I raised these alternative approaches with the Managing Directors in the 
clutch and pump cases. Both expressed considerable initial scepticism whether 
the necessary reductions in 'setup' times could be achieved. Doubt was also 
expressed whether quality levels could be improved sufficiently to enable small 
batch production to proceed without incurring penalties from 'occasional' batches 
with high levels of rejects. In a sense both areas of doubt reflected an awareness 
that the current systems of production incurred naturally high levels of 'internal' 
uncertainty. Management in both cases considered it easier and more effective  
to restrict the 'external' uncertainty, rather than resolve the 'internal' uncertain­
ties.
I do not claim that the choice between internal versus external uncertainty 
reduction was anything other than an empirical one. However, the choice and its 
consequences were real, even if made without full awareness of its implications.
In the next section I examine the reports and exception studies the Managing 
Directors received and consider whether their content facilitated more effective
73
control of manufacturing performance.
<».<*2 The Routine Information Received by the Managing Directors
Copies of all the Managing Directors' non accounting reports were obtained
and the proportions dealing w ith the major categories calculated. Based on a
notional 20 day, 4 week month, the number of reports per month was identified.
The results of this analysis are shown below as Table 3.
Table 3 The Proportion of the Reports Received by the Managing 





Physical Quantities 31 38 28 73
Plant Utilization 13 14
Plant Load 14 12 1
Labour Performance 3 5 12
Stocks and W.I.P. 18 8 24
Quality >1 3 6 3
Financial 5 4 3
Sales and Delivery 13 16 27
Total Percentage 100 100 100 100
Total Number of Reports 162 18) 87 30
N.B. In addition to the reports shown above the Managing Directors received 
monthly written reports from the heads of the main functions in their plant.
The proportion of reports in the ceramics case reflected a daily report which 
the Managing Director said he only 'glanced a t'. Two other factors had signif­
icant effects; his declared marketing orientation and an 'on-line' computer 
system. To counter his marketing (and financial) orientation, the Manufacturing 
Director received complementary reports on labour, quality, WIP etc. The 
Managing Director could also use a computer terminal in his office to access 
current performance on many issues. This information did not, however, extend 
to 'on-time' delivery. There he relied on the Manufacturing Director to warn him 
of lateness before he received customer complaints! Together these influences 
reduced his reports to 30, compared with an average of 144 in the other cases.
7k
The individual reports received by the Managing Directors were examined. 
Based on this examination two principal themes emerged. The first was the 
extent to which the reports showed the Managing Directors the level of complex­
ity of production's KMTs. The second was the extent the reports reflected the 
priorities of production's KMTs. The result of these analyses is presented below.
**.<*3 The Link between Managing Directors' Information and the Key Manufact­
uring Tasks
Proposition
Senior managers' information about production over-emphasises output 
levels /  overhead recovery and labour costs and under-emphasises other 
important KMTs. The reports are generally oversimplistic without 
sufficient analysis to identify how production can support corporate 
competitiveness.
While the case studies considered in this section were 'incontrol', this did not 
mean that there was no scope, or need, for them to raise performance. I have 
assumed such improvements are desirable but not always essential. Thus, the 
following sub-sections are written with the implicit assumption that should the 
managements of these plants wish to raise their performance, the changes out­
lined below would need to be considered.
The lack of manufacturing strategies was reflected in the absence of system­
atically developed statements of key manufacturing tasks, in the 'in control' 
cases. It was thus difficult to define in detailed terms whether a plant's perfor­
mance was, or was not, in a state of control. Although the Managing Directors of 
the plants were better placed than I to make such assessments, it is likely that
their perspective of the major manufacturing tasks was limited without this form 
of detailed analysis. This suggests that their capability to evaluate performance 
must have been impaired.
75
Table 6. A Comparison of K MTs and Information Received the 




Control reports received Deficiencies in reporting
Cost to sup- Labour efficiency reports. No examination of total plant
port price Weekly and six weekly.
Capacity utilisation on recent 
investments
hours against number of stand­
ard hours produced
Report on value of WIP in asse- Did not differentiate between
mbly. Weekly valuation of delays from shortages in inter-
stocks
Report on value of daily output 
of plant.
nally made and bought out 
items
Quality Warranty claims analysis No measures of cost of quality. 
Analysis of faults limited to 
design weaknesses. Did not 
extend to weaknesses at prod­
uction level.
Delivery of Availability of items in stock-
orders planning i.e. 1 or more item in Did not reveal critical measure
stock.
Analysis of daily sales v. ta r­
gets.
of level of customer service.
Load planned for next three No analysis of number of canc-
months. Monthly statement on elled firm orders or addition
value of back-orders, items 
over L 1000 and the number of 
weeks since stocks were at 1 or 
more items
priority one items.
In addition to the reports listed above the clutch case Managing Director 
received a full set of monthly accounts, copies of the minutes of all meetings held 
in the plant and a monthly report on the functioning of their departments by all 
heads of departments.
His approach to the control of production is shown in the following comment 
he made to me during an interview!
"I monitor the plant (selected items) to make sure that the money we 
invested in them is being well spent. The monitoring of the assembly 
shop (low performing) is to make the Superintendent know that I am 
aware of his output and the work load on his department".
In the pump case achieving a high 'stockturn' was identified as 'very import­
ant'. Performance in this dimension had improved from 7.5 turns p.a. to 12 over a
76
two year period. He anticipated that with the introduction of the MRP II comp­
uter system, this would be further increased. The target of a 20 times stockturn 
had been set, to be accomplished within a further two years. This dimension of 
performance was monitored via the monthly accounting system.
Three weaknesses can be identified in the pattern of control reports received 
by the Managing Directors. These patterns were most evident in the clutch case 
and least evident in the medical products case. The weaknesses were:
(a) The monitoring of labour and output levels appeared to be over-emphasised
(b) Some important dimensions of production performance were not monitored
(c) Some of the reports needed more analysis, rather than summarising of data.
It has been shown above that the performance of production in the 'steady
state' paradigm of control .is likely to concentrate on the cost of production and 
labour efficiency.
4.631 Critical review of the dimensions of performance monitored.
A clear pattern in the aspects of performance that were monitored was 
detectable in the four 'in control' cases.
The output achieved per month, (and in some plants, daily /  weekly), was 
universally given close attention by the plant Managing Directors. It was evident 
that the value of the months production was considered to be critically important. 
In the discussion with the Managing Director in the clutch case and the other 
Managing Directors, it emerged that they considered that the maior factor 
affecting their approach to output value was the influence of their respective 
group's accounting systems. A drop in value would lead to an adverse variance in 
the plant's performance and thus a degree of scrutiny from the centre, which
would restrict their control over the plant. This emphasis was most evident in 
the ceramics case, where the Managing Director stated!
"...month by month my main aim is to get sufficient output into the
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warehouse to meet the particular budget. I achieve this by getting my 
production control people to issue what is available to be made in that 
month and having a weekly arrears meeting....! keep the pressure on 
arrears with the objective of making everything production control say is 
available to make....In some months there is clearly not enough work in 
theory on the shop floor to make and hit the budget figure...then one is 
obviously looking for work to bring forward to enable me to at least get a 
factory breakeven, even if it means putting stuff into the warehouse that 
is not going to be sold for some time...the way we have set up the budget 
here means the prime thing is to not get a factory loss (failure to recover 
the overhead).
This gives strong support for the view that the value of output and /  or 
overhead recovery tends to be more important than producing to schedule specific 
part numbers. An essential qualification must be made about this claim. I was 
unable to find any evidence via the production control records of 'high value' 
parts being produced earlier than lower value parts.
I questioned each of them about which items were to be completed in order to 
achieve the monthly value, In the clutch case, the Managing Director did not 
express an opinion on what items were /  were not produced, other than achieving 
an elimination of the backlog in orders. In the pump case, the Managing Director 
considered that the Stock Controller was responsible for the balance of items via 
the orders he placed on the plant. However, it was evident that with an average 
of over one months WIP, the plant did have some discretion on which items it gave 
priority to, at the final stages of the month.
<».*»32 C ritical review of the dimensions of performance not monitored.
In none of the cases was there any measurement /  control of the percentage of 
on time delivery, either to the customer or to the warehouse. In the absence of 
such a measure and the presence of strong interest in the total value of output, 
the risks of some distortion in favour of high value items was a possibility. The
traditional measures of individual, section and works labour performance were 
evident in the four cases. In both the clutch and pump cases, the Managing 
Director received reports listing the weekly performance of individual production 
operators.
This level of detailed information appeared to be unnecessary at Managing 
Director level. In the clutch case, industrial engineering were experimentally 
producing a report on the number of standard hours produced. At the time of the 
research, the forward load on the plant was not expressed in standard hours, 
either in total or in the preferred form of load by key resource centre.
The omission of quality data at Managing Director level was considered to be 
serious, given the importance assigned to quality by the Directors themselves. 
The Managing Directors in the clutch and pump cases had good information on 
warranty claims showing the cost of claims. However, in neither case did they 
receive information about the costs of accomplishing quality. The pump case 
Managing Director used a simple guide to assist him to identify scrap levels. 
When patrolling the plant, he deliberately passed the central 'scrap' bins. If they 
exceeded a certain number by the Thursday in each week, he subsequently raised 
it as an issue at the Friday staff meeting. While such simple approaches have a 
great deal of merit as low cost monitoring devices, they are insufficient guides, 
where the cost of accomplishing quality can be a critical aspect of performance. 
In the ceramics case the Managing Director delegated all quality issues to the 
Manufacturing Director. As such he neither knew the full cost of quality nor had 
an adequate picture of the plant's outgoing quality levels.
<>.<»33 Weaknesses in the analytical content of reports
Examination of the Managing Directors' reports in the four cases showed a 
common pattern. All four received reports which primarily concentrated on the 
provision of raw or summarised data rather than analysed information. I consid­
ered the types of 'analysis' which were most likely to be of benefit; comparison of 
actuals against standards, examination of trends and the identification of causes.
79
Clearly, analyses lead to costs which are only worth incurring if they are 
likely to lead to better decisions. I did not make an economic appraisal of any 
lost benefits of any shortfalls in analysis. However, I approached the need for 
analyses from the perspective that there should be a good logical 'a priori' case 
prior to their being undertaken. Some reports were clearly used as 'psycho­
logical' controls, and thus did not require supporting analyses. The report on the 
output of the clutch case assembly department fell into this category. The 
Managing Director reported that!
"...I do so (monitor output), so that he (Superintendent) knows that I am 
looking at it and (he) will therefore improve his performance."
Where reports were used in this way I did not evaluate their scope for quantit­
ative analysis.
I have already shown that quality improvement although considered important, 
was essentially an unmeasured KMT in the clutch and pump cases. The only 
reports received by the respective Managing Directors were the warranty claims 
analyses. These reports were limited to classifying the type of faults and 
presenting a summary of them by product type. The reports also gave the total 
cost of meeting the claims per month. This information was clearly valuable and 
acted upon, with the Managing Directors seeking to achieve warranty costs of 2% 
in the clutch and >1% in the pump case. There was, however, no systematic 
examination of trends or presentation of the relative costs of one type of fault 
compared with the others. They reflected the Pareto principle by starting with 
the largest number of faults and working down towards the small numbers. Such 
reports do not require analysis every month but could, I consider, have been 
improved by undertaking a review of the relative costs at six monthly intervals. 
As well as not making adequate use of the warranty data, there was no analysis of 
the considerable volume of 'quality control' data, that was generated from the 
'Statistical Quality Assurance' programmes that both plants had adopted. Thus, 
even when limiting the nature of any analysis to that proposed in traditional
so
concepts of production, the analytical content was low. When considered against 
the need to reduce complexity and uncertainty, as in the revised paradigm, the 
analytical content fell substantially short of requirements.
A similar argument for analysis can be made in respect of delivery perform­
ance in the clutch and pump cases. Although the summary of the reports reveal­
ed that the Managing Directors received H».9% and 16.*»% of their reports on this 
topic, detailed examination showed that they were primarily about sales and not 
delivery. Furthermore, the limited information apparently on delivery perform­
ance was in fact simply a statement of 'availability1 of one or more items in stock. 
Given the importance attached to delivery in the KMTs, goal performance in this 
area needed not only to be measured but its trends to be analysed.
A similar failure to analyse 'work in progress' occurred in the clutch, but not 
in the other cases. Y et in the clutch case, as explained above, the Managing 
Director was concerned over the high inventory levels. Despite this there was no 
measure or analysis of such dimensions of performance as throughput times, lead 
times by product type or of setup times.
Overall the examination of the Managing Directors' reports showed a strong 
emphasis on simple reports about output and labour performance, a lack or 
weakness in the measures about other KMTs and a tendency for those reports that 
existed to lack appropriate analysis. Such a combination was adequate when it 
came to revealing a major crisis, but inadequate in picking up the more subtle 
themes required to bring about systematic improvement in performance. How­
ever, adding sufficient analytical content to the reports to bring about improve­
ment would, under prevailing conditions, further intensify staff numbers. I 
discuss in section 6 how a more analytical approach, at less cost, can be obtained 
by production involving workers and managers in the analysis of their own work.
U.kit The Weakness of the 'Traditional Paradigm' in terms of Senior 
Managements' Control of Production
Two weaknesses in the traditional paradigm can be identified from the fore­
going examination. Firstly, the paradigm has not adequately assisted senior 
management to regulate the task required from manufacturing. This has, as 
shown above, led to the manufacturing task demanded being too difficult for the 
available level of capability within production. Secondly, the paradigm has had a 
limited effect in stimulating senior management to improve the capability of their 
production functions. Where senior management have sought improvement in 
manufacturing capability, the maior focus of attention has been the staff funct­
ions. This has not been matched in either production management or workforce 
development.
The principal area of concern in terms of the difficulty of the task was the 
lack of involvement of production in the strategic process. Thus decisions about 
the product range, mix, rate of innovation etc. were taken which led to undesir­
able conflicts between the performance criteria needed to compete successfully.
In terms of the 'capability to control' the principal areas of concern were 
shown to be; the division between line and staff responsibility, the lack of monit­
oring of long term trends and the relatively low concern with training of product­
ion management and workforce.
The foregoing can be represented in the following Figure which demonstrates 
the issues given inadequate attention when using the traditional paradigm.
SI
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Figure 7 Issues Inadequately considered by Senior Management jn 
the Traditional Paradigm
Difficulty of the Manufacturing Task Capability of Production Management 
to accomplish the Task.
Integration of Manufacturing in the 
Corporate Strategy.
Organization of the Plant
- Product range and mix - Structure of Line and Staff 
responsibilities
- Rate of product/ process innovation - Monitoring of progress
- Diversity in KMTs - Commitment to training programme
<*.5 PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT'S CONTROL OF PERFORMANCE
I showed above how senior managers in the 'in control' cases adopted the 
traditional paradigm in their control of production performance. They redressed 
the tendency of their production system to go 'out of control' by making step 
changes to the systems to restore competitiveness. I showed the limitations of 
senior managers' attempts to counter the growth of complexity of the manufact­
uring task and how a number of their step changes intended to restore competit­
iveness could lead to even more loss of control. Furthermore I showed that their 
control of routine events was weakly linked with the KMTs which they had earlier 
identified as important. I now examine the way in which production managers 
approached their operational level control and how they linked this to the corp­
orate priorities.
<*.51 Production Managers and the Difficulty of the Manufacturing Task
In this thesis I treat the level of difficulty of the manufacturing task as a 
relative rather than absolute measure. Thus, a manufacturing task which is 
difficult for one set of managers could be relatively easy for another set of 
managers. The critical relationship is between the complexity of the task and 
the competence of the particular managers concerned. This relationship is 
illustrated below in Figure 8.
8 )
Figure 8 The Relationship between the Complexity of the Manufacturing 
Task and the Competence of the Production Managers.
Task difficulty Competence exceeds Competence increased
Task Capability Task Capability Task Capability






Shortfall between capability to control and difficulty of task. 
K V V l Reduced difficulty in the manufacturing task from improvements in 
^  systemY / / A  Increased difficulty in manufacturing task from undertaking more 
> r 1 competitive activities
Although the initial complexity of the manufacturing task above is shown at a 
constant level, it could just as easily vary as the level of managerial competence. 
In examining the state of control and the way in which production management 
worked, it was necessary to consider how they dealt with the complexity of the 
task and how they developed their competences to handle tasks which were 
necessarily complex.
The traditional paradigm of control within production is based on achieving a 
higher level of production managements' competence than difficulty in the 
manufacturing task. If the task's difficulty equals or exceeds this competence 
the system becomes 'out of control'. If the level of management competence is 
increased more than the difficulty of the task and /  or production management 
reduces the difficulty of the task, the plant will move into the 'in control' or even 
the 'improvement' state. At the higher levels of the latter state the gap between 
d ifficu lty  and competence is subsequently reduced. This happens when the firm 
learns to exploit the strengths of its manufacturing system as a means of compet­
ing. The plant remains 'in control' but at a more competitive level. Such
classifications are inevitably imprecise; despite these limitations, they represent 
an important set of differences, particularly over time.
The difficulty of the manufacturing task in the 'in control1 cases has already 
been explored. We now turn to the competence of the production managers to 
exercise control. Two factors affecting their competence were considered. 
Firstly, what type of information did the production managers receive and 
secondly, what, if anything, did they consider it important to learn in order to 
improve their competence.
<».52 The Diversity of Information Received by Production Management. 
Proposition
Production management seek their information from a wide variety of sources. 
They use information from their own sources to overcome the delays in the 
formal written reports. The 'formal' reporting system is primarily used to 
check what is reported about production and to confirm information obtained 
earlier.
The traditional paradigm primarily concentrates on the formal reporting 
systems used in production management. Examining the evidence I became more 
aware of the variety of sources of their information and how they used it for 
varying purposes. Figure 9 below sets out the principal relationships between the 
various sources of information. It also introduces how they were used to comple­
ment each other in the process of controlling.
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Figure 9 The Relationship Between the Various Sources of Information 
used Production-Managers
Main sources of information:
- Labour efficiency
- Work flowr l
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Direct collection of raw data
*
Use of personal contacts
<».521 Preferences in the sources of information
To examine the proposition outlined in <».52 above, I established by means of a 
questionnaire, the priorities of the production management teams for information 
from the alternative sources. Their preferred sources of information are summ­
arised in Table 7 below.





CLUTCH MEDICAL PUMPS OVERALL
PRODUCTION MOT'S 
OWN SOURCES
Personal contacts 2 1 3 3 1st
Production meetings 1 3 2 2 2nd
Touring the plant 3 2 <* <* <»th
STAFF BASED SOURCES
Written reports 4 <»* l 1 3rd
Non-production meetings 
* joint score
5 <♦• 3 3 3th
Table 7 shows that the two most preferred sources of information were 
production meetings and personal contacts. Both sources were based on 'face to 
face' contact between the provider and user. Indeed, were it not for the unusual
score of 1st place for w ritten reports in the medical case, the first three pre­
ferred sources would all have been under the direct influence of the production 
manager /  supervisors. The high score for written information in the medical 
case can probably be attributed to the fact that the main information providers 
reported directly to the Manufacturing Director, who actively ensured that they 
produced information which was useful to the users. Nevertheless, the fourth 
place assigned to 'touring the plant' suggested that the managers did not give high 
priority to observing the small fluctuations in performance, whether in quality, 
output rate or in plant condition, that led to uncertainty and thus to the build up 
of buffering devices. Given that such details are not shown in the traditional 
system of control reports, it is only through the system of 'managing by walking 
about' that they will be identified. That the majority of management teams in 
the 'in control' cases did not do so, suggests they were either unaware of these 
fluctuations or they considered them uncontrollable. The formal 'written' 
information system was ranked third in importance. However, it should be noted 
that the perceptions by individual managers of the importance of written inform­
ation differed more substantially than of any other source of information. The 
low ranking of written information is significant given its central position in the 
the traditional paradigm of control. The paradigm is predicated on the premise 
that the line managers control via information provided by specialist staff. The 
role of the specialist is generally considered to be identifying what data should be 
collected, performing any necessary analyses and producing the 'routine' report 
for line and senior management. Yet, it is evident from the above, that product­
ion managers prefer their own sources of information to the staff based reports. 
These findings need to be considered to establish whether they come from weak­
nesses in the reports or whether they indicate a weakness in the paradigm.
<».522 A comparison of the speed in obtaining information: written v. non-written 
sources
Figure 9 above argued that production management sought information from 
more rapid sources than was provided by the routine written reporting system.
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To meet the need for rapid information the managers developed a number of 
alternative means of obtaining the information in time to take the necessary 
decisions.
Three aspects of performance were most noticeably affected:
(a) Information about production levels
(b) Information about attendance /  idle time levels
(c) Information about scrap /  reject levels
In all three instances, supervision required to know either the same day an 
event occurred, or at the latest, the next working day. I compared the time at 
which the Production Supervisors first knew the facts from their own sources with 
when they knew the same data from the written reporting system. The results of 
this comparison in the pump case are shown below as Table 8.
The above comparison shows that information in these three important areas 
was obtained by production supervision more rapidly than was obtained through
the formal written reporting systems used in the plant.
ASPECT OF 
PERFORMANCE
HOW SUPER VISOR S OBTAINED 
THE INFORMATION AND WHEN




(1) Night shift record book
(2) Morning meeting
1-3 days
Information and consequences 
known by 1100 each day
Average
Attendance 6c idle time
Scrap /  
reject levels
(1) Unclocked cards examined in 9 days 
racks within 13 mins, of each shift 
starting
(2) Idle time known following day 
from booking records (0830)
Most scrap known by 0830 follow- Average 10 days 
ing day from copies of inspectors' 
reject slips
The routine reports on these topics were used to supplement information 
obtained directly. It is evident from studies of Japanese quality practices that
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shop floor workers, as well as managers, undertake a wide range of analyses and 
thus reduce the need for those made by staff, in addition to increasing their own 
commitment. These analyses often reach and at times exceed that provided by 
staff in a number of U.K. companies. Thus, the boundary between 'computer 
based' analyses and worker /  supervisor analyses is a shifting rather than a fixed 
frontier. If the system is transferred solely to the computer, the onus will remain 
on staff based control, while if it is placed on supervision, production management 
will be required to increase their rate of learning.
<♦.53 A Comparison of the Written Information and the Key Manufacturing Tasks 
Proposition
The competence of production management to exercise effective control is 
reduced by weaknesses in their written reports. These reports do not ade­
quately reflect the priorities of the KMTs; neither is their content adequately 
linked with decision making in production.
The comparison between the written information (reports) and the KMTs was 
based on three forms of assessment. These considered the:
(a) proportion of reports devoted to particular themes,
(b) quality of the link between a set of reports and each individual KMT,
(c) value of the reports in distinguishing between good and poor performance.
It was anticipated that the mis-match between the written reports and the 
KMTs would be greater, the closer a plant was to the 'out of control' condition. 
Conversely as the plant approached the 'continuous improvement' condition, its 
written reports would be more closely linked with its KMTs.
In order to make this evaluation a series of scales was developed, which 
reflected both the 'customer service' and the 'resource efficiency' dimensions of 
manufacturing performance. Details of these scales are provided in Appendix A.
<».531 The proportion of reports devoted to major topics
While the comparison of the written reports must be directly made with the
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specific KMTs applicable in a given plant, it was considered desirable to under­
take an initial broad comparison between the pattern of reports in the four cases. 
The results of this examination are shown in Table 9 below. Comparisons were 
made between the KMTs /  OWC identified by the four Managing Directors, and 
the written information received by their Production Managers /  immediate 
supervisory subordinates.
Table 9 The Proportion of Routine Control Reports received b^ the 






Clutch Medical Pump Unweighted
Average
Physical Quantities 66 96 23 39 93
Plant Utilization - 29 - 19 9
Plant Load 3 6 I I 6
Labour Performance - 5 9 9 3
Stocks and WIP - 2 20 8 8
Quality 29 2 8 2 9
Financial 1 3 >1 9 2
Sales and Delivery 9 16 90 17 19
Total Percentage 100 100 100 100 100
Total Number of Reports 91 186 106 181 191
Table 9 must be interpreted with caution, as it does not distinguish between
the size and quality of the reports. In practice, as would be expected, the 
reports varied between single and fifty-nine pages, hand written to computerized 
and differed between great and little  value to their recipients. Despite this 
caveat, the pattern of reports by topic suggests that the Production Managers' 
attention was being directed to differing sets of priorities. The percentage of 
the ceramics case reports on output quantities gives an erroneous perspective. 
This resulted from the use of the 'on-line' computer terminal substituting for some 
reports and his use of PPC records in the next office. He tended to use their 
records and discuss load etc. directly with the Production Controller, rather than 
rely on reports. However, two remarkable differences were worth noting} he 
received no direct figures on labour performance, nor did he receive stock level / 
VHP figures, except in the monthly accounting figures.
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It can be seen from Table 9 that the reports received by the production 
management teams were skewed in favour of the efficient use of resources rather 
than the level of customer service. It shows an emphasis on reporting the level 
of physical output in the cases. It also shows that the theme of quality received 
scant attention. The examination demonstrated that while considerable inform­
ation was provided about sales demand, none was provided explicitly about 
delivery. The measures most closely reflecting delivery performance were in 
practice based on a simplified version of the availability of items in the finished 
goods store.
The extent to which this volume of data was, or was not, reflected in the 
quality of information is discussed below.
9.532 The Quality of the link between production management's written reports 
and their KMTs.
To assess the quality of the linkage between the production management 
teams' written reports and their KMTs, I devised a rating system which gave a 
score to the quality of this fit. The scoring system was composed of two parts. 
The first gave the relative importance of the various dimensions of performance. 
This value was unadjusted for its importance in terms of corporate strategy. 
Thus it was theoretically possible to achieve an excellent score on an unnecessary 
dimension of performance. This weakness was overcome by using a second score 
which showed the importance of the particular dimension of performance. To 
facilitate  the distinction between them, I presented the former as numbers and 
the latter as letters. The result of these reviews is shown below in Table 10.
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Table 10 The Quality of Fit between Reports Received b  ^ Production Managers
“________________andlheir Plant's K M T s __________________" ____________
DIMENSIONS Ceramics Clutch Medical Pump
OF MD's Eval- MD's Eval- MD's Eval- MD's Eval-
PERFORM- Prior uation Prior uation Prior uation Prior uation
_____________ANCE________ -ity_________ -ity________ -tty__________ -tty________
(1) Measures Delivery B 9 B 9 B 3 B 9
of Customer Flexibility B 5 D 5 C 5 C 9
Service Cost B 2 A 3 A 2 B 3
Quality A 2 A 9 A 2 A 3
Sub-score 1.5 3.25 1.75 9.00 1.75 3.25 2.0 3.5




Machine U tiliz D 3 C /D 3 E (5)* D 3
-ation
Inventory C 3 B 9 B 3 B 3
Quality costs B 9 B 3 B 3 B 3
Sub-score 9.0 9.0 2.5 3.00 2.75 3.23 2.75 2.75
(Scoring system; Evaluation of reports: 1 ■ Excellent, 2 = Very good, 3 = 
Fair, 9 r Weak, 3 * Poor. Priority of performance: A * Essential, B = 
Very important, C = Important, D = Slightly important, E * Unimportant)
(*) No report received
Examining Table 10 it  can be seen that;
(a) the reporting system in each of the case studies was evaluated as 
providing better information on resource efficiency than on customer 
service.
(b) conversely the evaluation showed that there was a greater need for 
customer service information than for resource efficiency information.
(c) the measures of resource efficiency receiving most attention 
(labour efficiency Sc machine utilization) were considered less import­
ant than those (inventory Sc quality costs) receiving less coverage.
(d) the most extensive gap between the information provided and 
required, in terms of customer service, is about delivery performance.
The deficiencies in reporting on flexibility and quality were also 
significant.
(e) the only item of information which was over-reported was labour 
efficiency.
Thus it was concluded that there was an inadequate link between the control 
reports received by the production management team and the way in which senior 
management identified the plant as competing in the market place. Furthermore, 
the more emphasis the production management teams gave to the information they 
received, the greater would be the problems created. This would be particularly 
so in respect of the likely trade-offs between labour efficiency and quality. To a 
lesser, but still important, extent there was also scope for conflict between the
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machine utilization measures and controlling the level of inventory.
It was also noted that the ranking of the scores for the measures of customer 
service in the cases was consistent with my assessment of the extent to which 
each case was nearer to the 'out of control' or 'continuous improvement' condit­
ion.
*».533 The value of the production management's written reports in distinguishing 
between normal and abnormal performance
I examined the written reports received by the production management teams 
and interviewed the managers to establish their views on the content, frequency 
and timing of the reports. I established that the reports fell into three groups:
(a) those without standard,
(b) those dealing with summarized data against standards,
(c) those showing individual performances (products or people) against stand­
ards.
My central interest was whether the reports distinguished between normal and 
abnormal performance. Further, were abnormal performances treated as random 
variables, mistakes or as a basis for learning about the system. Discussion on the 
latter point is deferred until later to give it greater attention.
A major example of the non use of standards of performance was in the daily 
reports on output levels. The reports were usually listings of the quantities 
produced. Only in a limited number of instances was output compared with 
standards, either work measurement or capacity. The reports did not show the 
effects of current performance on the ability to meet future requirements. They 
made little  use of standard hours as a measure of load or capacity, although the 
work content varied by a ratio of 10:1. None of the output reports in the clutch 
case measured capacity. In the pump case two thirds did so but only in terms of 
the number of 'average' physical units per shift.
An example of how these weaknesses could be overcome is shown below.
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Assume a planned output of 1000 units to be achieved in five equal daily 
lots of 200 units. The output on day I was 100, and to meet the weekly 
target daily output would need to rise to 223 units. This new daily target 
could then be compared against the daily capacity and corrective action 
taken, if necessary. Where it was required the output and capacity could 
be given in standard hours and even adjusted for departmental perform­
ance.
The type of information discussed above is not always necessary. However, I 
considered the lack of attention to the implications of current production on the 
future in the clutch case was significant. I also considered that the lack of 
suitable capacity measures in the pump case would limit production management's 
ability to plan and control effectively.
The use of aggregate data and standards occurred mainly in parts of the 
costing and quality control systems. The production management cost data fell 
into two groups; product costs using standard costing and monthly management 
accounts, including statements of the expenses. The costing reports distinguish­
ed between different products, but hid the effects of small versus large volumes 
and the consequences of production by different operators. The one distinction 
commonly made was deviations from the specified route, and in these circum­
stances costs were computed and reported. Similarly, much of the internal 
quality data was also provided in an aggregated format.
Quality was shown in Table 10 above to be important in all four cases. It 
should also be noted that all the cases had customer approved SQA systems.
Thus, I was dealing with plants which sought good quality and had been audited by 
quality control specialists.
Production management in the clutch case received one weekly report. It 
showed the quantity rejected in goods inwards, machine shop, and assembly. The 
report stated the part number, the quantity rejected and the cause. Analysis of 
the data showed the reports to be inaccurate. In one instance I established that
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it stated the level of rejects was 2.06%, when the correct figure was 0.13%. The 
variation in reject rates between products was not recorded. However, I calc­
ulated that they ranged from O to (19%. A production manager would be
unlikely to have the time to make these analyses. The effect of such variation on 
uncertainty was not recognized by the production managers concerned, who 
considered 'normal' as covered by 'scheduled averages'. In fact these averages 
were less than the levels found in practice. The data recorded rejects by the line 
making the part, but hid the effect of rejects by product types. This could not 
normally be retrospectively calculated from the report. Although the rejects 
were divided into operator, machine and supplier scrap, the percentages of each 
were not shown, nor was the data broken down in the form needed to take corr­
ective action. I concluded that the weaknesses lay in the presentation of the 
reports not in the data collected. It will be seen from the above that the quality 
control system, despite being an approved SQA system, was not linked with the 
production management to enable the systematic control of inplant quality levels. 
The internal information that was available was often hidden in the aggregated 
form discussed above.
Several of the reports received by the production management teams present­
ed information about individual products and /  or people in the system and com­
pared them with either explicit or implicit standards of performance. The labour 
reports mainly fell into the implicit group. They did not show the target per­
formances for operators or departments, although the managers all expressed 
clear goals about the overall levels of performance they expected to achieve.
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< ♦ . 5 The value of the production management's written reports in identifying 
trends in performance.
I examined the reports received by the production management teams to see 
whether they received any information about trends in performance. I used a 
dBase II computer program which I wrote to give the 'cumulative sum' values of 
performance levels over time. I reinforced the quantitative examination with 
discussions with the users about each document. In two areas, warranty claims 
and labour performance, I obtained six month detailed historical data on perform­
ance.
The production managers' reports were mainly about the costs of scrap. The 
definition, however, was narrow. The data did not enable them to check whether 
quality levels were changing over time. In the pump and medical cases some 
trends were reviewed. In the pump case this was limited to the warranty claims 
but in the medical case the trends in 'in plant' rejects were also monitored by the 
production manager who developed his own records to identify trends in quality 
performance. In both cases the central interest was on the cost of rejects, but in 
neither case was the data provided which would give them the full costs of rejects 
etc. Unlike the data about 'in plant' quality in the pump and clutch cases, their 
warranty claims data identified the claims by specific products so that any 
redesign or changes in their means of manufacture could be made.
Although the production managers did not receive information showing the 
trends in labour performance, I demonstrated that such analysis was 
possible from the data they received. I did so, in the pump case, for operator 
performance and total labour employed. The analysis showed that productivity 
was increasing and that total labour employed in the plant was declining as a ratio 
of the number of production direct operators. These improvements reflected the 
Managing Director's interest in reducing 'indirects', but was given new clarity by 
the revised form of analysis. When this information was shown to the Production 
Manager he expressed surprise at the much earlier detection of trends in perform­
ance. However, as noted earlier, no initiatives were undertaken within product­
ion to reduce the 'demand' for documentation (and thus overheads) by modifying
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the conversion system.
In this and the preceding sub-section I have shown that the reports receiv­
ed by production managers had limited value in detecting either abnormal from 
normal performance or in detecting trends. Clearly, this did not apply to major 
deviations, but it can be argued that these would be known anyway. It is in 
identifying real but comparatively small trends and deviations that the written 
reports are most suitable, and were least effective.
Indeed, when I discussed their written 'control' reports, I found that product­
ion management did not expect to use them to exercise control. This was shown 
to be so in the clutch case, where the Production Manager said:
"I use the written reports in order to see what is said about us, rather than 
to control. I could not control with the information they (staff) provide 
as it's too late to take action when it arrives."
As shown by the above statement, the Production Manager used the non- 
written sources of information when he needed information in order to control. 
The written reports were either used to 'confirm information already known' or 
were simply redundant in the face of faster information gathering methods used 
by the supervision.
The examination showed that the production management teams in the 'in 
control' cases lacked reports which could have helped them evaluate whether they 
were making adequate progress towards these end goals. Without such inform­
ation, there was little  likelihood of movement into the 'continuous improvement' 
condition.
My interviews with the report users showed that they expected variation in 
the daily output. When none occurred they suspected false booking or worker 
controlled output levels. This expectation of variation in performance, combined 
with a lack of means of quickly identifying real trends, reinforced the traditional
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perspective that production management's primary role was to maintain, not 
improve, performance. It also supports the view that they did not understand the 
importance of the link between uncertainty and the control and improvement 
condition.
k.iU  Non-Written Sources of Information
Table 7 showed that production managers in the 'in control' cases considered 
that personal contacts and production meetings were their two most important 
sources of information. 'Touring the plants' was placed fourth in importance of 
information sources. Non production management chaired meetings were almost 
universally considered the least important source of information.
9.5<»l Information gathered at meetings
The analyses of the production management meetings showed a strong emph­
asis on rapid feedback of information about output. They also demonstrated that 
they were not used to eliminate problems. The Production Manager in the clutch 
case provided a particularly clear picture of his purposes for holding these 
meetings. These are summarised as follows:
(a) dissemination of company information to subordinates
(b) a vehicle for staff training
(c) a means of seeking solutions from subordinates
(d) a means of increasing co-ordination within production and with PPC
In particular he emphasised the training and solution dimensions of the meetings 
saying:
"I want them to see how corrective action should flow from a problem ...to get 
them to understand what they can do to solve a problem, as distinct from 
reporting its existence."
The proportion of time spent on the various themes in the meetings was examined.
This shows that 17% of the meeting's time was spent obtaining data more
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rapidly than was achieved by the written reporting system. The main information 
where this speed was sought involved the quantities produced at various stages of 
production and the report of their current location. This rapid exchange of 
information was necessary as the physical movement of the product was much 
faster than the l to 3 days delay in the computer based system of monitoring. It 
was particularly important in the context of items which were being 'urged' 
through the system.
The main emphasis in these meetings was on total output, rather than output 
of specific products. This observation was confirmed on a number of occasions in
'informal' discussions with those attending the meetings. The most explicit 
comment came from the Production Manager who said,
"It's production's job to get the total volumes out, it's other people's job 
to control the rest."
Delays caused by material, tooling or labour shortages led to nearly 32% of the 
discussion. Additionally a further 18% of time was devoted to finding alternative 
work in these circumstances. It can thus be seen that 50% of the time of the 
meetings was devoted to the consequences of uncertainty. It is also evident that 
the meetings were used as mechanisms for handling the consequences of the 
uncertainty, rather than for seeking to eliminate (or even reduce), the complexity 
that existed. With five people attending these meetings of 30 minutes duration, 
the weekly loss of time was 12.5 hours in management meetings. The loss of 
time on the shop floor was considered likely to be high.
A further 55 minutes discussion about delays and their consequences took 
place in the weekly 'Accountability' meeting. Despite the considerable time 
devoted to this theme, at no time was I able to find any positive actions being 
undertaken to eliminate the primary causes of the delays.
The production meetings in the clutch case tended to reflect the more marg­
99
inal 'in control' state in this case, than in the pump and medical cases. In the 
pump case, the production meetings were conducted in a more proactive environ­
ment. There remained a heavy emphasis on monitoring the location of work, so 
that smooth workflow could be maintained. However, this represented a smaller 
proportion of the meeting. The remainder of the time was spent on planning how 
to make future workflows operate more smoothly.
U.5<»2 Information gathered from personal contacts
Although information from personal contacts was given the overall highest 
score in importance as a source of control information, I was unable to examine 
this dimension of the production managers' work without changing the nature of 
the investigation and lengthening what was already a large study. I therefore 
decided that, despite its importance, I would not examine this source of inform­
ation. Clearly work is necessary on this theme, but I consider it requires forming 
the centre piece of another study, rather than being a peripheral component of 
this research.
4 .H 3  Patrolling the shop floor as a means of obtaining control information
Shop floor patrols formed a regular part of the practice of the Supervisors in 
the clutch and pump cases. In the clutch case, the Production Manager was also 
heavily involved, as a consequence of the Managing Director's daily tour of the 
plant. No detectable pattern of shop floor patrols was identified in the medical 
case.
I accompanied Supervisors in both plants and the Production Manager in the 
clutch case on a number of patrols. In the latter case study, the primary practice 
was to look for hold ups to the smooth flow of work, (i.e. machines that were idle, 
material that had not moved etc.). In a number of ways the behaviour of the
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Manager /  Supervisors was similar to that of a progress chaser. This was consist­
ent with the high level of concern over workflow found in their general approach 
to their role. In the pump case, the Supervisors were observed to concentrate 
more on maintaining working relationships between themselves and their subordin­
ates.
The limited data available in this area made it difficult to gauge the wider 
implications of these findings, (i.e. one case (clutch) was near the 'out of control' 
condition and in another (medical) patrols were not evident). It seemed, however, 
within these narrow limits that the non-written sources were partly used to 
supplement data not collected via the reporting system and partly used to give 
early warnings to management about the behaviour of workers /  the system, to 
detect when it was beginning to malfunction.
<».55 The Impact of Learning on the Competence of Production Management 
Proposition
Production managers do not emphasise 'learning', (and therefore, improve­
ment) as a central component of their role. They tend to have a limited 
perspective of the direction in which improvements should occur. In 
addition they do not recognize the extent to which improvements are 
practical within the manufacturing processes.
The literature review showed the significant role assigned to training (and 
therefore learning) of Japanese and German manufacturing firms. I, therefore, 
examined the scope for, and placed on, learning and how it affected their compet­
ence to control.
Three themes emerged:
(a) Production managers' view of learning
(b) The scope for learning
(c) What they did (and did not) learn
These themes are examined below.
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<*.551 Production managers' perception of their role and the impact on learning
Production Managers in the four 'in control' cases, shared a common concern 
for output levels, labour efficiency and quality. However, within these general 
issues their priorities differed significantly. In the clutch and pump cases, 
achieving output was assigned first priority. I asked the Production Manager in 
the clutch case how he would choose between achieving greater than planned 
output by not producing all the scheduled items, or meeting the schedule but at 
the cost of lower total value of output. He declared that he was quite clear that 
the Managing Director expected him in a ll but exceptional circumstances to 
achieve the higher level of output. This emphasis on the value of total output 
was also reflected in the pump case, where a Superintendent reported that:
"My job is to get the work out. I w ill override the systems when I have
to......I will get concession notes when the best machine is not available....!
will chase suppliers when the material is not there.... maybe next week I 
will use the system, because it will suit my needs then."
While the commitment to achieving output by the Supervisor is high, it shows 
that he views his role as getting the best out of the system rather than changing 
it. His approach gives precedence to current output, rather than improving 
competence through developing the manufacturing system. Further, it was 
evident that he did not perceive there to be any important linkage between the 
state of control and either uncertainty or complexity. At least, if he did consid­
er there was a linkage, he did not consider it to be part of his task to learn how to 
improve the system.
<*.552 The scope for learning
Considerable scope existed for learning by the production management teams 
in the four 'in control' cases. The literature review supported by Figure 8 shows 
learning in two forms; effectively handling existing tasks and reducing the 
complexity of tasks. The former reflects 'good' traditional practice, while both
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forms of improvement would be required in the revised paradigm. Both aspects 
of learning were considered.
The revised paradigm is characterised by four features. Low levels of 
inventory, high standards of inter-process quality, high flexibility by the work­
force and a significant reduction in transactional documentation. I have prev­
iously showed that the production management teams did not receive the inform­
ation necessary to evaluate the working of their systems in terms of these dimens­
ions of performance. The examination further showed that they did not have 
suitable information about the end-results achieved. Nor did they possess the 
information needed to guide them about their progress towards these goals.
U.553 '»hat they did (and did not) learn
The literature review revealed sharp differences in the approach to (and 
content of) learning between firms following the traditional and revised para­
digms. Common to the German and Japanese approaches to production is a high 
emphasis on technical competence, both in management, and more significantly by 
the workforce. This differs sharply from the generally perceived approach in 
British manufacturing firms.
In examining what was learnt in the case studies, I sought to differentiate  
between formal learning, where some form of certification occurred and informal 
learning when there was no public recognition of the knowledge acquired.
Information from the personnel departments in the cases showed that most of 
the Superintendents in the four cases had some form of managerial qualifications. 
These are shown below in Figure 10.
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It can be seen from the above that most of the Supervisors either had passed 
the 'National Examination Board in Supervisory Studies’ or had at least an equiva­
lent level of qualification. Thus, within the framework of qualifications, most of 
these 'in control' cases had taken advantage of the available provisions.
In my interviews with the Managers and Supervisors, I sought to establish what 
they considered they had learnt (on the job) in the previous 2-3 years. I looked to 
see whether they considered they, like the Germans and Japanese, had learnt 
much about the behaviour of their manufacturing systems. In particular, I wished 
to discover whether they had learnt to reduce the complexity /  uncertainties of 
the manufacturing systems and processes.
In the clutch case there was no recognition of these concepts. In the pump 
case, some awareness existed and the development of dedicated cells was quoted 
as an example of developing a much less complex system. Conversely, they also 
reported fears that the introduction of MRP systems would change the role of the 
manager, making it less close to the day to day operations. Wild (1986) also 
recognizes this as a potential difficulty. What was not recognized was that such 
distancing of production managers from the day to day task reduces the scope for 
making incremental improvements.
The response in the medical case was similar to that in the pump case. The 
main learning taking place was via the redesign of long-chained flow lines into 
small groups /  individual workers completing their own tasks.
In none of the cases could I find evidence of close involvement of production 
management in advancing product quality. Neither could I find evidence of 
reductions in setup times. Finally, although the production managers in the pump 
and medical cases both emphasised the importance of skilled workforces, in 
neither instance could they shown any evidence of systematic worker training 
programmes. Operators still learnt by initial examples from foremen /  setters, 
followed by working alongside a fellow worker. Sitting with Nellie was alive and 
well.
«».6 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE THE TRADITIONAL PARADIGM OF COISTTROL
The foregoing examination of four case studies of plants following the tradit­
ional paradigm of control has revealed the limitations of the model as a basis for 
maintaining a plant at a competitive level in a changing market place. It was 
evident, in these cases, that competitiveness depended significantly on manufact­
uring performance. Despite its critical role, there was little  evidence to show 
this 'importance' was reflected in the approach to controlling production.
Although the cases examined were all identified as'in control* this state  was 
largely achieved by a series of stepped changes to the manufacturing system. As 
was shown, the changes were primarily introduced from outside the production 
management team. Such changes tend to be the discrete replacement of old 
systems and technologies with newer alternatives. L ittle  attention is given to 
learning to exploit the potential of existing systems, nor of using such information 
as the basis for designing even better systems to replace them at the appropriate 
time. As a consequence, some of the changes led to further d ifficu lties  in 
achieving /  maintaining control. Additionally, they followed a strategy of 
attempting to achieve better control via a reduction of the complexity /  uncert­
ainty of the manufacturing task. This meant that the systems or mechanisms of
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control had to be correspondingly more complex, in order to regulate the high 
inherent variety in the manufacturing system. Such a weakness is of great 
significance in an economy which is dependent on manufacturing competitiveness.
The traditional paradigm does not stimulate senior or operational managers to 
seek a state of control which both maintains stability and is adaptive to necessary 
change. Production managers are not, in general, recognized as having a signif­
icant proactive contribution to make to corporate competitiveness. When 
improvements are recognized as necessary they fall into two groups; larger 
improvements which are sought in the form of discrete steps, generally based on 
capital expenditure and smaller improvements which are expected of production, 
tending to be limited to productivity.
The written reports, at senior and departmental management levels, which are 
perceived by the literature to be the central instruments of control, have only 
limited effectiveness in this role. Their main strength lies in the monitoring of 
'resource efficiency' while their main weakness lies in monitoring 'customer 
service'.
The production management team's written reports not only do not reflect the 
KMTs of their companies, neither do they contain the type of information needed 
to resolve outstanding problems. The data frequently arrives too late  to be used 
in decision making. Production management tend to overcome this lateness by 
gathering their own information either at meetings or by personal contact. 
Although such information is obtained in time, it is more difficult to use as a basis 
for analysis of outstanding problems. Thus, the conjunction of the absence of 
guidelines about where better production performance could lead to greater 
competitiveness and the lack of suitable information, leads to a low level of 
learning. This is particularly so in respect of improvements to the manufacturing 
task.
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The weaknesses outlined above can, in the face of strong competitive press­
ures or in the event of a low level of managerial capability, lead to a loss of 
control. Regrettably, even if the traditional paradigm is practised effectively, 
as demonstrated in the medical case, it does not produce the level of control and 
improvement that is claimed to arise from the practice of the revised paradigm.
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5. THE 'OUT OF CONTROL' CONDITION OF THE 
TRADITIONAL PARADIGM OF CONTROL IN PRODUCTION
Î . I  THE 'OUT OF CONTROL' CONDITION IN PRODUCTION
Figure I identified three conditions of control: 'in control', 'out of control' 
and 'control and improvement'. I showed in section U that the 'in  control' and 
'out of control' conditions are both products of the traditional paradigm of 
control in production. Further I suggested that the traditional paradigm would 
lead to the 'out of control' condition when the difficulty of the manufacturing 
task exceeds the capability of the production management team to exercise 
control. This section deals with situations where this occurred and gave rise to 
the 'out of control' condition.
Proposition
The 'out of control' condition occurs when either the manufacturing task 
is too difficult to accomplish or when production management lacks the 
necessary capabilities. The difficulty of the manufacturing task is a 
function of the way a company competes in the market and the suitability 
of its techno and infrastructures to support the competitive strategies 
adopted.
Three of the seven cases exhibited 'out of control' characteristics. The two 
most serious instances involved plants respectively producing kitchen furniture 
and brakes. A third, less serious instance involved a department in the clutch 
case discussed above.
5.11 Causes of the 'Out of Control' Condition
Earlier I developed the argument that the 'out of control' condition occurred 
when there was a mis-match between the difficulty of the manufacturing task and 
/  or the level of capability of management to exercise control. Based on the 
above it can be argued that a production unit is 'out of control' when it is unable, 
over a sustained period, to satisfactorily complete its required manufacturing 
tasks. A second criterion was identified in the literature review. The cyber­
netic principle of ultrastability showed that systems go out of control when they 
fail to maintain sufficient internal stability. Failures of either type have adverse 
effects on competitiveness.
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It was shown above that the complexity, and therefore difficulty, of the 
manufacturing task is largely a function of corporate competitive strategies and 
their means of execution. The literature showed that the traditional paradigm 
does not adequately address the link between strategy and complexity. This 
reflects the assumption that the production system is inevitably complex and 
uncertain. This assumption was challenged in the manufacturing strategy litera­
ture, which showed how to reduce the complexity of the manufacturing task via 
the focus concept and internal coherence. Section 6 showed that in the absence 
of manufacturing strategies the difficulty of the manufacturing task tended to 
increase in the four case studies.
5.12 Evidence of the 'Out of Control' Condition
The 'out of control' condition in the 'out of control' cases was identified by 
comparing production performance with the KMTs or OWC set out by the respect­
ive senior managers. (These KMTs and OWC are shown below in the sub-sections 
considering the quality of fit between them and the information provided.)
The brake case failed to meet output levels and cost standards. The original 
equipment and service output was reviewed over a six month period; this showed 
that 15* of the original equipment parts and 2 0 *  of service parts were not 
completed to schedule. Overall labour costs were more than 60% over, and a 
representative product's total costs nearly 31* over, budget.
In the kitchen furniture case the main failure was the 'on time delivery of 
complete orders'. Delivery promises were broken for 3 8 *  of orders. As the 
majority of broken delivery promises were for larger orders, the overall effect 
was the late delivery of 67 * of the items ordered.
As noted above, the problems in the clutch case were mainly in the assembly
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department. Output was 10% below target levels, but was achieved in an atmos­
phere of dis-order and frantic expediting of components from the machine shop 
and purchasing. Component shortages led to considerable re-setting and breaking 
down of products on the assembly equipment. This subsequently led to other 
delays in production and deterioration of quality.
3.2 THE CAUSES OF ThC ’OUT OF CONTROL' CONDITION
Figure 8 showed that the 'out of control' condition is created when the 
d ifficu lty  of the manufacturing task exceeds the capability of the production 
management team to accomplish the task. I showed above that the mis-match 
occurs via two forms of incongruence; either between the task and the process 
technology /  procedures, or between the task and management's capability to 
exercise control. Both mis-matches can be triggered by changes in the manufact­
uring task to support corporate competitiveness. The following proposition 
emerged from the above discussion.
Proposition
The 'out of control' condition occurs when either there is a mis-match 
between the corporate strategy and the manufacturing task or when the 
manufacturing task and the capability to control are incompatible. The 
absence of a manufacturing strategy contributes significantly to both 
types of mis-match.
3.21 A Lack of Manufacturing Strategy
Discussions with the Managing Directors of the kitchen furniture and brake 
cases revealed the absence of manufacturing strategies in either case. Although 
many changes were being made within the companies, to help them compete more 
e ffe c tive ly , they were primarily defensive and lacked the perspectives found in
manufacturing strategies.
In the brake case the Managing Director was interested in developing a 
manufacturing strategy, but it had not as yet been formulated. However, some
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action was undertaken to reduce the complexity of the manufacturing system, and 
to reduce the extent of the process -  task mis-match. These plans consisted of a 
limited application of the 'plant within plant* concept and use of CNC machinery 
to produce smaller batches and achieve closer tolerances. At the time of the 
study a small 'plant within plant* section had been implemented.
In the kitchen furniture case neither the Managing nor Manufacturing 
Directors were aware of the concept of manufacturing strategy nor did their 
practices cover the type of issues involved. A similar lack of awareness existed 
in the clutch case. In both instance*, policy decisions were mainly communicated 
verbally between senior and production management. This tended to limit the 
scope for detailed examination of alternatives. This suggested to me that senior 
management did not recognize the link between their policy decisions and the 
control of production performance. Related to this was the question in both case 
studies of whether senior management possessed /  sought the information needed 
to inform them of the effects of increasing the level of difficulty of the manu­
facturing task on the control of their plants. If they possessed such information, 
did they have a strategy to enable their manufacturing function to be restored to 
effective levels of control?
The above examples demonstrated the high levels of difficulty of the manu­
facturing task in the 'out of control' cases and the absence of manufacturing 
strategies which would help corporate management to recognize the link between 
the complexity of the manufacturing task and the control of production. In all 
the 'out of control' cases, attempts were made to escape from the condition 
through technological changes in the manufacturing processes.
Senior and operational managers in the clutch and brake cases strongly 
suggested that the 'out of control' condition had arisen recently as a consequence 
of the increased pressures on production, as their firms sought to improve their
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competitiveness. However, the Works Managers in the kitchen case did not 
agree, arguing that (ire-fighting was simply more intense as a result of increased 
difficulty in the manufacturing task over the past two years.
5.22 The Impact of Increased Competition on the Difficulty of the Manufacturing 
Tasks
I examined the competitive pressures in these 'out of control' cases to see 
whether they led to the expected expansion of the product range and thus to 
greater manufacturing complexity. Investigations in the brake and clutch cases 
took place in 1981*2, when a maior contraction occurred in the automotive 
industry. The kitchen furniture case was studied in 1985*6, when imports from 
maior European producers challenged the company's leadership of its market 
sector. Table I I  below summarises the main changes to the manufacturing tasks 
in these case studies.









Range increase from 
2 to 6 families of 
products. (Output 
reduced by by 90%)
229 new designs /  
modification and 263 
Engineering changes 
in 2 years
From 197 to 952 
lines and 11 to 18 
ranges in two years
Reduced Inven­
tory Levels
Cut WIP from 19m. to 
16.3m. Make 
components in same 
month as assembly.
Inventory cut from 
two to one months 
supply.
Cut total stocks by 





Tolerances on the 
new products reduced 
to one tenth of 
previous levels
Commitment to 
reach grade A from 
Grade B and below 
SQA levels





Cut production costs 
by 30%.




More flexible output, 
matching demand.
Hold current costs 
for 2 years.
Specials from 6 to 9 
weeks
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Two types of changes m the manufacturing task are shown in Table I I .  In the 
kitchen furniture and clutch cases the type of task remained similar, while the 
complexity increased. However, in the brake case the nature of the task become 
more difficult as the plant was repositioned on the product-process matrix. 
Smaller batches with more frequent changeovers, and closer tolerances, were 
required. These were d ifficu lt to achieve on the highly dedicated plant. To a 
lesser extent incongruence existed between the task and process in the kitchen 
furniture case as the product range expanded and production of 'specials' grew m 
importance. Against this background of change, production management in these 
cases was slow to meet the changes and this tended to exacerbate the 'out of 
control' condition.
Structural inconsistencies between the processes /  procedures and the manu­
facturing task have been given the title of 'process and profile mis-match'. They 
typically occur as above, when changes take place in market requirements, so that 
the relative importance of price, quality, delivery speed etc. change from those 
previously incorporated in the design of the process and procedures. Conse­
quently the manufacturing processes and procedures are no longer adequate for 
the tasks they are required to perform.
The two principal 'out of control' cases highlighted the differences between 
increasing the d ifficulty of the task and changing the nature of the manufacturing 
task. The increased d ifficu lty  of the manufacturing task in the cases has been 
shown to arise in response to the need for higher competitive performance. The 
absence of manufacturing strategies in these 'out of control' case studies meant 
that there were no formal mechanisms to ensure the manufacturing task was 
constrained to match the resources available, or that new resources were obtain­
ed to meet these revised tasks.
The effect on control was significant. Under this structure the goals which
control sought to accomplish were changeable in both difficulty and direction. 
The rate  of change of such goals appeared to be more rapid than that which could 
be achieved within production, affected as it is by the physical constraints of the 
process technologies and the organizational constraints of the procedures used to 
regulate the manufacturing system.
5.3 WEAKNESSES IN SENIOR MANAGEMENT’S CONTROL OF PRODUCTION
The discussion above revealed three important factors. Firstly, that product­
ion performance had fallen short of the necessary levels and thus had led to the 
’out of control' condition. Secondly, that the primary cause of this condition lay 
in the manufacturing task being too d ifficult for the capability of the present 
system of controlling production. Thirdly, that the senior management lacked a 
manufacturing strategy to guide their resolution of technological or infrastruct­
ural problems.
The examination above led to further consideration of three ways in which 
senior management's control of production appeared to be ineffective. The first 
was the limited knowledge of senior management about the extent of production's 
control of the competitively important dimensions of performance. Secondly, 
there was the inadequate extent to which the system of control made clear the 
level and rate of improvements in production performance required in order to 
restore the plants to an effective state of control in their changing environments. 
Thirdly, there was the extent to which senior management brought about e ffect­
ive integration between line and staff managers to resolve control problems.
3.31 Control of the Strategically Important Dimensions of Production Perform­
ance
Proposition
Senior management reporting systems do not sufficiently reflect the ways 
in which production performance can support corporate competitiveness.
I interviewed the managers concerned to establish sets of KMTs or OWC, as
the absence of manufacturing strategies meant that they did not have statements 
of their key manufacturing tasks. In the brake case this was achieved via 
discussions with Design, Marketing and Manufacturing Managers. The KMTs are 
displayed in the left hand column of Table 12 below, while the reports received 
are shown in the middle column. The last column identifies deficiencies in the 
match between KMTs and the reporting system.
Table 12 A Comparison of KMTs Ac the Managing Director's Control 
InformationlBrake (Tase)






(a) keeping abreast, and poss- 
ibly slightly ahead of, 
its rivals in terms ofi
(i) manufactured quality none critical for cost & quality, no 
basis for comparison with 
competition.
<u) delivery speed none not critical for O.E.
( i i i ) delivery reliability none was low but not reported directly 
to Managing Director




lacked information by product 
group and volume
(iv) reducing manufacturing 
costs by 20-30 % (b) weekly labour efficiency report detailed monitoring of labour not trends or analysis
(c) Total hours to 
standard hours
trends only visually inspected no 
analysis of underlying causes.
(v) improve service delivery 
speed and reliability
none critical issue not reported
(vi) reduce lead time to intro 




no use of critical path or resour­
ce allocation techniques to 
reduce lead times
(v ii) minimize tooling costs single exception 
report
needs maior improvement and 
routine control
(viii)support production of 
more advanced products




Daily and weekly output 
Absenteeism figures 
Forecast of standard hours 
required per month




Table 12 shows a gap between the KMTs identified earlier by the Plant 
Manager as important, and his reports. First was a series of omissions in the 
topics covered by the reports. No reports were received on quality, delivery 
speed or delivery reliability. Secondly, his information was inadequate on costs 
and on new product introductions which were insufficient for effective control. 
Examination of the reports revealed weaknesses in the way they presented 
important information. The missing themes are as follows.
He did not know about the quality reaching customers or about the internal 
costs of quality. He stated that he relied on phone calls from the Chief 
Executives of his customers to indicate problems. He stated that he had not 
realized the deficiency until he discussed it with me.
He considered delivery speed and reliability, covering bothorigmal and service 
parts, to be a particularly critical element in the company's plans to increase its 
share of this profitable sector. To improve delivery speed had been identified as 
the first priority in offering a more competitive approach. Despite recognition of 
its importance, no reports on its performance were provided.
Tooling costs were particularly significant in the context of tenders for new 
products, as the customer purchased the tools on a separate contract. However, 
costs and delivery performance were not reported in ways which enabled compar­
ison w ith the main competitors.
Similar weaknesses in the omission of important dimensions of production
performance were identified in the kitchen furniture case.
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3.311 Use of substitute control reports 
Proposition
Senior management use multiple ’indirect' reports to compensate for the 
omission of specific reports reflecting the key dimensions of production's 
potential contribution to corporate competitiveness
The absence of specific reports showing performance on the senior managers' 
KMTs led to the use of a series of indirect reports.
An example of indirect reports was found in the brake case. The Managing 
Director used a combination of reports to attempt to regulate delivery perform­
ance. Shortages and stock levels were noted from the weekly sales /  stock report 
and compared against daily and weekly output reports. Machine utilization 
reports were used selectively to examine known bottlenecks. Despite this, he 
was unable to ensure satisfactory delivery levels. He attributed this failure to 
inadequacies in the answers provided by the Production Managers when they 
reported on the shortfalls in output. He considered they did not reveal the 
important primary or secondary causes of the restriction in output, which inhib­
ited him from taking appropriate corrective action. He claimed that even when 
the primary problems were solved, secondary problems would constrain output to 
current levels unless they too were resolved. Despite these views, which were 
strongly expressed, no evidence was found of attempts to change the reports or to 
make the Production Managers provide better explanations of the shortfalls.
Similarly, the introduction of new products had been identified as a critical 
factor in corporate competitiveness. This required new products to be intro­
duced quickly and tooling costs to be reduced substantially. None of the reports 
dealt specifically with these issues. Instead, the timing of introductions was 
monitored via the minutes of the product development committee. While this 
enabled detailed follow up of specific products /  components and the departments 
concerned, it was of limited value to senior management in evaluating progress on 
reducing the overall lead times. This was, however, needed, to at least match 
the times of their competitors. Management was aware that customers consider 
the higher than average tooling costs a disadvantage in obtaining contracts. The 
costs were monitored via the monthly departmental accounts. While this gave
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them accurate accounts, (within the reliability of standard costing systems), of 
the cost of the toolmaking facility, it did not assist them to analyse the cost of 
individual tools or to identify how they could be reduced to a competitive level.
In the kitchen furniture case a similar substitution of indirect monitoring 
occurred in respect of delivery performance.
9.312 Use of partial reports 
Proposition
The partial nature of the reports received by senior management further 
weakened the analysis of production performance because of the limited 
nature of their content.
Although similar to the use of substitute reports, partial reports differ subtly 
from them, in that they addressed an important issue, albeit incompletely.
The brake case Managing Director was aware from the monthly accounts that 
the factory labour variance was 61% over standards. However, he could not 
identify whether it was localised in particular parts of the plant. Neither was he 
able to identify whether particular families of products had better or worse 
variances than the average. This forced him to seek general rather than partic* 
ular solutions. Similarly, although aware that output for certain families of 
products was below target, he was unable to identify if this arose from giving 
inappropriate priority to other items in the range.
Total staff costs were regarded as an important element in works costs. They
were monitored using the ratio of total hours to standard hours, which revealed 
that they exceeded t i l .  The Managing Director paid close attention to the total 
of the overall ratio, but significantly less to those of the subsections. Five years 
historical data was available, providing comparative figures for the group's LK 
and continental plants. Despite this, no evidence was found of his using the 
information to exercise control over indirect labour costs beyond the simple 
practice of restricting replacement of vacancies. No form of trend analysis was
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undertaken, simply the visual inspection of graphs.
The brake case Managing Director was aware of limitations in his information; 
in particular he wanted to know the labour contents of the plant load and to 
measure labour efficiency. The work study department was working on the 
production of a new report showing the labour requirements of the plant load. 
The report was inaccurate and slow to produce, as some of the figures were 
unavailable and all of the calculations were done by hand. The data for these 
calculations existed in the accounting database, but the Plant Manager was 
advised by the computer department of a delay of approximately 3-6 months and 
an internal re-charge of 112,000 to obtain them.
3.313 Limitations of the strategic control information
In both the clutch and the kitchen furniture cases an inadequate link was 
detected between the pattern of information received by senior management and 
the role production needed to play in bringing about competitiveness. It was 
concluded that this reinforced the view that the directors' information was 
inadequately linked with production's major manufacturing tasks. Although 
aware of a failure to meet their performance levels, senior management lacked 
the information with which to review effectively their long term performance.
Not only were important dimensions of performance not covered by reports, 
but, in addition, in other important areas, the reports received were limited in 
their content. The limitation of a nunber of these 'partial reports' was suffic­
iently great so that managers receiving them could not be expected to realistic­
ally control performance on these topics.
The degree to which important themes in the KMTs were either omitted 
entirely, or only partially covered, strictly limited senior management's scope in
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evaluating the rate of improvement in performance. Even where an aspect of 
performance was covered, the content of the report did not facilitate effective  
monitoring of trends. Consequently, senior management were unable to adequ­
ately gauge whether the problems leading to their plants being 'out of control' 
were being overcome and, if so, what rate of improvement was being achieved. 
The only exception to this general problem was that of total costs. The account­
ing system in the main 'out of control' cases reflected where any overall level of 
loss of planned profits occurred. Vet in neither case could this information show 
senior managers where an individual product's 'actual' costs were, or were not, 
improving.
5.32 The Contribution of Staff to Senior Managements' Control of Production
I have shown that senior management lacked the information or analyses to 
effectively control production. Traditionally responsibility for providing such 
reports has been given to functional specialists. Earlier studies by manufacturing 
strategists and organizational theorists have criticised the Taylorian model for 
fragmenting responsibility for control between the functions. I, therefore, 
decided to examine how, if at all, functional staff affected senior management's 
control of production.
3.321 Senior managers' use of staff to control production 
Proposition
Where the line and staff system is used, senior management expect staff 
groups to bring about the main revisions to the manufacturing task.
Senior management in the 'out of control' cases outlined their expectations of 
the various functions' contribution to competitiveness. This established their 
relative importance and identified what was expected of them. The latter dealt 
with how these contributions affected the long term controllability of the plant, 
and whether these efforts emphasised new systems or the exercise of compliance 
to existing systems. The result of this discussion in the brake case is shown
below in Figure 11.
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• indicates current contribution to competitiveness 
- indicates expected contribution to competitiveness in 3-5 years
Production was currently considered essential, although it was expected to 
reduce in importance while production engineering and quality control advanced 
over the next 3-5 years. Detailed discussion of the roles revealed that the 
Managing Director considered two aspect of production's task to be important; 
firstly, achieving target output and secondly, reducing adverse labour variances. 
Production management's role was only discussed in terms of complying with 
changes brought about by staff. This was highlighted by the approach to resolv­
ing the 'profile mis-match' between the product mix, market requirements, and 
the technology available, responsibility for which was given to production engin­
eering. This failed to reflect the large number of small improvements which




could have been carried out on the shop floor.
5.322 Differences in the emphasis on using functional staff 
Proposition
When a traditionally controlled plant combines a low ratio of staff to 
direct workers and a growth in the complexity of its manufacturing task, 
it will either reduce the number of paperwork transactions made or offer a 
low level of support in terms of reports to production management.
A maior difference in the application of functional staff was observed 
between the plants in the 'out of control' cases. The brake and clutch cases both 
used the traditional line and staff system, while the kitchen furniture case 
management relied on line management for these tasks. The differences in ratios 
of the various classes of employees were examined. This showed that the brakes 
case had |ust over a 9: 1 ratio of total works employees to direct production 
operatives, while the kitchen furniture case had only a ratio of 1.9: 1.









Brakes 39% 91% 22% 9. It l
Clutches 26% 91% 33% 3.8s 1
K.Furniture 59% 37% 9% 1.9« 1
The low ratios of staff to direct production workers in the kitchen case 
affected the scope for the collection and analysis of data.
It can be seen from Table 13 that there was a major difference in approach m 
the level of staff between the sites. The comparatively low proportion of staff 
in the kitchen case arose from the strongly expressed concern of the Managing 
Director to maintain low overheads.
The argument has already been made that the manufacturing task in the three 
cases had grown more d ifficult to accomplish. This led to my considering what 
happened when there was an interaction between difficult tasks and low staff
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ratios. The ability of staff groups to collect further data or to analyse existing 
data in more powerful ways was impaired by a combination of factors. The first 
factor working against the provision of better information was an increase in the 
number of transactions performed. In all three cases the product ranges had been 
increased and batch sizes reduced. As such changes had not been off-set either 
with changes to the processes, (i.e. from batch to flow or from systematic reduct­
ions in the number of documents per operation), there was an increase in the work 
load of staff. This phenomenon in the kitchen furniture case is shown below in 
Table 14.
Table 14 Volume of Transactions m a Two Year Period (Kitchen Case) 
Number of transactions
Year Customer Production Dispatch
Orders Orders Notes
1984/5 19,4 16 est 270 5454
198 5/6 42,916 est 550 6261
The second factor was that all three cases reduced their staffing levels to cut 
overhead costs. This further cut the time available for data collection and 
analysis. The lower ratio of staff in the kitchen case resulted in both the 
absence of important data and in the failure to perform important analyses on the 
transactional data. The Managing Director's routine information about product­
ion performance was limited to the stock availability report and the monthly 
accounts. No records were made of actual costs by product or specific depart­
ments, and thus the accounting data was limited to work study based standards of 
performance and total variances based on three monthly estimates or on twelve 
monthly audits. Information on costs was important as the product range grew, 
increasing the risk that variances in one product(s) would be hidden m the aver­
aging of all products' costs.
12)
5.323 Analysing transactional data for its strategic content
Records were not kept of the loss of material or labour incurred in rectifi­
cation work, whether through faulty materials or from operator error. Yet the 
cost of sub-standard material was potentially high. An example of this occurred 
in the kitchen furniture case when the Managing Director insisted on the Purchas­
ing Manager procuring cheaper material for one of the main product ranges. The 
Works Manager of the finishing plant was convinced that this material had led to 
low yields, but as no records were kept it proved impossible to confirm this. 
However, for the Managing Director this information should have been available 
for effective purchasing.
The kitchen furniture case also revealed that, of the information provided by 
staff, much was concerned with operational transactions. Nevertheless, such 
transactional data could have been analysed to provide early indications of 
breakdowns in the planned events. To demonstrate the value of this data I 
undertook a number of conventional analyses. As the main characteristic of the 
'out of control' condition in this case was failure to deliver complete orders on 
time, I examined the transactional information and the single control system; the 
'availability' report. Although the information on availability of finished stocks 
was not ideal, it contained potentially valuable information about which product 
types and sizes wefe most frequently out of stock. I analysed the records using 
the Pareto technique, discovering that over S2%  of the stock outs fell in less than 
19% of the range. While this was to be expected, the analysis also revealed that 
over 7 5% of the out of stock items were consistently on the list in a nine month 
period. This implied the need to revise the stock targets. Thus the critical 
information senior management needed in this situation was that acceptable 
delivery performance could not be achieved by production if they 'complied' with 
the control system limits set for them. The remedial action in the first instance 
was to revise the control system, and if this led to higher stock levels than was
economically justifiable, the correct course of action would have been to redesign 
the production system to make smaller stock levels a practical alternative. Thus 
control would be improved by changes in design of the processes and procedures, 
not in the reporting system.
Similarly some items were over stocked. This too would have been detected 
had suitable analyses been made. It was subsequently confirmed that the stock 
levels were set judgementaily, as the Stock Controller did not either have a 
statistically based forecast of demand or make an analysis of the accuracy of the 
Sales Manager's predicted sales. However had senior management been informed 
of the level of failure to achieve delivery, they may have pursued the application 
of forecasting or inventory control techniques.
I tested the scope for producing reports from other transactional data, using a 
sample of the sales orders, in conjunction with the Sales O ffice Manager. This 
showed that the 'on-time' delivery performance had declined from 83.9% in 
October 1989 to 62.7% in September 1985. Examination of the records of 728 
deliveries revealed a high level of part orders were being dispatched. For every 
100 orders, 139 dispatches were required. This not only increased labour and 
transport costs, but also added to the number of paperwork transactions perform­
ed. Neither this information nor the costs involved had been reported to senior 
management. Further analysis showed that the largest selling range, believed by 
the Works Director to have the best customer service level, had in fact the worst 
service, at 73% compared w ith 77% for the other lines. It was discovered that 
(excluding accessories) 92% of the orders were for single items. The examination 
revealed that the average size of order delivered complete was 2.9 items against 
7 items for the orders not delivered complete. Such information is strategically 
important for policy formulation and control both for production and other 
functions in the case. Subsequent checks confirmed that no allowance had been 
made for these effects in their control processes.
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I therefore concluded that senior management in the kitchen case did not have 
the correct information and had consequently mis-identified some of their prob- 
lems. As a result they were likely to seek the wrong solutions by applying their 
efforts in the wrong direction.
The Managing Director initially reacted the above evidence, claiming that the 
majority of orders were for larger numbers of items. A cross check using data 
drawn from a representative week's sample of customers was selected by the 
Sales O ffice Manager. When allowance was made for the number of accessories, 
the original findings were confirmed. The Accountant confirmed that the 
computer system suppliers had available packaged software which would provide 
the analysis shown above, and in addition they could supply a package which 
would forecast demand from the order entry data. Both of these controls were 
urgently required if the complexity of the manufacturing task was to be reduced 
to proportions that production management could currently handle effectively.
It was evident in the kitchen case that in some instances a number of problems 
could have been overcome by the greater use of analyses, but the Managing 
Director strongly opposed recruiting the additional staff needed. The heads of 
Accounting and Production Control and the Works Director all stated categor­
ically that the Managing Director would not allow additional staff. Thus, they 
did not consider it worthwhile to request staff to perform additional analyses or 
collect the data.
While the failure to collect or analyse available data in the kitchen furniture 
case could be accounted for by the shortage of staff, the same could not be said 
of the brake case. Yet similar weaknesses occurred in the lack of analysis of 
senior management information. The KMT of quality was not well followed up bv 
the reporting system. Using the production control records I found that for a 10 
month period, covering a sample of 155 batches and 765,793 components, over 7 \
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of throughput was rejected, compared with a maximum allowance of 2%. This 
contributed to shortfalls in final assembly and was a major cost factor which was 
not highlighted to any level of management. Similar analysis of assembly records 
showed rejects ranging from >0.3% to 3 3%. This too was unreported. Analysis 
of the quality control records showed that patrol inspection identified that 
machines were outside the control limits (not specifications) on between 13% and 
2<*% of occasions. This information was not circulated to management, nor was 
any Pareto type analysis made of e ither rejects or examples of non standard 
working practices. Similar non use of quality control records was found in the 
clutch case study.
5.32<* Weaknesses in staff provision o f information for the strategic review of 
production performance
Proposition
The information and analyses, provided to senior management by staff, 
fall short of that needed for the effective review of policies for product­
ion. In particular it fails to reveal important trends and patterns in 
perfomance.
I showed above that senior management in the kitchen furniture and brake 
cases did not receive some strategically important information necessary to 
evaluate production's current performance. Similarly their information was weak 
in terms of data needed to reformulate policies to match changes in the competi­
tive environment.
This led to consideration of the gaps in the information and analysis provided.
I established that 72% of the reports received by the brake case Managing 
Director concerned daily or weekly levels of output. Interviews with the Heads 
of Production Engineering, Work Study, Administration (accounting) and 
Production Control showed that in all but the work study department they consid­
ered that it was the responsibility of the Managing Director or the Manufacturing 
Director, and not themselves, to request information if wanted. As a cross check 
on priorities, the heads of department were asked to identify their perceptions of
the KMTs. The heads of department, again with the exception of work study and
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to some extent production engineering, identified lower manufacturing costs and 
improved quality. The fit between their priorities and those of the Managing 
Director was weak. This was considered the main reason for the non provision of 
the strategic information.
The brake and kitchen furniture cases both revealed a tendency, in a number 
of the reports, to present information to senior management in over simplified 
formats. These were unsuitable for more than a visual review of the contents. 
No examination of trends was made, even at the elementary level o f moving 
averages. An example of simple trends and CUSUMS is given below in Figure 12. 
The 'cumulative sum techniques' were unknown to those producing the reports. 
This revised form of presentation revealed changes in the pattern o f labour 










The graph in Figure 12 demonstrates that there were improvements mall three 
dimensions of labour performance. The reduction in the level of losses in 'direct 
hours' and of excess costs in 'direct hours' was shown to start in week l t while 
those of the ratio of 'indirect' to 'direct hours' did not start until week <*. The 
CUSUM technique identifies such changes more rapidly than other methods. It 
has already been shown that in the brake case the total factory labour hours were 
known by type for all the group's plants. The data was only presented as simple 
numbers and graphs.
5.323 Adjusting staff analyses and information to match changing manufacturing 
tasks
Proposition
The information provided to senior management by staff about production 
performance fails to reflect adjustments to production's manufacturing 
tasks.
As noted above, the mis-match between the manufacturing task and the 
process design was a major cause of the 'out o f control' condition in the brake 
case. This could not be rectified simply by the provision of better control 
information or analyses of failures to meet the performance levels set for prod­
uction. The changes in the manufacturing task required of production to meet 
the increased competition faced by the firms was not paralleled by changes in the 
staff provision of information to senior management.
I noted above that the brake case had changed from making a small range of 
high volume products to a wide variety of products. There was also a new 
emphasis on service sector products. Staff, particularly production engineers, 
were responsible for developing new manufacturing processes to improve the 
controllability of the plant, while production management was responsible for 
implementing these changes. The staff did not, however, either provide the 
Managing Director or the Manufacturing Director with analyses or introduce 
control reports which would have reflected the complexity arising from the 
widening product range. This was particularly noticeable in terms of the addit-
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tonal changeover associated with the wider product range. This change in the 
manufacturing task was not matched by quicker setup times, or closer control of 
setter time, nor was it supported by revisions to the information or analyses 
provided by the staff groups. Yet, at the time of the study, Setters represented 
21% of the blue collar workforce. Despite this, neither production engineering 
nor work study undertook any schemes to reduce the setup times. Investigations 
showed that both functions believed that they were not required to make improve­
ments to the performance in this area. The Chief Production Engineer claimed 
that the problem needed to be solved by purchasing new CNC machines, with 
quicker setup capabilities. They considered the priority for improvements was in 
reducing the 'running time' of processes. They explained this response stating 
that they were required to produce a 1250,000 cost saving p.a. and that savings 
from quicker changeovers did not count as part of the target. The Croup 
Manufacturing Director rejected that interpretation of his instruction.
Additionally, the Production Engineers applied the full 700% factory overhead 
rate to the time saved on shopfloor activities. While th is  is undoubtedly an 
element of overhead which needs to be recovered on changeover times, using the 
rate applicable to production was arbitrary and therefore possibly misleading. 
The reduction or removal of the job it was allocated to, only resulted in the costs 
having to be recovered on the tasks. The new more flex ib le  machinery was 
considered by the Manufacturing Director to be necessary in order to achieve high 
product specifications. The Production Engineer confirmed that his staff worked 
on the reduction of cycle times and not setup times as the la tte r  were part of the 
overhead, and thus did not count as part of the required cost saving programme. 
Staff in the different functions within the brake case d iffe re d  significantly in 
their provision of analyses of underlying problems.
Despite the general pattern of staff failure to adjust their roles to suit 
changing manufacturing tasks, some exceptions occurred. The Production
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Engineers produced reports from investigations into long standing problems. In 
one example they suggested ways in which labour losses on assembly could be 
reduced from <*2% to 20%, redesigned the assembly line to reflect a lower level of 
demand and suggested ways of reducing rejection levels. Thus the function 
clearly had a reasonable level of professional staff who could undertake such 
exercises. Similarly, work study carried out a number of investigations, often as 
a result of a request from the Production Manager.
It was, nevertheless, evident that the system did not as a whole lead to an 
integrated attack on the problems faced by production management. Some 
departments, notably work study, attempted in part to reduce the existing level of 
complexity, others, namely, quality control, production control and production 
engineering did not. The latter sought technolgical changes, such as new CNC 
machines, which would have had some impact on the complexity caused by the 
long setup times combined with small batch quantities. In the clutch case, staff 
tended to provide less analyses than in the brake case. There was, however, a 
similar tendency for the reports to reflect old rather than current priorities. In 
particular, the emphasis on direct labour control appeared mis-matched with their 
level at <*% of works costs.
5.326 The mis-match between staff efforts to control and corporate needs
The research has shown that while senior managers expect both line and staff 
to play important roles in controlling production, the nature of their roles differs 
in important ways. In particular the line managers role in control is achieving 
compliance, while that of the staff manager is in designing and operating controls.
The intensity with which staff play this role was shown to d iffe r  significantly. 
In the brakes case a full range of staff services was provided, while in the kitchen 
furniture case the policy of limiting staff numbers meant th a t only a limited
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service was available. It was noted that staff in both cases tended to meet the 
transactional requirements of the manufacturing system before producing the 
control reports for senior and operations managers. Thus, where few staff 
existed, the impact on the provision of information was acute.
It was further noted that the priorities of the staff functions tended to lag 
behind the changing arenas of manufacturing competition. Thus, where control 
reports were received there was a danger of a mis-match between them and the 
latest KMTs /  OWC.
The final weakness that was detected was that of a fa ilu re  by staff groups to 
come to grips with the basic causes of any loss of control. While there were 
some limited attempts to reduce the complexity of the manufacturing systems, 
there was very little  recognition by them that attacking the causes of uncertainty 
was a critical component of achieving control.
3.«* WEAKNESSES IN PRODUCTION MANAGEMENTS' CONTROL OF 
PERFORMANCE
It was shown above that senior management in the 'out of control' cases did 
not exercise effective control over the performance of their production functions. 
It was also apparent that the staff functions, where they existed, did little  to 
assist senior management in terms of revising their reports to match changes in 
the manufacturing task. This section focuses on the weaknesses in the control of 
production performance by production management.
J.U! Comparing Production Managements' W ritten Control Information with the 
Firms' Competitive Goals
Proposition
The routine written reports received by production managers are weakly 
linked w ith the companies' main competitive goals.
The w ritten controls were weakly linked to the way the firms sought to 
compete. Secondly, the primary emphasis was on workflow followed by control of
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labour efficiency. The written reports were frequently only used to 'confirm' 
information already known to the Production Managers. The reports were 
frequently used as a means of checking the accuracy of what was reported about 
production rather than as the basis to take corrective action for Production 
Managers. The Production Managers needed rapid feedback which the written 
reports largely failed to satisfy. These reports were also heavily oriented to 
results rather than to the behaviour or processes involved. Such information fell 
short of that needed to achieve effective  control of production performance. In 
an attempt to overcome these weaknesses, more immediate and process oriented 
information was gathered by the Production Managers themselves using patrols of 
the shopfloor, making personal contacts and collecting raw data from various 
sources.
A comparison was made between the Managing Director's KMTs, and the 
reports he received. This revealed a mis-match, of which the principal points are 
shown in Table I 5 below.
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Table 15 Com p a r i s o n  oE KMTs and Weaknesses of W ritten 
Information (Brake Case)
IJ )
Similar weaknesses occurred between the Production Manager's information 
and the plant's KMTs. The main points were that cost variances were global 
rather than for individual products. With a wide variety of products and a 
considerable difference in their complexity of design and tolerance limits, there 
was a serious risk of uneven levels of variances between products.
Given a failure to achieve the desired level of output for original equipment 
and service products, despite the notionally excess capacity, it was considered 
important that more reliable planning and monitoring systems be developed so that 
this critical aspect of performance would be improved. The Production Manager 
also needed to monitor progress on meeting the plant load.
Similar weak linkages were noted between the information in written reports 
and the competitive goals in the other instances of 'out of control'.
5.1*2 Production Managers' Primary Concern with Information about Work Flow 
Transactions and Labour Efficiency
Proposition
The two main sources of production management information are meetings 
and reports. Both sources emphasise work flow transactions and, to a 
lesser extent, labour efficiency, rather than the wider control of product­
ion performance.
Table 16 shows the results of the questionnaires about the Production 
Managers' and Supervisors' preferred sources of information.
Table l£  Ranking of Managers' Preferred Sources of Information









PRODUCTION MGT'S OWN SOURCES
Production meetings l 1 1 1
Personal contacts 3 2 U 3
Touring the plant 3 3 3 3
STAFF BASED SOURCES
Written reports 2 it 2 2.67
Non-product ion meetings 5 5 N.A. )
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I compared the examination of the Production Managers' preferred sources of 
information with those of the 'in control' cases shown in section 6. The results 
are shown below in Table 17.
Table l_7 Differences m the Pattern of Preferred Sources of Information
Information sources 'In Control' 'Out of Control'
Personal contacts 1 3
Production meetings 2 I
Touring the plant 6 3
Written reports 3 2
Non-production meetings 5 3
The comparison was made on very limited evidence (six cases). However, it 
suggests that managers in the 'out of control' cases relied less on personal 
contacts and more on written reports and meetings. While this conclusion must 
be treated with caution, it is consistent with the greater reliance on formal means 
of control to overcome the problems found in the 'out of control' condition. 
However, as suggested in section 6, the informal sources and collection of own 
data tended to give information that revealed the behaviour of the systems of 
production as well as their immediate tangible results.
Table 17 shows that the two mam sources of information were their own 
meetings and written reports. The latter were, however, considered only margin­
ally more important than other sources of information. Examination of both of 
these sources of information showed that they primarily concentrated on the 
regulation of workflow. This was emphasised in ways which were disproport­
ionate to the way the firms competed in the market.
5.621 The emphasis in the written reports 
Proposition
The reports received by production managers concentrate on output and 
labour efficiency and provide little  coverage of the wider ranges of ways 
in which production can contribute to competitiveness.
I examined the relative frequency of the Manufacturing Manager's control 
reports in the brake case, repeating the method as in section 6. The findings
were compared with the average of the 'in control' case studies. The results of 
this comparison are shown below as Figure I 3.
Figure 13 Number of Reports in Four Week Period by Manufacturing Manager 
(Brake CascF Compared with Average of the 'In Control' Cases
Category of 
Performance




Output quantities 61* 36
Labour performance 26 6
Sales performance 6 13
Introduction ofnew U <»
products 
Financial /  cost 2 0
Other 0 36
Total percentage 100 100
Total number of reports 110 l<*4
N.B. The comparison of the 'out of control' cases was limited to the brake case 
because of the very small number of reports in the kitchen furniture case.
The largest proportion of reports, in both the 'in' and 'out of control' cases, 
was devoted to output figures. It can also be seen that two other categories 
showed significant differences, namely labour performance and 'other'. There 
was a much greater emphasis on labour performance in the 'out of control' case. 
The general category 'other' reflects the interest in the 'in control' cases in plant 
utilization, plant load and inventory levels.
It would be simplistic to expect a very close correspondence between the 
frequency of reports and the KMTs. However, I considered that the proportion of 
reports dealing with output and labour was likely to distract attention from other 
important aspects of performance. In this instance, the emphasis on output and 
production labour was likely to hide the need for improvements to quality, reduct­
ion of inventories and lead times. Further the immediacy associated with output 
reports might encourage a shorter rather than longer term approach to problem 
solving. Thus, any disposition that might exist towards fire-fighting was likely to 
be re-inforced.
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Similar reviews were madeof the reports received by the Production Managers 
and Foremen in the brake case and the Superintendent in the clutch case. These 
also reflected an emphasis on output and labour. However, in the brake case, the 
Production Manager received information on the utilization of selected pieces of 
plant. While less pronounced in the kitchen furniture case, a similar bias towards 
output data was observed.
5.<*22 The quality of the link between production managers' reports and the 
KMTs, in the 'out of control' cases.
I repeated the form of analysis, of the quality of the linkage between the 
control reports and the KMTs, shown in section <* above. The objectives were 
two fold. The first was to evaluate the relevance of the reports to the KMTs / 
OWC, and the second was to consider the usefulness of the reports in achieving 
their aims, even where those aims were not closely linked with the competitive 
priorities of their firms. The result of the analysis is shown below in Table 18.
Table l_8 The Quality of Fit between Reports Received by Production Managers 













(1) Measures of Delivery A 5* A 0
Customer Service Flexibility B )* C 5*
Cost A Î A 0
Quality A <* A «*
Sub-score 1.2) <*. 2) 1.50 <*.50




B 2/3 B <*
Efficiency Machine Utiliz 
-ation
D 3* D 5*
Inventory B <* C <*
Quality costs B <* C 5*
Sub-score 2.50 3.88 3.00 *.30
(Scoring systemi Evaluation of reports! I ■ Excellent, 2 * Very good, 3 a 
Fair, <* = Weak, 3 a Poor. Priority of performances A = Essential, B = 
Very important, C a Important, D * Slightly important, E * Unimportant)
( • )  No report received
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Table 18 raises a number of important issues. Firstly, it shows that senior 
management, in the 'out of control' cases, did not follow the concepts of manu­
facturing strategists, who claim that production cannot simultaneously do well on 
all dimensions of performance. Instead, although 'out of control', they expected 
production to achieve 'excellent' performance in all three classical areas of 
performance: costs, quality and delivery. Additionally, in the brake case, 
production was required to achieve 'very good' flexibility. Simultaneously, 
meeting all the above goals would be d ifficult for world class competitors, but for 
plants that were 'out of control', seeking excellence in such a wide variety of 
areas was likely to worsen rather than improve performance. This could occur if 
production management, finding it could not do everything, switched from issue to 
issue or made erroneous judgements about the trade-offs required between the 
different aspects of performance.
Secondly, in contrast to the stated wide range of performancecriteriadiscuss- 
ed above. Table 18 shows that only a few dimensions of performance were closely 
monitored. Two interpretations of this phenomenon are possible. Either senior 
management overstated the importance of the wide range of areas of performance 
or they failed to monitor important aspects of performance. I concluded that the 
weight of the evidence suggested that the latter was more prominent than the 
former. I did so because in two areas of performance, delivery and quality, both 
the main 'out of control' cases' performance noticeably fe ll short of expectations. 
I have previously shown, when examining the transactional data in these cases, 
that!
(a) 37% of orders in the kitchen case were not delivered on time. In practice 
performance was worse than this, as the majority of late deliveries were for 
larger order sizes.
(b) output in the brake case was approximately 18% below target
(c) internal quality levels in the brake case were worse than allowed for at 7% 
of production, instead of the maximum allowance of 2% in the costing and 
scheduling systems.
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The need for information about delivery performance could not adequately be 
satisfied by the kitchen case's 'availability report', as it did not consider orders, 
but rather it showed what was in stock. While it is possible that part of the gap 
between the content of the reports and the production managers' requirements 
could have been filled by managers using their subjective knowledge and under­
standing, it is unlikely that it would have provided a satisfactory basis for con­
trol. Although not wanting to understate the value of such knowledge and 
judgement, it is nevertheless necessary to be cautious about its quality, particu­
larly where there is a wide product range and therefore much diversity.
Similarly, weaknesses in information about quality was considered significant. 
Production managers in the brake, but not the kitchen furniture case, received 
data on scrap levels. The latter did, however, receive a monthly summary of
customer complaints. This was a new document which was only started after I
interviewed the Marketing and Managing Directors and asked how they knew 
about quality performance. In itially , production was only told about the financial 
value of the customer complaints. Later, this was changed so that they saw the 
items when available or the letters where not. What they did not know was the 
level of rejects or re-work conducted in the plants. With a natural material such 
as timber, the scope for minor re-work is great and thus requires to be known. 
This is particularly relevant given the pressure by the Managing Director to 
purchase cheaper timber. It was unexaminable, however, as no records were kept 
of production times etc.
A comparison was made between the results of the above analysis for the 'out 
of control' and the 'in control' cases. I aggregated the evidence into two cate­
gories» 'customer service' and 'resource efficiency*. The result of the analysis is 
shown below as Table 19.
mTable 19 A Comparison of Customer Service & Resource Efficiency jn 'Out of 
_ Control' 4  jTn C ontrol' Case Studies
'In Control' 'Out of Control'
Cases Cases
Performance MD's Research MD's Research
Criteria Goal Score Goal Score
Customer service 1.5 3.6 1.9 9.9
Resource efficiency 2.7 2.9 2.8 9.1
N.B. The score shown is my evaluation of the quality of the reports. 
(Evaluation scales 1 « high; 3 > low)
The Table shows that a marginally greater importance was placed on customer 
service dimensions of performance in the 'out of control' cases (1.9) than for the 
'in control' cases ( I . ) ) .  It also shows that the quality of the reports was signific­
antly worse, in these 'out of control' cases, at 9.9 compared with 3.6 for the 'in 
control caes. The reason for the higher score on importance of customer service 
was the wider range of items regarded as 'essential'. Table 19 shows that instead 
of focusing attention on a few c ritica l issues, senior management in the 'out of 
control' cases operated a wide rather than narrow set of priorities. This wide 
range suggests that senior management was reacting to the 'out of control' 
performance in these cases by seeking improvements on many, rather than a few 
critical, dimensions of performance. This was consistent with the earlier evid­
ence that they did not have manufacturing strategies or statements of their key 
manufacturing tasks. The Table also shows that the quality of the reports about 
'resource efficiency' was less good than in the 'in control' cases. This led me to 
consider the production management's other sources of information to see 
whether they overcame the limitations of the written reporting systems.
3.923 The emphasis in the production meetings 
Proposition
Where production management meetings took place they were dominated 
by attention to expediting workflow rather than the elimination of recurr­
ing problems in the production system.
It was shown above that production management and supervision in the 'out of 
control' cases considered their own meetings to be their most mportant sources 
of control information. The examination was limited to the brake case as no 
formal meetings were held by production in the kitchen furniture case.
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Production in the brake case made extensive use of scheduled meetings These 
ranged from an average of 8 hours a week for the Manufacturing Manager, 12 
hours for the Production Manager, and 1 3.5 hours for the Superintendents and 
General Foremen. Additionally a number of unscheduled meetings and many 
'discussions' occurred in the corridors. The high incidence of meetings in this 
case was examined to identify their content and role in control.
Two separate morning meetings were held, one each for the two major divis­
ions of the plant. The meetings were chaired either by the Production Manager 
or, less frequently, a Production Superintendent. On average, fourteen man­
agers, superintendents, foremen and staff attended the morning meetings, consum­
ing 52.5 managerial hours per week per division, 105 hours for the plant. Analy­
sis of the time devoted to each topic and their style of organisation showed that 
the meetings concentrated on expediting items from a list compiled by the 
Production Manager, rather than on resolving problems, or ensuring that the wider 
issues of competitiveness identified by senior management, were achieved. The 
content and conduct of the meetings were examined to identify their effect on 
the control of production.
The tenor in which the meeting was conducted was considered significant. 
This is demonstrated by a quote from the Production Manager at the end of one 
meeting approaching the period end.
"Yesterday was a sheer .......  disaster. We w ill have to tear this place
apart to get the maximum output."
Such views were forcefully expressed on a number of occasions. The meetings 
generally started and finished with the Production Manager rebuking the Foremen 
and Production Controllers for the shortfalls in previous day's output. In the 
final weeks of production periods, direct workers were moved from the early 
stages of production into assembly areas to 'boost' output. The emphasis on
expediting and a tendency to storm the month-end, increased the uncertainty and 
complexity already existing due to the mis-match between the highly dedicated 
production technology and the changing pattern of order sizes and different 
means of competing in the market. The conduct of the meetings also demonstr­
ated the need for basic training in such skills as chairmanship and the management 
of time.
While the above reflects what took place at the meetings, it has not shown a 
number of significant omissions. The first omission was the absence of attempts 
to smooth output levels and steadily overcome production difficulties. Such an 
approach was needed to counter the effects of the process - task mis-match. No 
analysis was made or discussed at these meetings to solve bottlenecks. A second 
omission concerned the failure to discuss the control of changeover times. The 
wide product range and frequent rescheduling of jobs made setups a critical 
factor. Not only was there no improvement in the setup performance, but the 
times were not even recorded. Similarly, scope existed for improving the propor­
tion of setups passing first-off inspection, first time. Yet this was not discussed. 
These omissions reflected that production management in the brake case was more 
concerned with fire-fighting than resolving the causes of its problems.
Another effect of the large number of meetings was to reduce the time 
available to exercise control through observation on the shopfloor. I showed this 
by counting the number of workers walking along the passageways, both when the 
meetings were, and were not, taking place. I compared the results and over three 
separate trials, this showed more workers in the gangways when the Foremen 
were absent. This suggested that the meetings indirectly contributed to the loss 
of control. I discussed the finding with one of the Superintendents. His cross 
check of the situation confirmed the conclusion. He then arranged to cut short 
some of the morning meetings to 'get the Foremen back on the shop floor'.
Despite the high ranking given to meetings in the kitchen furniture case, 
formal meetings in the plants were very rarely held. However, the Works 
Manager in the main factory used the morning and afternoon coffee breaks to 
meet his Supervisors and to exchange information with them. The Assembly 
Superintendent in the clutch case attended the Production Manager's daily 
meetings, but refused to hold meetings of his own, despite instructions to do so 
from the Production Manager. He explained that he was 'too busy' (chasing up 
late items) to have meetings. Despite these wide differences in time and formal­
ity in the different cases, meetings were seen as a primary means of production 
management information in all three cases.
Although meetings were reported as an important source of information, it is 
evident that they were primarily used to expedite output, particularly as month 
ends approached. Thus they contributed to uneven levels o f activity in the 
production period. They were also shown to be ineffective vehicles for solving 
problems, such as the control of setup times. In addition there were indications 
of a lack of control on the shopfloor during the meetings. I also considered that 
had such meetings been conducted effectively, senior management would have had 
greater scope for delegative decision making to production management and thus 
freed themselves to give greater attention to strategic issues. Given the sub­
stantial time consumed in their attendance and low effectiveness, particularly in 
the brake case, the managers' high valuation of meetings appeared to be inflated.
3.<*3 The Non Workflow Control of Production Performance 
Proposition
The control of the non workflow dimensions of performance is predomin­
antly achieved by production managers' use of direct information gather­
ing methods, rather than from reports.
Although the questionnaires showed that the production management teams in 
the 'out of control' cases placed less priority on information from their own 
sources, than did their counterparts in 'in control' cases, they remained an 
important source of information. Production Managers were observed to use a
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number of direct means of obtaining the information they required to accomplish 
control. These included patrolling the shopfloor, use of personal contacts and 
collecting raw data from the shopfloor. I interviewed the managers, who sugg­
ested that they used these methods because of the rapid access they gave to 
information. They also claimed to have more 'trust* in such information, than in 
the written reports. The contradiction implicit in the statement by the product­
ion managers that they preferred the written reports to the data they collected, 
was not consistent with their own declared 'lack of trust' in the written informat­
ion.
3.431 Use of shop floor patrols
Production Managers and Foremen in the clutch and kitchen furniture cases 
regularly patrolled the shop floor. Although the Supervisors in the brake case 
gave this source of information the same rating, they appeared to spend less time 
on the shop floor, than those in the other two cases. This could, in part, be 
traced to the average of 13.5 hours per week they spent in meetings.
The Works Director and Works Manager in the kitchen furniture case were 
both observed to use these shop floor patrols to test product quality and to 
identify worker attitudes. I accompanied the respective managers on a number of 
occasions when they toured the plant. It was noted that they ran their hands 
over the surface of the stacked products as they went past them. When they 
considered the surface unsatisfactory they stopped and made a more formal 
inspection of the products. It was also noted that as they stopped to talk to the 
various workers they generally asked how the worker was, rather than how the job 
was proceeding. The workers, on the other hand, generally gave a dual response, 
reporting the progress of the work and their own state of health or feelings at the 
time. When discussing this behaviour with the managers they initially expressed 
surprise that they had behaved in these ways. However, as they reflected on
their own conduct, they both expressed the view that both parts of the behaviour 
enabled them to either identify existing quality or anticipate future quality 
levels. In these discussions a number of the Production Managers volunteered the 
view that the patrols gave junior supervisors a chance to inform them of any 
actual or anticipated hold ups in the workflow.
In the clutch case the Production and the General Managers both said they 
regularly conducted tours of the plant w ith the Assembly Superintendent to guide 
him how to observe what was taking place in his department. Both said that they 
considered such observations an essential source of information.
In the discussions following up these questionnaires, there was general agree­
ment that the patrols were primarily orientated to detecting errors or deviations 
from agreed systems of working. I probed the Managers /  Foremen concerned to 
try and identify whether they used these patrols as a basis for seeking improve­
ment. Although all said they did, not one was able to offer a specific example of 
improvement that came from patrolling the shopfloor. All the examples quoted 
referred to detecting incidents where unplanned behaviour was occurring. I 
concluded that although an important source of information, the 'tours' provided a 
backup, rather than a major direct means of control.
5.<»32 Use of personal contacts
As noted in section it above, this source of information was not followed up 
because of its probable impact on the method of study required. However, the 
following points were noted when pursuing other aspects of the investigation. 
Most supervisors rated the use of personal contacts as equally valuable to data 
from their patrols of the shopfloor. While this form of information gathering was 
difficult to record, it was clear from their discussions that for most of them it 
was an accepted source of information. These discussions showed that the
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information thus obtained was primarily used to provide 'early warnings' of 
impending difficulties. This came from operatives, setters etc. advising them of 
actual /  potential problems. Only in two incidents did the Foremen discuss using 
personal contacts outside the shopfloor. In these incidents the contacts were 
production control warning them of changes due to occur in the planned work 
load.
5.<*33 The collection of raw data by Production Managers
I showed above that the Production Managers in the'in control'cases collect­
ed their own data to overcome the delays in the written reports. This behaviour 
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Rejection slips (next working day) 14 days
Production Managers in the brake and kitchen furniture cases madeextensive
use of personally collected raw data. In the brake case this included information 
about worker lateness and absenteeism. To control output the Foremen needed
to know each day how many workers were available and thus which lines could be 
manned. The written reports on lateness and absence, however, arrived 10-14 
days later. To overcome this deficiency the Foremen collected all 'unclocked'
cards within half an hour of each shift. Workers who were late had to ask for 
their clock cards from their Foreman. The rapid access to the information 
enabled them to reallocate labour to meet the latest 'emergency' in the workflow. 
Similarly, a number of brake case Foremen also collected the previous day's 
rejection slips from inspection. The written report on the cost of rejects did not 
arrive until I *  days later, and although these reports did provide cost information, 
most of the Foremen were familiar with the general level of cost of the various 
items made in their sections. Thus, they were able to take corrective action 
much earlier than they would have done using the existing written reports.
A distinction needs to be made between the use of raw data in the brake and 
kitchen furniture cases. The Foremen in the brake case used this source of data 
to give more rapid information about performance than was obtained from the 
reports. The Foremen and Manager in the kitchen case used the same approach. 
However, in their situation, they did so to obtain information that was not other* 
wise available as reports. The low level of documentation in the kitchen case 
reduced the scope for monitoring from this source. Instead the Production 
Manager was observed to spend time checking the settings on machines, the 
accuracy of scales etc.
The discussions with production management in the brake and kitchen cases 
showed that they were surprised that the collection of raw data was considered 
part of the control processes. They said that it was a 'natural' part of their job, 
which they 'just did, rather than thought about'. However, there was almost 
universal agreement that it gave essential information about the working of the 
plant. Examination of the data collected showed that it was frequently concern­
ed with the behaviour of the production system, rather than the results that were 
being accomplished. As such it reflected in part the reported practices of 
Japanese production management.
5.66 Production Management's Approach to Control
We have seen in these cases that some important data was not collected while 
other important data was not used effectively! also that insufficient analyses 
were made of the available data. While these weaknesses contributed to the 'out 
of control' condition, they did not fully account for the failure to achieve control. 
The following sections examine other positive and negative influences and their 
effects on the loss of control. Four major issues are considered. Firstly, linked 
with the concentration on output levels, was a tendency to storm the month-end 
output; secondly, was production managements' narrow view of their rolei 
thirdly, was their lack of commitment to improving the underlying manufacturing 
processes outside the narrow area of labour efficiency! finally, was the low level 
of training and updating of their skills.
3.** I Month end storming
Production, in the brake case, was dominated by month end storming of output 
levels. To assess the extent to which it occurred, I examined six months output 
figures for seven product groups. In level production the output in all weeks 
would be approximately even. Thus storming could be measured by the difference 
in the output of the last over first weeks of each month. I also checked whether 
storming applied equally to original equipment and service products. Data was 
taken from the 'Weekly 5  Monthly Output' report of the period week 60, 1981 to 
week 17, 1982. The results are shown below in Figure 16.
Product Group Month end /  month
beginning output
Original Equipment Products Service Products
A 16.2% D 160.3 %
R 61.7% E 83.6%
C -6.9 % G 199.9 %
61.7  % 
199.9  
I 33.7 %Unweighted Average 17.0 %
5 0
Figure 14 shows the difference in the level of output between the final and 
first weeks in a production period. Thus, it can be seen that for original equip­
ment products output was on average 17% higher in the final week than in the 
first week, while for service parts the difference was greater at 134%. This 
shows strong evidence of month end storming of output. The storming was 
significantly greater for the more profitable service products, than for original 
equipment parts. The uneven level of output was likely to reduce the total 
monthly output compared with that achieved if an even level of production had 
been maintained, unless overtime was worked or additional effort expended to 
make up for the time lost in the slack periods. It should be noted that items F & 
G made part of the end (original equipment) product C. It can be seen that 
preference was given to service parts at the month end, adversely affecting the 
output of the original equipment product. This suggested that the service parts 
were provided at the cost of delivery to original equipment customers. The 
Foremen responsible for producing these parts confirmed that preference was 
given to 'high earning' service sales.
Further examination of the same six months data revealed that output regular­
ly fell short of the planned targets, achieving only 82% of scheduled production. 
This did not in practice mean a worsening delivery performance, as the target was 
based on over production to eliminate the backlog in demand.
In the kitchen furniture case, the Works Managers were concerned to achieve 
the level of output needed to recover the financial target set in terms of contri­
bution. Thus they urged their plants to complete orders when nearing the month 
end so that the target was met. Although the Managers said that they would not 
delay a low value product that was in back order, in order to complete a higher 
value item that was not, they both agreed that where other factors were equal, 
high value items were sent to stores at month end in preference to lower value 
items. This was regardless of whether there was a customer for the items
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concerned.
The Managers in the brake and kitchen furniture cases were reluctant to 
discuss the relative importance of output levels and product mix. However, both 
informally confirmed that output levels came before meeting a schedule from the 
stockholding function. These perspectives, while understandable, were likely, in 
the absence of clear measures of delivery performance, to distort production 
performance in favour of uneven output levels and thus encourage fire-fighting 
through the lack of smooth well developed approaches to achieving the required 
level of output.
The definition of 'acceptable delivery performance' had received little  
recognition in any of the cases. In the clutch case an informal definition of 
90-99% was commonly discussed but lacked an operational definition. Thus, they 
had not determined whether this meant 90-99% of orders met ex-stock or 90-99% 
of parts delivered ex-stock.
It can be seen, therefore, that the combination of month end storming to meet 
production targets and the lack of control information on delivery performance 
were in complete contrast with the basic principles behind Japanese manufact­
uring systems. There could be no greater contrast than between level and 
stormed output and between great attention to delivery performance and its 
non-recording. It is therefore not surprising that the states of control achieved 
in these two approaches differ so remarkably.
5.i»<*2 Production managements' narrow view of their role
It has been shown above that attempts to achieve the target output tended to 
dominate the Production Managers' approaches in the 'out of control' cases. An 
important secondary factor was the reduction of production direct and indirect
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workers. The concern with output was understandable, as in all three cases it 
fell short of the targets. In the kitchen case the shortfall was overcome towards 
the end of the research when they changed the system as a consequence of 
discussions with me. Where there was a choice of several different finishes to 
the same product, the system was changed from holding all the finished stock as 
separate items, to holding a week's supply as finished items and the remainder as 
common stock. These were then finished in the appropriate colours as demand 
arose. This easing of the back order situation resulted in senior management 
putting a new emphasis on the importance of quality.
Discussions with production managers in these cases and observations of their 
practices showed that they had a restricted view of their role in their firm's 
competitiveness. This was most easily detected in their approach to the wide 
variety of products they needed to produce and the associated inventory levels. 
In each case these wide product ranges were combined with corporate compet­
itiveness based on achieving low costs. One component of lower costs was the 
level of inventory, particularly 'work in progress'. In all three cases senior 
management had caused the inventory levels to be cut or reduced in comparison 
with the activity levels. Yet, in none of these cases did production management 
actively seek to positively reduce the stock levels or to actively manage the 
changeover times which would have facilitated the production of smaller batches. 
In the brake and clutch cases, where there was documentation from the quality 
control functions, this information was not used to examine the behaviour of the 
manufacturing processes used.
).UU3 Lack of learning about process behaviour to achieve improved performance
I considered the failure to use information about the behaviour of the pro­
cesses to be significant. This was particularly noticeable in the brake case, 
where detailed inspection records were available, which showed maior departures
from planned quality levels. Although these variations did not always lead to 
refects, they showed that the processes were not in a statistical state of control.
The lack of a state of control in the brake case was shown both in the quality 
control records and in the transaction data on setups. A large proportion of 
setups was rejected at the first-off stage. Although recorded, this did not form 
part of any management report. Analysis showed that in excess of 25% of setups 
on the automatics were rejected at first-off stage. The ratio on nights was 
higher. Similar analyses on other machines revealed first-off rejections ranging 
from zero to 73%, with an average of 32%. Not only does this inevitably lengthen 
the changeover times, it also indicates a lack of competence by the Setters and a 
lack of control by production supervision. The quality control records were 
similarly not used effectively to learn about the behaviour of the process. I 
reviewed these records and established the results shown in Table 21 below.
Table 21 Analysis of the Inspection Records of a Department (Brake Case)
















DEIOESHIEV I I 8 73* 307 197
WICK MAN 12 6 50% N.A. N.A. -
SCHUTTI 6 3 50% N.A. N.A. -
L.S.A. 9 2 22% 210 63 30%
WAVIS 20 3 15% 31 7 23%
GNUTTI 18 1 6% 107 17 16%
MILLER 18 1 6% 113 3 3%
PLUNGE
GRINDER
1 0 >1% 76 36 65%
The above table clearly demonstrates that some of the processes were not 
effectively under control. It was precisely in this area of mastery of the tech­
nical processes that the German and Japanese systems of production management 
achieve their advantage.
5AUi* Training and updating of production management skills
Section discussed the German and Japanese approaches to management 
training in the 'in control' case studies.
The wide differences in approach, noted earlier, between the brake and 
kitchen cases, were also evident in their view of training. In the brake case all 
Supervisors were given management training at the group's training centre. This 
training was recognized by the National Board for Supervisory Studies as an 
exempting qualification. Thus, such training was relatively rigorous. Such an 
approach reflected the size of the group and of the plant, which had over 2000 
employees on that site alone. The kitchen furniture case was at the other end of 
the training spectrum. Only one of the Supervisors or Managers had any training 
and that was one week. Yet none of the Foremen level personnel considered they 
needed any training. Indeed the one Supervisor who had been trained said, "I've  
had my one week, I don't think there is anything else | need to know."
Although the Supervisors in the brake case had, by comparison, good basic 
management training, in neither this, nor in the other 'out of control' cases, was 
there any systematic training or updating of the technical skills needed to master 
the production process. In this sense they fe ll well short of the German and 
Japanese approaches. As part of the interviews all Supervisors were asked if 
they wanted any form of additional training to enable them to achieve better 
performance. Only one General Foreman in the brake case and none in the 
kitchen furniture case considered this necessary. The Works Director and the 
Works Manager in the kitchen furniture case both wished to undergo a course of 
training. In neither instance had they any previous management or technical 
training other than an apprenticeship for the Works Manager.
The lack of concern with learning and continuing improvement was a char act-
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eristic of the 'out of control' cases. While they all expressed the desire to be in 
control, their concept of control was, almost universally, to return to the 'steady 
state' model of control.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE 'OUT OF CONTROL' CASE STUDIES
I showed above that the 'out of control' and 'in control1 case studies applied 
essentially the same approach to controlling production. Both, to greater or 
lesser extents, adopted the traditional paradigm; seeking to achieve /  maintain 
stability within evolving environments. In both instances the aim of stability 
became too closely associated with static performances, when changes were 
required to meet evolving market places.
Senior managements' approach to control at the macro and micro levels was a 
significant factor in the loss of control. The macro level combination of seeking 
improvement to corporate competitiveness via better manufacturing and the 
failure to develop manufacturing strategies, was significant. It led to increased 
product ranges and widening sets of performance criteria, and in turn to greater 
complexity and increased difficulty in the management task. Instead of recogniz­
ing that when production was 'out of control' they needed to, at least temporar­
ily, restrict the difficulty of the manufacturing task, they allowed it to grow. 
Thus instead of achieving improvement they obtained fire fighting. They were 
presented with a dilemma. The changes they needed in their product ranges to 
improve their competitiveness were, if they maintained the traditional paradigm, 
the basis for losing control within manufacturing.
At the micro level the inadequacies of senior managements' control meant that 
they only knew in detail about a limited area of production performance. Signifi­
cantly, their control reports did not reflect the issues that they had earlier 
identified as important to competitiveness. Thus even if their control over the
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issues covered by the reports had been effective, their plants would still not have 
achieved the goals set for them in terms of the KMTs.
The difficulties were not limited to senior management. Production manage­
ment lacked both suitable frameworks for reviewing its functions and also the 
information necessary to monitor and regulate performance. Its written inform­
ation was relatively slow and heavily biased towards output and labour efficiency. 
Neither did it reflect the KMTs identified by senior management, particularly in 
terms of quality and delivery. To redress some of these weaknesses production 
management used a variety of information sources. Meetings overcame some of 
the delays in obtaining information, but tended to over-emphasise output (work- 
flow) and expediting. This emphasis on output led to month-end storming to meet 
targeted production levels. This in turn suggested that the targets were met 
inefficiently and at a higher than necessary cost.
Shop floor patrols, informal contacts and self-collected data widened the 
sources of information. More particularly, they widened the issues monitored. 
The patrols enabled production management to test product quality and to gauge 
the working atmosphere within their plants. They also gave them a form of early 
warning about future performance. Although they collected some information of 
their own, inadequate use was made of the large volume of transactional data 
within plants. Such data was shown to be capable of providing information 
necessary to the control of production.
It was evident that improving senior and production managements' information 
would help to bring about better control. Yet, I concluded that better inform­
ation, covering the full range of KMTs, would not fully resolve the problems. 
The real difficulties were two fold. The first was production managements' 
perceptions about their role and the second their understanding about the nature 
of how to achieve control. They sought stability when they needed change.
They sought control of results when they needed to control the behaviour of the 
processes involved. Yet, neither of these weaknesses could be adequately 
overcome by production management on its own. It required similar changes in 
perception and understanding on the part of senior management. Thus, the 
primary weakness lies in the paradigm of control. When firms face serious 
competition the limitations of the paradigm are rapidly exposed. Where the 
competitive pressure is allowed to generate additional complexity and /  or 
production management is weak, these limitations result in a loss of control.
6. THE 'CONTINUOUS INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENT 
AND CONTROL' PARADIGM
6.1 THE 'CONTINUOUS INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENT AND CONTROL' 
CONDITION IN PRODUCTION.
Sections <* and 5 demonstrated the limitations of the traditional paradigm of 
controlling production. I showed that when faced with a combination of high 
complexity and uncertainty stemming from corporate responses to strong compet­
ition and internally reactive production management, the manufacturing task 
became too difficult and in a number of instances resulted in a loss of control. I 
also demonstrated that even when production managers achieved a state of 
control they still only sought to maintain the current manufacturing system rather 
than to make production more controllable. None of the plants had strategies for 
their manufacturing. Neither did they adopt the Japanese approach of system­
atically reducing the uncertainty and /  or complexity in manufacturing. Based on 
the above, I considered that the traditional paradigm was inappropriate for firms 
needing to change in response to competition, especially when competitiveness is 
based on non-price aspects of production performance. Therefore a revised 
paradigm of control is required which is more relevant to the conditions likely to 
prevail within today's manufacturing plants.
The alternative paradigm is summarised in the following proposition. It offers 
a dynamic approach to the changes in the market place, integrating control and 
improvement into a coherent framework.
Proposition
The revised paradigm of control replaces the maintenance of stability 
phase with a dynamic programme of strategically chosen incremental 
improvements. This becomes the core of the production manager's task, 
and it depends on increasing the skill and knowledge within production and 
the adoption of a proactive approach. The aim of the improvements is to 
support corporate competitiveness.
A diagrammatic representation of the revised paradigm was outlined in Figure 
I. Figure I )  below shows a development of the model, concentrating on the 
interface between good traditional practice and the application of the revised 
paradigm.
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Figure 13 Part of the Framework of the Paradigm of the Control of Production 
('continuous incremental improvement & control' condition!
RANGE OF DIMENSIONS OF IMPROVEMENT
I
TRADITIONAL Tactical ■ »■ Strategic REVISED
PRACTICE Fragmented ■ -  Integrated PARADIGM
*  ~ Intermittent ■ — Continuous m
Stepped — w  Incremental
Weak Good Initial Rapid Final Unending
Traditional traditional 'slow start' 'catch up' 'long grind' improvemen
practice practice incremental incremental incremental
Area of overlap in 
performance
Advancing forms of the paradigm of control in production
6.11 The Four Factors Affecting the Form of Improvement
Figure 13 shows four dimensions of improvement. The right hand side shows 
the features found in the 'revised' paradigm, while the left hand side reflects the 
'traditional' practices. Although discussed individually, the dimensions need to 
be considered as a whole, because of their interactive nature. It is evident that 
these dimensions can only provide a guideline between the 'traditional' and 
'revised' paradigms. The critical test is whether a plant is satisfactorily pro­
gressing along all these dimensions towards the higher levels found in the 'revised' 
paradigm.
6.111 Tactical v. strategic improvements
The combination of Wheelwright (1981) and Schonberger (1982) provided the 
link between the control and improvement processes. Wheelwright linked individ­
ual 'improvements' and the corporate strategy, while Schonberger linked improve­
ment and variability. Both showed improvements in a number of Japanese plants 
stemmed from production; managers and workers. This contrasts strongly with 
the traditional approach in which improvements are staff based and tend to 
concentrate on technological or procedural changes. As shown in sections 9 and
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5, such changes are generally made without a manufacturing strategy, and fre­
quently lead to conflicts and fragmented development. Furthermore, the emph­
asis on tactical improvements to the organizational sub-systems tends to reinforce 
the development of sophisticated control systems. These controls in turn tend to 
reinforce conflicts between staff groups and to emphasise conflicting dimensions 
of performance.
As noted above, the revised paradigm contrasts sharply with the traditional 
approach. Production is expected to at least support, and if possible to create, a 
competitive advantage. This requires a strategic framework to guide the devel­
opment of the individual sub-systems within manufacturing.
6.112 Fragmented v. integrated improvements
I showed above that the emphasis on the control of resources led to fragment­
ation of efforts between various staff groups and between line and staff. In the 
'revised' paradigm emphasis is on the link between strategy and improvements and 
the proactive role of production management. The strategic emphasis ensures 
that investments in improvement are not wasted by unnecessary fragmentation or 
in piecemeal developments which detract from the critical OWC.
Not only does the traditional paradigm lead to a fragmented improvement 
process, it also leads to fragmentation of the control systems. Although the 
production management team has a common role as the recipient o f the reports 
produced by staff, it has little  power to modify them or to integrate the diverse 
approaches of the powerful staff functions. The allocation of tasks between the 
various staff reflects and amplifies the differences in their roles. Quality is 
looked at by quality control, delivery and plant utilisation by production control, 
labour efficiency by work study, while physical plant and processes are the 
concern of production engineering.
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The revised paradigm seeks to overcome the conflicting aims of these staff 
functions and to provide a means of unifying the efforts to control and improve 
towards common and strategically important goals. The common denominator in 
this process is the line production manager.
6.113 Stepped v. incremental improvements
The literature and practice of the traditional paradigm include both incre­
mental and stepped improvements. However, the over-riding emphasis tends to 
rest on stepped improvements. Such an approach cannot with justice be termed 
Taylorian, as his contributions were typified by both stepped and incremental 
improvements. Indeed it can be argued that the techniques of work study, which 
form an important component of modern improvements, were initiated by Taylor. 
Nevertheless, Western practice in the post second world war period has strongly 
favoured strengthening the role of staff specialists who have in turn emphasised 
stepped improvements, such as introduction of new plant and equipment and /  or 
new systems and procedures, rather than improving the use of existing systems 
etc. Although uncharted, there appears, at the same time, to have been a move 
away from work study, which was the chief staff agent for introducing small 
incremental changes on the shop floor.
6 .11* Intermittent v. continuous improvements
Not only are we concerned with the size of the improvements, but also with 
their continuity of direction. Thus, the revised paradigm seeks a continuous flow 
of improvements which re-inforce the strategic objectives of the plant. This 
contrasts with the traditional paradigm, in which the improvement process 
frequently oscillates between periods of intense activity and periods of relative 
inactivity.
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6.115 An evaluation of the cases studies using the four factors of improvement
I developed the sets of scales shown in Figure 16 below, for the four elements 
of the revised paradigm. I applied these to the case studies with the results 
shown below.
















Brakes OOC 2 2 1 1
Kitchen OOC 1 2 1 1
Furniture
Clutches OOC/IC 2 2 1 2
Pumps 1C 3 3 2 3
Ceramics 1C 3 3 3 3
Medical 1C 6 3 2 3
Food CAI U 3 3 •_________ 1
Keyt OOC * Out of Control; 1C = In Control; C&l = Control & Improvement; I « 
Inadequate; 2 * Poor; 3 ■ Fair; 6 = Good; 5 » Very Good
Using the evaluations shown above, it can be seen that none of the cases
adequately adopted the revised paradigm. One case, food processing showed 
indications that it was on the borderline between the revised paradigm and an 
example of a well organised plant following a more traditional approach. I now 
consider the criteria  underpinning the three phases shown in Figure 15 and 
establish the differences between them.
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6.12 The Three Phases within the New Paradigm
A critical difference between the traditional and revised paradigms is that the 
latter represents a direction, while the former identifies a final state. In the 
revised paradigm there is no natural upper limit to improvement, nor is there a 
maximum level of competence or a minimum level of complexity. Where capabil­
ity has been low and complexity high, the scope for, if not ease of, change will be 
greatest. Thus, after overcoming the initial inertia, rapid change is possible, 
when ideas used in other firms are adopted. Once this transfer of ideas has been 
absorbed, management will be either forced to rely on their own initiatives or to 
limit their progress to publicly available knowledge created by others.
6.121 The initial'slow  start'phase
Although the traditional paradigm of control concentrates on maintaining 
stability, there has always been some concern with improvement. As noted above 
this was often based on work study, although it also appears in other staff disci­
plines. The revised paradigm of control radically challenges the practices of 
both line and staff management, by expecting line managers (and workforces) to 
take the initiative in accomplishing small scale improvements within production. 
Initially this is unlikely to lead to a significant difference in the level of improve­
ment in performance achieved between traditional and revised paradigm controll­
ed plants. In this period production management and workforce need to learn the 
techniques and skills necessary to achieve improvement and to acquire an appro­
priate sense of direction and confidence. The types of weaknesses, shown earlier 
in section 3 and part of section 6, would inhibit even this early phase of the 
revised paradigm.
The move towards a proactive role for production management is unlikely to 
be accepted equally in all functions within a plant. Differential levels of accept­
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ance /  resistance are likely to occur. As Schonberger (1986) has shown, the full 
application of improvement has to be implemented over all aspects for it to be 
fully effective. Thus, in the early stages of the adoption of the new paradigm, 
improvements are likely to be slow and thus, in terms of results, not noticeably 
different from those in the traditional paradigm.
6.122 The rapid'catching up* phase
Schonberger claims to have identified a number of companies which have 
become 'World Class Competitors'. He asserts that they exhibited sustained 
periods of rapid improvement. His arguments tend to emphasise 'catching up' on 
the application of concepts which are already known to 'world class' firms. He 
states that Western firms do not need the same time to catch up that it took the 
Japanese to develop their approaches. He shows that given the right 'climate', 
the principal techniques underpinning the Japanese achievements in manufactur­
ing can be incorporated into American firms within two to three years. Ed. Hay, 
a leading American consultant in JIT, supports the view that improvements can be 
rapid. Civen the similarity of British and American approaches to controlling 
plants, a similar rapid catch up should be possible in the U.K.
6.123 The final 'long grind' phase
The capability to 'catch up' on the techniques and systems developed by other 
organisations is clearly important, but has an inevitable upper limit; equality. 
After that, further progress slows, matching the rate of new knowledge generated 
either from outside, or within the organisation. It is likely that such knowledge 
would in practice stem from a combination of these two streams. Although there 
has not been any evidence offered to date, it would appear reasonable to assume 
an intermediate phase between catching up with world practice and taking the 
initiative in developing new ideas and philosophies in firms moving into the
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forefront of practice.
6.13 How the Revised Approach to Control helps Competitiveness
The revised paradigm operates in two ways. The first is by simultaneously 
reducing the difficulty of the current manufacturing task and improving the 
exercise of control, so that the capability to control exceeds the needs of the 
current tasks. The second way is by using the 'new' excess capability to perform 
tasks which give the firm a strategic advantage. The new paradigm is represent­
ed in Figure 17 below. It should be noted that the incremental improvements add 
to and do not replace the stepped improvements in the traditional paradigm. The 
latter still occur as technological advances are made and /  or new systems are 
required to up date or align the manufacturing capability with the market's 
requirements. However, as argued by Bohn, these steps can now be undertaken 
on a much higher level of knowledge developed within production from its new 
experimental approach. In this way the greater knowledge developed within  
production can be harnessed, so that firms can incorporate it into the design of its 
next level of technology /  systems.
Figure 17 A Schematic View of the Revised Paradigm 
Improved competence
(workforce & management) iOrder winning 
criteria











Thus the result of the revised paradigm is increased ability to support the
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corporate competitive task. It does so by better performance on some traditional 
tasks, such as improving cost and quality performance and by accomplishing other 
more difficult tasks, such as cutting lead times and increasing flexibility. The 
scale of improvement sought is generally much larger than is sought in the tradit­
ional paradigm without the risk of losing control. I include cutting lead times, 
which is a well know production goal, in the 'more difficult' category, because of 
the size of reduction, which can be as large as 95% of previous levels. To 
accomplish this approach managers must exercise their control and seek improve­
ments in ways which are consistent with the four dimensions shown in Figure 15 
above; that is they must be strategic, integrated, continuous and incremental. 
Above all the state of control must be maintained even when the market forces 
changes in direction. Control is achieved by providing information which monit­
ors the strategically important issues and stimulates the problem solving necess­
ary to achieve the next set of improvements.
6.2 SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF THE REVISED PARADIGM 
Proposition
To achieve optimal performance firms require manufacturing strategies 
which directly address the complexity of the manufacturing task. Lead­
ing firms eliminate unnecessary complexity and uncertainty, substituting 
for them alternative, commercially beneficial complexities and dramatic­
ally increasing competence within manufacturing.
The dominance of the traditional paradigm in the cases in sections four and 
five, as shown in Figure 16, made it desirable to find secondary evidence of the 
application of the revised paradigm. Were I to rely entirely on the direct case 
evidence, doubt might be thrown on the viability of the revised paradigm. 
However, using secondary evidence to support it, the challenge is instead to the 
practices of control in the case studies. A qualification is necessary, since, 
because the evidence is secondary, the data captured does not always fully 
reflect the variables that I wish to cover. This limited the conclusions that I can 
safely draw from such work. The maior limitation was that most of these studies 
show the results achieved but show only limited evidence of the means used to
accomplish them.
6.21 The Strategic Approach of 'World Class Competitors'
Proposition
The design of the product range and selection of processes significantly 
influences the complexity of the manufacturing task. Such decisions 
provide a vital link between control and strategy, which is generally 
inadequately recognized in Western manufacturing organizations.
I showed in sections <t ic 5 that the control of production performance did not 
adequately support the senior managers' strategic goals identified in the cases. 
Additionally, I only found one instance of an attempt to start formulating a 
manufacturing strategy. The evidence about the Japanese use of manufacturing 
strategy is mixed. Although Wheelwright considers Japanese manufacturing 
operations to be strategically oriented, there is little  evidence of any use of 
formalized manufacturing strategy methodologies, such as proposed by Hayes & 
Wheelwright or Hill. Nevertheless, it is equally clear from the innovations they 
have made in manufacturing that they have a strong strategic perspective. They 
have not simply accomplished conventional production goals a t a higher level, but 
have sought to achieve mixtures of goals which were previously considered 
impractical. Abegglen & Stalk (1983) show with reference to Toyota forklift 
trucks, how some Japanese manufacturers, after many years of 'focusing' product­
ion, have widened their product ranges while still remaining price competitive. 
Similarly Kiyoshi Suzaki (1986) has shown that the growth of product variety is 
widespread in Japanese companies ranging from the colour of automobiles, to 
varieties of white and brown goods and canned beer. Previously, such strategies 
would have led to substantial cost increases. They are now achieved without 
losing cost advantages or worsening delivery performance. In other words, 
companies have remained in a state of control, while improving their competi­
tiveness.
The link between complexity and focused production provides a clue to the 
sources of improvements in the production processes and manufacturing system.
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Conventionally a wide product range marginally reduces the demand for individual 
product lines, but increases total demand. The e ffect on production is either 
constant changeovers between products or the build up of stocks while each 
product line is produced in sequence. Both approaches incur considerable 
additional costs. Abegglen & Stalk have estimated that cutting a product range 
to one quarter of its previous level could reduce employment by almost 75% and 
total costs by 30%. Many of these savings occur in the offices. To control a 
wide range of products, sophisticated control systems are used to monitor the 
progress of the individual batches. Other systems record the level of quality etc. 
Figures produced by Abegglen St Stalk suggest that a doubling of a product range 
could lead to a fourfold increase in overheads per unit produced. As Miller ¿c 
Vollman (1985) have shown, the 'hidden factory' needed to run complex plants is a 
major cause of high overhead costs. Yet, despite the historical advantages of 
focused production, the Japanese are now rapidly widening their product ranges 
and still achieving an approximately 30% price advantage over Western competi­
tors.
Abegglen & Stalk show that it is in industries w ith more complex (multi- 
stepped processes) production systems, and thus where control is most necessary, 
that the Japanese enjoy their highest comparative levels of productivity. In 
engine and transmission plants they are twice as productive, while in stamping 
plants they are only 20% better than leading American plants.
This is not the first time the Japanese have achieved such strategic break­
throughs. Previously, they successfully shifted the 'quality /  cost' trade-off 
curve, so that, at least in terms of compliance, higher quality results in lower 
costs. Indeed, quality specialists, such as Crosby (1979), now argue that the cost 
of compliance to quality standards is zero.
The link between complexity (A uncertainty) and strategic improvement is
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critica l. I showed above that a number of leading Japanese plants have achieved 
distinct competitive advantages over their Western counterparts where complex­
ity is normally at its highest. Given this link between strategy and control, it 
can be seen that part of the control /  improvement process must involve learning 
how to control complexity and how to integrate it with a commitment to improve­
ment.
6.22 A Commitment to Continual Improvement 
Proposition
A commitment to a strategically chosen, systematically and continuously 
applied process of incremental improvement is essential to the attainment 
and maintenance of a state of control in a dynamic environment.
Schonberger (1986) coined the expression 'WorldClass Competitor' to describe 
companies with outstanding levels of manufacturing performance. He found a 
common characteristic of these companies was a dedication to improvement, 
which he likened to that of Olympic athletes, contending that they were committ­
ed to i
"...continual improvement in quality, cost, lead time, and customer ser­
vice" and that they believed that such improvements were: "possible, 
realistic and necessary".
Such improvements in performance have come from both increased competence 
within production and from learning to control the conversion process, at a much 
higher level than was previously considered realistic. The control and improve­
ment of the conversion process comes from making it less variable and its systems 
and /  or technology less complex. However, the size of improvements sought and 
their strategic nature makes it essential that there is a formal system to support 
the improvement efforts. Such a system has to provide direction, training and 
support as well as create a new climate within the organisation.
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6.221 Corporate methodologies of improvement
Sumitomo Electrical Industries have used a formal system for promoting small 
scale improvements in manufacturing since a t least 1978. A number of these
groups' papers have subsequently been published in English. The Sumitomo 
system is based on small voluntary teams, similar in form to Quality Circles. 
They meet regularly to produce improved methods of manufacturing or of organis­
ing production. The study papers produced by these groups cover a wide range of 
topics and are of considerable rigour, one such paper being awarded the Nikkei 
prize for Quality Control by the Deming Prize committee.
Improvement programmes are also adopted by some companies in the U. K. The 
Ford programme tends to concentrate on improvements in quality, but is not 
exclusively limited to such efforts. Harrison (1987) has shown that Mullard has 
an improvement programme which integrates strategic goals and small mprove- 
ment teams into a coherent attack on enhancing their manufacturing systems.
6.222 Improving competence to exercise control, through training
The traditional paradigm relies on intermittent staff led changes to the 
production process, to restore declining competitiveness. This
requires little training of the workforce and limited training of supervision. The 
1987 NEDO report discusses comparative expenditures on training, showing that 
British firms spend one sixth of their American, one tenth of their West German 
and one twentieth of their Japanese counterparts on training. The Kaishas, 
(Japanese Corporations), generally place a very heavy emphasis on training. This 
is consistent with their goal of growth and policy of life-time employment for key 
workers. Growth leads not simply to new tasks, but to the elimination of old 
tasks. When this is combined with life-tim e employment, it is necessary to 
retrain the workforce. In addition, the policy of life-time employment means
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that the firms can reap the benefits of their training expenditure.
Daly ebal. (1985) afford a number of important insights into the significance 
of technical competence and its link with training. They contend that German 
production management exhibits greater technical competence, in its lower 
echelons, than does its British counterparts. Hayes Sc Wheelwright (19S<0, noted 
some differences between North American and German production management. 
They referred to this as low level technical competence, the low level being in 
the hierarchy not the competence. Daly et.al. highlight the different roles of 
foremen in the U.K. and Germany. They claim that the British foreman is pre­
dominantly appointed for his management /  human skills, while German foremen 
are primarily technically skilled personnel, who receive some managerial training. 
In both Daly's and Hayes & Wheelwright's accounts, there is an emphasis on good 
practices that reduce the risk of undesirable behaviour occurring within the 
processes of production. Machine maintenance, worker training, machine running 
speeds etc. all affect the extent to which the system is, or is not, in control. 
Other issues, such as greater emphasis on mechanical handling, clearly received 
more attention in the German plants. These have an immediate impact on the 
control of the number of production indirects in the plant. Many of the items 
outlined above are essentially process skills, rather than control system skills. 
Control in this oontext stems from doing the right things well, not from correcting 
what should not have occurred. The emphasis on developing the skills of low 
level members of the organization helps to bring about this different type of 
control. In a number of British companies the priorities appear to be reversed. 
The shop floor skills are seen as less important and the sta ff skills as more 
important. Nevertheless, as I have shown earlier, even the 'more' valued manag­
erial skills receive scant attention. It can be argued that this only creates a self 
fulfilling requirement. It can be seen from the above that British manufacturing 
industry places a relatively low priority  on improving the competence of its 
production workforce and management. Without such competence firms will not
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be able to take on the more difficult manufacturing tasks which enable them to 
create the comparative advantage that leads to their out performing rivals in the 
market place.
6.23 A Strategic Approach to Reducing Complexity /  Uncertainty in Production 
Proposition
Internal and external uncertainties and complexities must be systematic­
ally eliminated to produce a state of control which can be sustained 
without undue expenditure on a formal control system.
I discussed how 'world class manufacturing' companies set significantly higher 
goals than traditionally run plants. To meet them, particularly those of greater 
flexibility and reduced lead times, products need to flow rapidly and reliably 
through the production system. A common cause of delay and unreliability in 
production systems is generally complexity and uncertainty. In the traditional 
paradigm of control the delays and variability caused by complexity and uncert­
ainty are largely accepted as inevitable. As shown in the literature, the primary 
means of limiting the complexity is to protect the technical core from the vagar­
ies of the environment. The revised paradigm, however, is based on reducing this 
internal complexity and uncertainty by eliminating variation within production 
and only buffering it from the outside world when the internal variations have 
been minimised.
While is is difficult to develop good measures of complexity, it is easier to 
measure its effects. Complexity and uncertainty take many forms and their 
removal is dependent on detailed knowledge of the actual, rather than intended, 
working of the system. If considered only in cost terms, some uncertainties are 
uneconomic to remove. However, their removal may enable the accomplishment 
of other more complex tasks which were previously impractical. Where such an 
approach would make the firm more competitive, their elimination is justified.
6.231 Complexity /  uncerta inty and qua lity
Erratic quality is a common cause of uncertainty in production. However, the 
combination of high speed production processes and batch manufacturing gener­
ally hides this uncertainty in a buffer of stock. Thus the problem appears to be 
with inventory rather than uncertainty. This leads to one of two additional 
costs; a better than usual process makes too many items and a worse than expect­
ed process requires 'make-up' batches and causes delivery delays.
The Japanese emphasis on quality is wider than considering the goods received 
by the customer. High quality is also sought for its effects on the production 
system in terms of higher utilization of resources, better levels of process yields 
etc., Abernathy et.al. (1981). They conducted a number of extensive discussions 
with U.S. industrial executives, who identified and ranked a number of factors 
they considered to be most important in determining relative U.S. /  Japanese 
performance. The highest factor at 90% was seen as process yields. The 
difference was largely attributed to quality levels and maintenance of equipment.
6.232 Uncertainty and the production process 
Proposition
The manufacturing process can be designed to give greater reliability. A 
critical part of achieving improved reliability depends on using production 
workers and managers to identify weaknesses and to involve them in 
solutions.
Production processes, particularly in batch work, exhibit considerable varia­
tion and thus lead to uncertainty. This uncertainty occurs in the time at which 
items will be available and the yield levels of the products produced. A critical 
feature of the JIT system has been the substitution of standardized procedures for 
more complex and uncertain procedures. Machine setups represent one of the 
most concrete examples of this subsection. Shingo (1985) claims that 50% of 
changeover times are caused by the need for adjustment in tools. This 50% is an 
average which differs considerably between setups and gives their completion a
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low predictability.
High speed, high volume manufacturing systems can be vulnerable to break­
down. Schonberger (1986) advocates using multiple, slower production lines 
which can continue working when the more complex 'advanced flow lines' break 
down. Haydon (1980), a Ford executive, reports Toyota being able to achieve 
'first run capability of paintshops' as follows!
Table 22 A Comparison of the First Run Capability of Paintshops
Toyota 93% Valencio 73%
Toyo Kogyo 85% Halewood 68%
Sarlouis 73% Dagenham 50%
He also reported the comparative levels of 'down time' between Ford and Toyo 
Kogyo. The former was 49%, while the latter was 20%. Similar operational 
impact was also reported by the above author in terms of the high level of 'avail­
ability' achieved in 'Green Grinding operations'. The author did not identify 
whether any proportion of the reduced 'down time' was due to the reduction in 
scrap rates, although it would appear from the broader evidence on Japanese 
practices, that this was a likely factor.
Shingo (1989), outlining the 'improvement of process', highlights the multi­
functional attack of the Japanese and identifies both the value analysis and 
industrial engineering as central vehicles in improving manufacturing processes. 
It should be noted that his reference to industrial engineering is closer in practice 
to British production engineering than work study. Although reference is made 
to Galbraith and use is made of the American Society of Mechanical Engineering 
symbols, the technological nature of the conversion process changes discussed are 
closer to production engineering than to work study.
6.233 Uncertainty reduction (external elements)
Much of the uncertainty faced within production is generated outside product­
ion management's direct control. Variability exists in the pattern of customer 
orders and supplier deliveries and quality. All three elements of uncertainty 
have been tackled in recent years to reduce the uncertainty on production.
Freezing production schedules has long been advocated as a means of provid­
ing production w ith  a stable period of certainty and thus the ability to plan its 
work effectively. Although many firms have set this as their formal policy, as in 
the clutch case, i t  is often impractical to maintain. The length of the lead time 
in many plants makes this an unrealistic objective. However, with the dramatic 
shortening of lead times in 'world class manufacturers', it is now possible to 
ensure that schedules can be protected for 2 to 6 weeks ahead.
Supplier delivery and quality problems provide further causes of uncertainty 
within production. The use of supplier vendor rating systems, evaluating both 
delivery reliability and quality, are now used in many firms. The Open University
(1986) has shown Rank Zerox using such systems to control supplier performance, 
with the effect o f giving greater stability within production, and thus making it 
more controllable.
6.26 Changing the Measures of Performance 
Proposition
The measurement of performance in the revised paradigm reflects the 
wide set of ways in which production supports corporate competitiveness 
and also reflects the strategic value of monitoring the levers of the future 
state of control.
The increasing role of manufacturing in corporate competitiveness was 
highlighted above. It requires revisions to the measures of performance used at 
senior and production management levels and to the information systems support­
ing performance measurement. Kiyoshi Suzaki (1986) suggests that the flexible
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organizational structures needed to support the new form of competition have less 
clear performance measures than exist in firms following the traditional organiz­
ation structures. However, it may be that the data is gathered directly by 
production managers /  workers and is no longer perceived as measures. It is also 
more likely that the intangible aspects of performance will receive more attention 
than under the former approach.
Successful changing of the measures of performance, however, depends on the 
goals of the firms. If they only perceive of production goals in terms of cost 
reductions, their measures are likely to be limited. There is, however, evidence 
of a widening awareness of the other goals which can be achieved via manufactur­
ing. New it Myers (1986), in a survey of 239 U.K. manufacturing plants, found 
that their priorities were as follows:
Table 23 Competitive Priorities over the Next Two Years 
fin a sample of 239 U.K. manufacturing plants)






High performance products 93%
After sales service 38%
Fast deliveries 26%
Rapid product design changes 13%
In similar surveys, Ferdows & de Meyer (1989) found comparable priorities in 
their study of European companies.
The priorities in Table 23 overlap and diverge from those in Figure 17, in a 
number of important ways. Quality and cost are consistent in both lists. Shorter 
lead times are partly reflected in the desire for 'fast deliveries' and ' rapid 
product design changes', although New flt Myers did not report any seeking of 
greater flexib ility  within production. Yet it it these aspects of performance,
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flexibility and radically reduced lead times, that has given many of the world 
class competitors their distinctive edge.
Given the pattern of goals shown in Table 23 above, it is reasonable to argue 
that the system of performance measurement should enable senior managers to 
monitor progress, and production managers to gauge their progress, on the inter­
mediate measures as well identify any obstruction which might eventually affect 
meeting the goals.
The state of control is not achieved by simply monitoring the end dimensions 
of performance» it is equally important to monitor the intermediate levers of the 
future state of control. Thus, the measurement of performance has to be improv­
ed so that it monitors both current achievements, such as quality, cost, lead times 
and flexibility and intermediate dimensions such as uncertainty reduction and 
improvement in competence. The relationship between these three factors and 
the state of control is shown in an illustrative form in Figure 18 below.
Figure 18 An Illustration of the Relationship between Uncertainty, Complexity 
and Competence with the State oi Control
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In control Ot improving 
(Revised paradigm)
It will be noted that the expected movements in competence, uncertainty and 
complexity are not linear. The difference in 'competence' between being 'in' and 
'out of control' may not be very great in absolute tern». The reduction in 
uncertainty and complexity may be more significant. As can be seen above, 
uncertainty continues to decline to very low levels in the revised paradigm, while 
competence has undergone a major improvement. Complexity, however, reveals a 
more convoluted path. After an initial reduction, it plateaus until the benefits of 
reduced uncertainty and higher competence are felt. Once they come into 
effect, complexity can rise as firms learn how to stay in control while undertaking 
more commercially beneficial tasks.
Senior management need to translate the conceptual relationship in Figure 18 
above into concrete measures of performance which reveal the state of the 
'levers of control'. Illustrative sets of these intermediate measures of the 'levers 
of control' are developed in Appendix B.
Although the traditional emphasis on inappropriate internal and narrowly 
selected end measures of performance has come under increasing criticism, 
Skinner (1978), Schonberger (1986), few other authors have adequately discussed 
the need to replace the old internal measures with new ones which show how the 
firm is progressing on the levers of the future state of control.
6.261 Senior managements' monitoring of strategic variables in production 
performance
I showed earlier that the information received by senior management was
loosely linked with the way in which these firms competed. Given production's 
wider role in modern competitiveness, this defect has to be overcome. Even 
within the narrower view of manufacturing competitiveness in New & Myers, it is 
evident that delivery and quality performance are vital issues. Gauged in terms 
of stated priorities they often exceed the importance of cost performance. 
However, as was shown above, and confirmed, (in part on delivery), by New &
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Myers' study, the level of concern is not matched by appropriate performance 
measures.
As well as wishing to monitor these performance goals, it will be desirable for 
senior management to be able to monitor, at appropriate intervals, how well 
production are performing on a series of intermediate aims, which eventually 
enable them to achieve their competitive goals. Hayes A Clark (1986) recognize 
that senior managements' control systems are ill-suited to this task. They 
consider that traditional accounting data, which is a major source of reports, is 
ill-suited for comparing manufacturing performance between plants and is even 
less effective in 'the important contributions that (production) managers can make 
by reducing confusion in the system and promoting organizational learning'.
As well as monitoring current performance, senior management needs to 
monitor those dimensions of current practice that act as levers on the future 
levels of performance. These levers of future performance concern issues 
requiring manufacturing policies to guide subordinates so that their control and 
improvement activities meet the plant's strategic goals. Yet, it is in the area of 
formulating future performance that senior managements' reporting systems are 
weakest in the traditional paradigm.
In addition to the under monitoring of strategic performance, senior manage­
ment are frequently over burdened with less significant details. Both New A 
Myers and Hayes A Clark criticise the emphasis on direct labour. Each point out 
that other costs, which are generally several times larger, receive less detailed 
attention, (e.g. purchased items which were 32% of ex-works cost in New A 
Myers' study and staff costs, which at 20-23% were <i to 3 times that of direct 
labour in Hayes A Clark). Although the need for good monitoring of the strategic 
variables is becoming more widely recognized, there is, as yet, no evidence that 
firms have developed appropriate means of monitoring them.
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6.2U2 Senior managements' monitoring of routine production performance
Senior management must monitor routine as well as strategic performance. 
However, many of the reports traditionally available are ill-suited to the revised 
role production is now required to play in competitiveness. One such weakness 
involves the need to achieve and maintain a high level of certainty and a low level 
of complexity in production. While the measurement of complexity is often 
recognized as a strategic variable, (uncertainty is more closely related to routine 
activities.
One innovative form of measurement, showing the level of internal certainty 
in the transfer of work between departments, is the CLIP score developed in 
Mullard, Harrison (1987). The system scores 1 for all items in a period which are 
within -3% to * 10% of scheduled output. Items higher or lower than this score 0. 
Performance is gauged by the percentage of Is out of the scheduled range in each 
department / section. The system generally starts with monthly schedules and 
the frequency is progressively reduced until they are daily. Departments with 
high daily CLIP scores provide reliable deliveries to their receiving departments 
or customers.
6.2<i3 Production managers' monitoring of production performance
The changing nature of the production managers' role in competitiveness has a 
direct effect on the areas of performance they need to monitor. In particular, 
the need to achieve improvement, often via uncertainty reduction /  complexity 
removal, requires them to monitor different dimensions of performance to those 
traditionally identified in POM literature.
The research also noted differences in the time intervals of the reporting
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systems between the case studies and accounts of the Japanese plants. The 
intervals in the case studies were longer, with the emphasis on weekly /  monthly 
output and quality and monthly costs and delivery. In the Japanese reports 
output and quality were monitored hourly and daily.
The more frequent reporting, particularly of output and quality, was critically 
linked with exposing problems. Management in the Japanese plants appeared to 
recognize that the traditional production system leads to considerable variation in 
performance, often stemming from the uncertainty within its technology and /  or 
procedures, Hall (1983), Schonberger (1986). In well run traditional plants these 
variations average each other out over the medium term (weekly /  monthly) with 
the result that performance targets are met. In less well run plants some of the 
losses are not recovered and performance slippage occurs. Thus, in my terms, the 
plant is 'out of control'. The more frantic the efforts to overcome these slipp­
ages, the easier it is for the plant to degenerate into 'fire-fighting'. However, 
although the well run traditional plant has hidden its losses in the averaging 
process, these variations are signs of areas for potential improvement.
The Japanese manager and engineer is, however, urged to adopt a sense of 
immediacy as well as forward thinking. This is sometimes called 'SENTI Control'. 
The word SENTI means to seize the initiative over a rival. They use this idea in 
the form of 'feedforward', with the emphasis on creating worker skills and 
technical reliability which enable them to 'guarantee that objectives are met'. 
Sumitomo report that their work leaders find this approach far more efficient 
than learning through making mistakes.
They are also encouraged to see the above moves to 'SENTI Control' in terms 
of a progression from weekly control, through day-to-day, hour to hour and even 
beyond instantaneous control to the 'fina l' state of feedforward control.
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6.25 The Role of Information in the Control and Improvement of Manufacturing 
Performance
The goals of the 'world class competitors' have been shown to be higher and 
different from those of the traditional manufacturing company. This has an 
impact on the information required at all levels. Sumitomo Metal Industries 
describes one of these differences, with the aid of the following diagram.
Figure 19 A Comparison of the Traditional and Revised Control Cycles
TRADITIONAL REVISED
CONTROL CYCLE CONTROL CYCLE
Manager 5 = S  Worker Manager « * Worker
Plan ____ £ Plan 1
I 1 Plan
Do , Do 1J 4
Check .  * Check Check ,  ~*~ Do
The traditional approach often leads to large volumes of information, at a high 
cost, which produce low value information. Such information has limited effect­
iveness in helping managers improve their competence by learning from the past 
or in helping them identify where reductions in complexity /  uncertainty would 
increase performance.
We have seen that the traditional paradigm leads to information systems
which:
(a) failed to report on a number of strategically important dimensions of
manufacturing performance
(b) were slower than the information needs of the users
(c )  were heavily oriented to transactions and with little  emphasis on analysis
I showed that the way in which manufacturing could compete in the revised 
model required consideration of different dimensions of performance, and thus, 
information.
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6.231 Information needs at the operational level
The revised paradigm requires more information and a more rapid provision of 
that information. However, it does not automatically require that that informat­
ion is formally processed through a corporate MIS. The rapid movement of work 
through modern manufacturing systems is frequently too fast to be accommodated 
by the conventional staff based MIS. In addition if the new data was gathered 
and processed by staff, as distinct from production managers /  workers, it would 
lose much of its impact, as well as become expensive to produce.
Some of the additional information necessary to enable high co-ordination 
between operations is achieved by KANBAN cards, while other information is 
provided by the 1ANDONS1 lights (score boards), Hall (1983), Schonberger (1982 & 
1986). Neither system incurs staff time to compile records of transactions or 
summarise data for routine reports. Furthermore, the information is both more 
rapidly available and, because it  is produced on the shopfloor, is more easily 
understood by other shopfloor workers.
The scoreboards are located so that they are visible to the maximum number of 
workers in the production area. Some boards use coloured lights to indicate the 
activity status of the work centres. Under this system it is normal to record the 
hourly output compared with the scheduled. This enables tight control of the 
short term over this important dimension of performance, while still ensuring both 
that a high level of co-ordination is attained and that problems are clearly 
highlighted for improvement.
The yellow warning lights are used in some plants to fine tune the balance 
between work stations. Traditionally this has been done by industrial engineers, 
but now with the information available to the shop floor workers, they can take 
effective control over this component of the system. The solution is likely to be
better than that from the industrial engineers, who have to rely on concepts of 
the average (qualified) worker, rather than the set of individuals who actually 
make up a real workforce.
The role of record keeping becomes critical in respect of the problems ident­
ified. These must be recorded, so that their relative occurrence is known and so 
that senior management is able to check that problems are not allowed to reoccur.
6.252 Data collection and analysis by shopfloor workers
Whereas the traditional paradigm of control is based on line management 
action (and often staff data collection /  analysis), the revised paradigm is pre­
dicated on workers taking a more proactive role in data collection and analysis. 
The use of production workers in this way not only speeds the receipt of the 
information but also makes it  more likely that they will react positively to 
shortfalls in performance.
Schonberger (1986) illustrates this with an example from H.P.Greeley, where 
delays occur in a small JIT based assembly unit. There workers record all delays 
on a white board and analyse them via a 20 minute daily meeting. The workers 
not only analyse, but also undertake other tasks previously only performed by 
managers or staff; line re-balancing as a consequence of their analyses.
6.253 Using coloured lights as controlling mechanisms
Although not written information, the system of red and yellow lights on the 
assembly line has been a well documented form of providing data, Schonberger 
(1982 & 1986). The red light, informing of a worker controlled line stop, is
considered valuable because it is anticipated that it will stimulate learning. Thus 
learning arises from a combination of line stops, bringing managers and engineers
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down to the problem on the shopfloor and from the view that problems must be 
resolved, not just temporarily overcome. Compared with the predominant 
reaction in the traditional paradigm of shunting the problem off to a repair area 
or finding some temporary palliative, the Japanese approach leads to more 
problems being drawn to management's attention and being resolved.
6.3 EVIDENCE FROM DIRECT SOURCES
Evidence of the adoption of the revised paradigm was sparse. Only one case 
could, in any realistic sense, be considered to follow the revised paradigm, and 
that only in part. This does not mean that the other cases did not seek and 
achieve improvements. Rather, it reflects that in these other cases they had not 
set their target levels of improvement to give them a distinctive competitive 
edge. Production performance was to be raised to respond to competition rather 
than to create a competitive advantage of their own. The commitment to 
continuous incremental improvement, characteristic of the best Japanese plants, 
did not exist.
Even in the food processing case, where the improvement process had recently 
become an integral part of the system of control, the vision of where improve­
ments could and should be sought was more limited than appears in the Japanese 
firms. In addition it should be pointed out that the flow process nature of the 
technology used in this case tended to exaggerate the extent to which it was 
adopting the higher paradigm.
An exception to the lack of improvements sought in the other cases was shown 
in the ceramics case. Although the plant lacked a strategic approach and its 
control reports were less than satisfactory, it did seek a limited range of improve­
ments in an interesting way. Because of the scarcity of evidence in this area, I 
include observations from the case, although it did not meet the c riteria  to be
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classified as a follower of the revised paradigm.
Proposition
The revised paradigm links the control and improvement of production 
performance with the corporate strategy, via the difficulty of the manu­
facturing task. It seeks, in both the stepped and incremental phases, to 
systematically reduce uncertainty /  complexity and improve capability to 
accomplish strategic tasks. In the short term this leads to reducing the 
difficulty of the manufacturing task, while long term efforts are also made 
to increase the capability to perform difficult tasks.
6.31 Competitive Pressures in the Ceramics and Food Processing Cases
The plants in both case studies faced strong competition. The ceramics 
competition was primarily overseas. Its high value products competed against a 
few specialised North American and European competitors, while its lower value 
products competed against third world suppliers. The Managing Director did not 
consider either market large enough to support the technical and design effort 
needed to compete. This technical component of competitiveness was most 
necessary in the high value market sector. Competition in the food case was also 
strong, but this time from both U.K. and European producers. Overall demand for 
canned food products has declined, as consumers have sought to move away from 
the can into alternative packaging, coupled with seeking the removal of emuls­
ifiers and sugar. To counter this trend, the plant modified a number of its 
traditional products and additionally it also diversified into a number of higher 
value 'non-canned' food products. These high value products faced strong 
competition from established large companies in continental Europe.
Both managements sought improvement to corporate competitiveness with 
changes in the production capability. The degree and direction of these improve­
ments varied between the plants. In the ceramics case the improvement was 
sought primarily by introducing a new range of high value products. In the food 
processing case there was a commitment to continuously improve the conversion 
processes. However, as will be shown below, the main thrust of improvement was 
labour saving via capital expenditure. Other important dimensions of perform­
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ance were not pursued with the same alacrity.
6.32 The Absence of a Formal Manufacturing Strategy
Figure 16 above showed the evaluation of all the cases in the 'strategic- 
tactical' scale. The medical case was the only one in which there was any formal 
attempt to even start formulating a manufacturing strategy. As I showed above 
this case was not classified as part of the highest category because of the absen­
ce of improvements by production management and also because it did not seek to 
create a distinctive competitive advantage in its manufacturing activities.
Neither the food processing nor ceramics cases had written manufacturing 
strategies. However, as shown above, there is no clear evidence that successful 
Japanese companies have such strategies in the form advocated by Western 
specialists. The critical issue was not the possession of a written strategic plan, 
valuable as that may be, but the degree to which the approach adopted within 
production was strategic and coherent. Such an approach would be reflected in 
the manufacturing task. It was anticipated that in the early stages of a strategy 
this would show up as simplification of the task, making it capable of execution, 
while in the later stages of strategy development it would lead to increasing the 
capability to perform complex tasks which add to corporate competitiveness.
6.321 The clarity of the manufacturing task
In the absence of a formal manufacturing strategy, I considered that the 
degree of strategic thinking would be most clearly displayed in terms of the 
clarity and unity of the perception of senior managers about the manufacturing 
task. Secondly, I expected that such perceptions would be reflected in their 
control reports being consistent with their stated aims and containing data which 
would show the direction o f performance as well its current achievements.
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Examining the clarity and unity of approach within the functions in the food 
processing case, I found them highly consistent. They universally emphasised 
improving quality and lowering labour costs as their aims. While I would question 
the depth of such perceptions, I was left in no doubt that all senior managers in 
the case agreed on these aims. In the ceramics case the same level of unity was 
not evident. There was, however, little open conflict in aims, as in the clutch or 
brake cases. The most common theme was cost control, with differences in 
reducing development and /  or production lead times, quality etc. Such differ­
ences were not wide or intense, but they indicated the scope for developing a 
greater commonality of approach on strategic issues.
The analysis of the manufacturing aims in the food processing case showed 
that despite senior management's commitment to improvement, they lacked 
suitable information with which to evaluate their plant's manufacturing perform­
ance. The measures of manufacturing performance were very similar to those in 
companies whose aims were more static. The case revealed a very positive 
approach to its labour performance. Its information in this dimension was
analysed, rather than simply reviewed. It was projected over the succeeding 12
months to predict the level of achievement expected. This data was used in 
guiding the company in making difficult pricing decisions.
6.322 Changes in the complexity of the manufacturing task
The ceramics case had developed a dedicated manufacturing unit, which 
produced the final stages of a set of high value repetitively demanded products. 
This had the effect of reducing the complexity of the manufacturing task. The 
earlier stages of production were accomplished in the main plant.
The complexity of the manufacturing task in the food processing case moved in 
two directions, depending upon the sub-unit of production concerned. In the
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cannary, the developments in process technology and product strategy led to a 
small reduction in the product range and a consistent set of criteria being applied 
to those products which were produced. In the non-cannary unit, the product 
range was increased by 83%.
Management in the ceramics case made no deliberate efforts to expand the 
ability of its production functions to successfully accomplish more difficult 
manufacturing tasks. However, in the food processing case, there was a pro­
gramme of worker training which contributed to their competence to perform a 
wide range of tasks. The food processing case faced a major expansion of 
product recipes and receptacles in one of the major divisions of the plant. In this 
instance, the expansion in the product range was reactive, rather than stemming 
from a deliberate attempt to create the competence to accomplish more difficult 
manufacturing tasks. I was able to establish in discussions with corporate and 
production management that in neither were there any plans to improve compet­
itiveness through enhancing production's ability to do more difficult tasks than 
could be accomplished by rival producers.
6.33 Fragmentation or Integration of Control and Improvements
Figure 13 shows a fragmentation-integration scale which reflects the degree 
of unity in efforts to exercise control and /  or improvements. Clearly, the 
possession of a manufacturing strategy would enhance such unity, although the 
absence of such a strategy does not prohibit its existence.
The food processing case exhibited a high degree of integration between its 
various specialist functions and its production management. To an incalculable 
extent this was helped by the relatively low number of specialist staff, and the 
limited number of specialist functions in the plant. The organization structure 
supported this integration with the Work Study Engineer reporting directly to the
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Production Director. The Head of Maintenance Engineering and the Production 
Director worked closely with each other, ensuring effective implementation of 
small changes in the plant and equipment. These changes went beyond repair and 
were closely linked with improvements, such as energy saving and wastage 
reduction, through reducing the level of damage to cans in transit through a 
better mechanical handling process.
6.6 SENIOR MANAGEMENTS' CONTROL OF PRODUCTION PE RFOR MANCE
Section 0 showed that senior managers' information in the 'in control* cases 
inadequately reflected their KMTs. In examining the food processing case, as the 
best of the available sites, I checked whether this link was more effective. 
Given that the case was only in the initial stages of the revised paradigm, I did 
not expect to find any maior difference in approach.
Secondly I compared both the order winning criteria and the 'leversof control' 
dimensions of manufacturing performance in the case with the model of the 
revised paradigm discussed above; additionally, some references are made to the 
ceramics case.
6.61 Comparing the Reports in the Food Processing Case and 'In Control* Cases
A simple comparison of the percentage of reports by topic received by the 
Managing Directors in the 'in control' cases and the Managing Director in the food 
processing case is shown below as Table 26.
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Table 20 Comparing the Percentages by Topic in the 'In Control' Cases and Food 
Processing Case
Category of Average for 






Physical quantities 32 12 21
Plant utilization 10 - .
Plant load /  schedule 9 99 9
Labour performance 6 3 9
Stocks 4  WIP 17 5 9
Quality 3 - -
Financial 9 15 26
Sales & delivery 19 15 26
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 20 gives a misleading impression in two senses. Firstly, it over- emph­
asises the plant load /  schedule category in the food processing case. Secondly, 
by over-stating plant load /  scheduling, it under-emphasises the other categories.
This misrepresentation occurs because the Managing Director received a daily 
report on the schedule of output and planned changeovers in the plant. These 20 
reports represented a large proportion of his 91 reports per month. However, 
their relative frequency did not reflect their impact. He stated that he only 
received them to keep in touch with what was going on in production, rather than 
to use them as any form of control. I therefore recalculated the proportions 
after allowing 9% for the reports in this group, so that they matched the average 
in the 'in control' cases. The results are shown in the 'adjusted' column.
Given the factors discussed above, there was litt le  difference in the pattern 
of reports, except for the wider variety of individual documents on costs in the 
food processing case compared with those in the 'in control' cases.
6.92 The Coherence between the Managing Director's Control Reports and his 
Order Winning Criteria.
I interviewed the Managing Director in the food processing case, identifying 
his OWC and competitive strategy. We discussed his use of routine control 
reports and I also asked him whether he required any other information to exer-
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cise control of production. Table 25 below summarises the reports received by 
the Managing Director, which are compared with his self-identified OWC. It also 
outlines a number of deficiencies in this information.
Table 25 A Comparison of Order Winning and Qualifying Criteria and the 






Price /  cost Labour perform­
ance, materials, 
energy use & full 
monthly accounts
No measurement of complex inter­




None No monitoring of the non-health 
related aspects of quality
Service None Relied on complaints for delivery 
failure. No measure of response time 
(particularly in developing new 
recipes)
Notes:
1. The list of order winning criteria shown above reveals all the criteria for the 
six representative products.
2. The criteria differed between product groups; price, quality and service were, 
however, common items.
3. Service is related to the tendency of the company's few large customers to 
require ex-stock supply based on call-off schedules. They also expect the plant 
to give rapid service to unexpected changes in schedule.
U. Rapid introductions occur in non-canned products, which require reduced lead 
times to develop new specifications and containers.
As can be seen from the summary above, the Managing Director's control 
information reflected the same pattern of weaknesses as those of his counterparts 
in the 'in control' case studies. Thus, even though I regarded the firm as the best 
of the seven case studies, the Managing Director was still attempting to control 
his plant without direct information about quality and delivery performance. 
While he clearly lacked any of the more sophisticated measures referred to above,
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these 'advanced' measures could not be expected to play an active role when 
basic dimensions of 'order winning criteria' were not monitored.
6.<»21 Strengths and weaknesses in the system of reporting order winning criteria
As shown above, the main OWC were price, quality and service. The Manag­
ing Director received reports on issues affecting the control of production costs) 
labour, material usage, purchasing, energy. Both costs and variances were 
reported monthly. He anticipated an improvement in the analysis of variances 
when a revised computerized accounting system came on line.
Cost analysis was particularly difficult because of the interaction of material 
usage rates, energy and storage costs. Products fell into two categories, season­
al and non-seasonal products. English seasonal fruit and vegetables command a 
premium over continental produce. These products have relatively short seasons 
and decisions have to cover requirements for the anticipated year's demand. 
Even within a season, the cost of materials and the energy consumed in production 
vary considerably. The classical semi-seasonal produce is carrots. Later in the 
season, purchased material may be lower, but the amount of surface needing 
removal is greater. This lowers yield and increases energy consumption. 
However, the later the production, the lower the total storage cost. A problem 
of similar complexity occurs in respect of scheduling production of non-seasonal 
produce. The availability of a particular fruit or vegetable and its price could 
lead to either early or late production of another product. The most complex 
aspect of this problem was in terms of the knock-on effects an the cost balance in 
other products. Neither the current nor proposed accounting systems were 
expected to examine this class of problem. Decisions were therefore made 
judgementally. In both of these areas the development of 'decision support' 
models may have facilitated more effective decision making by the Managing 
Director.
The control of finished stocks was particularly important, given the whole­
saling role carried out in this case. No analysis was made of the optimal combin­
ation of holding finished goods and production run lengths. The minimum run in 
the main plant was half a day, but was normally not less than one whole day. 
With high speed processing lines this could amount to several months sales. 
Currently the cost of the hygiene programme, which occurred with every product 
change and /  or end of day, was considered too high to permit less than half day 
length runs. In principle this problem is the same as the changeovers in manu­
facturing plants and, as I have shown, dramatic improvements have occurred in 
that area.
I concluded that in respect of the costs needed to support price competitive­
ness the Managing Director was as well provided for as any of his counter-parts in 
the study. However, in common with them, he too lacked strategic measures 
which could help him make fundamental shifts in cost performance.
Table 25 showed that although product quality was an important OWC, it was 
not covered by reports to the Managing Director. To some extent this is explic­
able, as food products have to pass rigid Governmental testing procedures prior to 
dispatch. However, considered strategically, this explanation is inadequate. 
Firstly, the tests were about compliance to health standards and did not consider 
presentational and other aspects of quality. Given that he was seeking to 'win', 
rather than 'qualify' for orders in terms of quality, the criteria must be more than 
compliance to health standards. These other dimensions of quality lie in the 
presentation of the can and its contents, as well as the flavour of the produce. I 
should, however, note that the Production Director checked presentational quality 
daily. Another dimension of quality is the nature of the additives, sugar, emulsif­
iers etc. This has become an important dimension in all foods in recent years. 
Given these points, I consider that he should have sought reports at regular, if 
longer intervals, such as three monthly, on these more subtle but critical aspects
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of quality.
The final dimension of the OWC was service. I found that in common with the 
rest of my survey, records were not kept of the plant's delivery reliability. The 
second dimension of service, that of meeting customer revisions to schedule, was 
similarly unrecorded. However, in this area, I would have expected a strategic 
analysis of performance in order to evaluate, at say three monthly intervals, the 
capability to respond to such requests. The Managing Director was, however, 
aware of these schedule changes and production's /  wholesaling's ability to meet 
these requisitions. What he was unable to analyse were the trends in this per­
formance, as all the data was verbal.
It emerged that production in the smaller jams etc. unit was frequently asked 
to prepare new recipes which might later be converted into orders. This develop­
ment process was critical to qualifying for future orders from some of the larger 
customers. I found that this aspect of performance was not monitored. I also 
found that some recipes took seven months to develop, against ten days from 
leading competitors.
I concluded that the Managing Director needed to review the service perform­
ance in the three dimensions discussed above and to ensure that a programme of 
improvement was developed to eliminate uncompetitive parts of the system. 
Overall the review revealed that the Managing Director's reports did not ade­
quately reflect how well the plant met its OWC, nor did it provide a sufficient 
basis for the strategic review of performance. Taken overall, the Managing 
Director's control reports were indistinguishable from those of his counter-parts 
in the 'in control' cases.
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6.<i22 Strengths and weaknesses for monitoring the 'levers of control'
The review of performance against the OWC is a limited, if vital, part of the 
control information needs of plants which aspire to achieve 'world class' competi­
tive performance. A second set of issues involves the levers on future control. 
These, as discussed above, involve uncertainty, complexity and competence within 
the manufacturing techno and infrastructures. While such reports are uncommon 
in traditionally controlled plants, they occupy an essential strategic role in 
competitiveness, in those following the revised paradigm.
The food processing plant's use of flow process technology contributed to the 
reduction of complexity and uncertainty compared with batch process technol­
ogies. This is because flow technologies tend to expose any impediments to the 
rapid movement of material or bottlenecks in the process. Nevertheless some 
complexity and uncertainty remained, in particular, variability (thus uncertainty) 
in the time to pressure heat the cans for sterilization. The time varied as a 
result of the pressure level (steam generated) and the condition of the pressure 
vessel. This time was carefully measured, but mainly used as part of the quality 
control procedure. Although supervisors did monitor it and quickly call for 
maintenance when it exceeded a set limit, no evaluation was made of the average 
level of variability experienced, nor was there any direct link with the improve­
ment programme to reduce the variations taking place.
Complexity existed via the product range in the smaller of the two production 
units. It had expanded the range in response to competitive pressure in the 
market, rather than as a means of deliberately creating an advantage via better 
manufacturing. The expansion occurred without supporting changes to the 
technology or managerial systems. This led to a process mis-match as discussed 
by Hill. Control became more difficult to accomplish because of the mis-match 
and the increasing complexity in product range. Neither the mis-match nor
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complexity were shown up in the control reports produced.
The production management was aware of the importance of worker compet­
ence (skills) in achieving good performance. The Production Manager in the 
larger of the two units organized two courses a year in conjunction w ith the 
Industrial Society and pursued an active programme of |ob rotation, so that all 
workers could perform well on at least two tasks and most on many more. 
Although this practice was followed, discussions with the Manager revealed that 
he saw no reason to monitor the level of competence via any written control 
system, as he considered his personal recall of events eliminated the need for such 
formal monitoring.
Thus, the three areas involved in the levers of control in the food processing 
case were unmonitored. Were the case to move to the 'rapid improvement' phase, 
which is based on the ability to accomplish more difficult tasks, it is likely that 
senior management would need to monitor these less obvious dimensions of 
production performance.
6.5 PRODUCTION MANAGEMENTS' CONTROL AND IMPROVEMENT OF 
PERFORMANCE
I showed above that the control reports available to the Managing Director in 
the food processing case differed little  from those in the 'in control' cases. I 
divide the examination of the Production Managers' control processes and improv­
ements into two parts. The first part, that of 'control' is considered in 6.51, 
while the second, that of 'improvement', is discussed in 6.52.
6.51 The Preferred Sources of Information
Table 26 below shows the production management team's preferred sources of 
information in the food processing case. These were compared with the averaged 
preferences of the 'in control' case studies.
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Table 26 Production Managements1 Preferred Sources of Information
PREFERRED SOURCES OF FOOD AVERAGE
INFORMATION PROCESSING ('in control')
PRODUCTION MGT'S OWN
SOURCES
Personal contacts 2* 1
Production meetings 2* 2
Touring the plant 1 9
STAFF BASED SOURCES
Written reports 2* 3
Non-production meetings 5 5
* joint score
Table 26 shows a number of important features. Firstly, the joint scores for 
personal contacts, production meetings and written reports suggest a lack of 
differentiation in the priorities of information among the production management 
team. Secondly, in so far as any pattern did emerge, it was not markedly differ­
ent from the average of the 'in control' cases, except in respect of touring the 
plant. As can be seen in the Table, touring the plant received the highest overall 
score as an important source of control information, whereas, in the 'in control' 
cases, it was perceived to be fourth out of five categories. This emphasis on 
touring the plant is consistent with Peters & Waterman's (1982) 'managing by 
walking about'.
6.511 The type of information gathered in tours of the shopfloor
In the food processing case both Production Managers and Supervisors cited 
shopfloor patrols as their primary source of information. I therefore investigated 
what type of information they gathered and how it was used. This was accomp­
lished through interviews and accompanying them on some of their patrols.
The common theme in the interviews was the speed in obtaining information 
and the level of detail obtained. They also stated that they attempted to 'feel 
out' worker attitudes during the patrols so that they were quickly aware of any
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discontent among their staff.
During the patrols which the Managers and I made on the shop floor, I identif­
ied that they continually checked the quality of work and the environment, using 
both visual and tactile senses. The Managers generally ran their hands round the 
rims of cans, testing the smoothness of the seals. They would constantly look for 
items such as the build up of gum on labelling machines and the level of house­
keeping to check for excess wastage of material spilt on to the floor, and simi­
larly at the way items were stacked etc.
I considered that the common characteristic shown by both the interviews and 
the patrols was a search for deviations from their view of normality. The 
Managers appeared to have developed in their minds a concept of smooth running 
sections. Their patrols gave them the opportunity to look at items that they had 
discovered from experience could disturb that normality. Thus their approach to 
control was in a sense preventive rather than simply corrective and in this way 
consistent with the revised paradigm.
6.312 Production meetings
Despite being rated as the joint second most important source of information, 
there were no regular meetings specifically devoted to routinely controlling 
production. However, part of the wastage meeting, considered in section 6.52 
below on improvements, discussed aspects of the flow of work between sections. 
Given the primary focus of these meetings was improvement, I defer discussion of 
them until later.
6.313 Production management's written reports
The Production Managers in the food processing case received a different
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pattern of written reports than their counter-parts in the other case studies. This 
made direct comparison of their contents, using the classification used in sections 
U and 5, unrealistic. The primary difference was a much greater emphasis at 
production manager level on examining the way the conversion process was 
performing. This took the form of detailed daily reports showing the fill weights, 
quality checks, process behaviour in terms of temperature etc. These reports 
were not exclusively daily but, where appropriate, recorded performance at 
intervals as short as 30 minutes.
The process orientated data recorded temperatures in and out of the pro­
cesses, line speed, valve settings, fill weights, cooking durations, dial readings 
etc. Other reports gave detailed recordings of the quality of product and 
presentation, including quality of can and label. These reports were used, 
according to the Production Managers, to ensure that the processes were being 
correctly followed. This is clearly critical in food products and is in part mand­
atory. In particular, canning regulations require companies to maintain records 
for three years after processing.
Based on the detailed information received the Production Manager in the 
cannary calculated his process yields. (His counter-part in the preserves depart­
ment had this information provided, although no-one could explain why this 
difference occurred.) Based on these yield values, the Production Manager 
maintained a detailed daily log of process efficiency, which he used as a means of 
controlling the wastage of materials. As I noted in the review of the Managing 
Director's reports, the management regrettably was not currently provided with a 
means of scientifically evaluating material yield losses and the energy consumed 
in the conversion process.
The process performance information was also used by the Chargehands on the 
line as, for instance, when the time taken to perform a pressurization of filled
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cans took longer than scheduled, they would use the data to call up maintenance 
to ad|ust the steam pressures.
The Production Manager did not himself maintain quality control records about 
the product, other than about fill weight or presentation. However, he main­
tained detailed control over this critical aspect of performance by visiting the 
quality control department approximately hourly. He argued that this aspect of 
control was too important to rely on written reports which would 'inevitably be 
slower than visiting the Q.C. department'. In addition to the above, he was also 
able to see, during his shopfloor visits, the records, maintained at each of the 
maior units in the plant, of half-hourly quality checks on vacuum and fill weight. 
In this context he claimed that 60-70% of the time he did not need the records, as 
his shopfloor patrols had already provided him with the data. The above should 
not distract from the importance of his other written reports. These covered 
costs, labour productivity performance etc. However, i t  was evident in the 
interviews and observing his behaviour that the immediate control of the plant 
was accomplished through the combination of shopfloor patrols and daily detailed 
monitoring of the process. The greater emphasis on rapidly gathered data, with 
its richness of detail, reflected a number of the characteristics discussed above in 
the Japanese approach to controlling production. As I noted earlier, this was in 
part due to the nature of the flow process technology employed, rather than as a 
result of a superior strategic concept of control. Despite the lack of obvious 
intent, the effect was in part similar to that experienced by the Japanese. 
However, as I will discuss below, a major difference existed in the link between 
their use of the data in improvement, compared with that made by the reported 
practices in Japanese case studies.
6.52 The Improvement Process
The food processing and ceramics cases were both distinguished by small scale
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improvements to the manufacturing process. Although management in neither 
plant perceived these efforts as a means of enhancing control, it had that effect 
in both cases. The commitment to process improvement was, however, restricted 
to a narrow range of issues. While in both cases the aim of improvement was 
found, in that such improvements stemmed from the Manufacturing Directors and 
the meetings under their respective chairmanships, neither case had developed the 
type of formal system of improvement found in Sumitomo or Mullards. Both cases 
approached improvement via raising quality /  reducing waste, and to this the food 
processing case added improvements in productivity. One aspect of quality 
improvements differed between the cases. Both cases had to achieve high level 
compliance to standards; in the food processing case all products had to achieve 
high quality as an order qualifying criteria, while in the ceramics case OQC only 
applied to the higher value products. Thus, the scope for, and type of, improved 
quality differed between the companies. In the food processing their improve­
ments were to taste, presentation etc. of the products, as well as waste reduct­
ion. In the ceramics case there was scope for better quality to the customer in 
some products, as well as reducing the costs of quality overall. Both cases set 
targets for reduction in wastage rates, which can be interpreted both as cost 
savings and quality improvements.
I tested whether the Cannary Production Manager and his Superintendents 
maintained the objectives of better quality /  reduced waste, identified by senior 
management. They were interviewed to identify which aspects of performance or 
working practices they wished to improve. Twenty-one responses were elicited, 
and only two items, training and output, were mentioned four times. Eight items 
only received one mention. The list of items covered is shown below as Table 27.
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Table 27 Issues Identified as Important for Improvement by the Production 
Manager and /  or Supervisors in the Food Processing Case
Issue mentioned No. of 
mentions
Average ranking of 
mentions
Improve output/ throughput •* 1.25
Worker training i* 2.25
Working conditions 3 2.33
Reduce wastage 2 2
Supply of raw materials 1 2
Methods of operation 1 2
Motivation 1 -
Safety standards 1 3
Co-operation between line -
& service depts. 1 3
Modernization of plant -
(selective) 1
Passing on quality -
information 1 0
Communications 1 k
N.B. The 'average ranking' is calculated from totalling the priorities and dividing 
by the number of times an item was mentioned.
It can be seen from the above Table that not only was there a wide diversity of 
goals, but there was little connection between those set by the Manufacturing 
Director and those sought by his staff. I considered this discrepency was a 
significant factor in the failure of production to move beyond the basic level of 
the revised paradigm. In order to overcome the diversity of goals and to ensure 
that those chosen were appropriate, a formal system for achieving improvements, 
linked with the competitive goals, needed to be developed.
Turning to the two aspects of improvement identified by the Production 
Director, labour productivity and waste reduction, I examined in detail the 
process used to achieve them. A central vehicle in both cases was waste reduct­
ion /  quality improvement meetings.
6.521 Production meetings and the improvement process
I noted above that there were no routine morning 'control' meetings in the 
food processing case and only limited weekly meetings in the ceramics case.
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However, in both cases meetings were regularly held as part of their improvement 
processes. In the ceramics case the Manufacturing Director held a fortnightly 
'scrap' meeting, which aimed to monitor and steadily improve the process yield. 
The meetings involved most functions, although maintenance engineering had been 
allowed to drop out of attending them. The group worked through a list prepared 
by the Manufacturing Director of all batches which in the previous two weeks had 
a 10% or greater rejection level.
Once on the list, valuable repeat orders would 'officially' continue to receive 
attention until their yield losses were cut to the 2-3% level. These lower level 
targets were not precise or followed up with a great deal of attention. However, 
if they remained above 10% they were usually followed up until the target was 
met. However, I observed that some jobs were considered too d ifficult for this 
target and these were simply passed over. The improvement process was also 
limited in its commitment, in terms of priorities. On a number of occasions they 
identified products with high yield losses, which they claimed could have been cut 
dramatically if they had used a different process. However, the plant required to 
achieve this better quality had been 'lent' to design and development a year 
earlier and was not available to production. The combination of imprecise 
targets, which in any case did not seek zero defects, and the shortfall in commit­
ment to use the best processes showed that, despite the obvious achievements, 
they were not yet adopting the revised paradigm.
The Manufacturing Director in the food processing case introduced a series of 
meetings devoted to identifying and monitoring improvements. The initial theme 
of these meetings was improving yield levels and reducing scrap rates. The 
meetings brought together production, stores, maintenance engineering and work 
study in attempts to improve manufacturing performance. The Manufacturing 
Director encouraged the group to use a simple form of 'brain storming' to identify 
agenda items for improvement. The identified projects were monitored at the
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fortnightly progress meetings.
In both case studies the major theme of the meetings was quality /  yield 
improvement. These 'improvements' were primarily aimed at cost reduction, 
rather than providing the market with superior products. While such cost savings 
were clearly important, they did not go as far as the creation of a distinct 
competitive advantage advocated in the revised paradigm.
The meetings, particularly in the food processing case, reflected a number of 
the characteristics that might be expected in the revised paradigm. Yet, in a 
number of significant ways, they lacked the final ingredients that distinguished 
what occurred from good 'conventional' practice. In particular, the improve­
ments were not part of a strategy for manufacturing, nor were they structured in 
ways which promoted monitoring of the results and their application in other 
areas. However, most significantly, they did not have any link with training 
programmes etc. which could ensure that the necessary skills were acquired and 
deployed in achieving improvements.
6.522 Improving labour productivity
Labour productivity in the food processing case was monitored effectively, 
with considerable attention being paid by all levels of management to the reduct­
ion in manhours per tonne of output. Until 1986 the plant in this case had easy 
access to capital from its then parent company. The parent group had been 
willing to invest in process improvement which reduced labour, as long as there 
was clear evidence of productivity improvements and of profitability. This 
interest helped stimulate the development of the labour reporting system and 
encourage widespread interest in its results. Figure 20 below reproduces a 
section of one of these reports.
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Figure 20 Reporting Labour Performance in the Food Processing Case
Month
Man Hours per 
Monthly
1986/5 1985/6
_________ i i l____
Tonne Produced
1986/7 a to b 
__ _______
b to c
April 9TÏ7 9.53 8.56 4 6. 5% - 1 1 .8%
May 9.90 10.16 8.96 4 3.0% -13.5%
June 9.9 5 9.61 8.76 - 6. 2 % - 8.5%
July 9.86 8.60 8. «»5 -16.7% - 8.0%
August 10.70 8.56 8.88 -23.0% - 2.0%
September 11.28 8.52 8.06 -27.6% ♦ 6.7%
October 9.77 8.68 78.11 -15.0% - 6.6%
November 10.23 8 .66 - 20.0 % - 5.2%
December 10.09 8.29 - 20.6%
January 9.96 8.21 - 20.0%
February 9.39 8.35 -13.0%
March 9.03 8.36 - 9.1%
As well as the above report, the data was entered into a Z chart on the 
Production Director's office wall. This quickly showed up any loss of momentum 
in productivity improvement. As noted above, most of the improvements in 
productivity stemmed from investments in new process technology.
In 1986 the plant was sold and its new parent company indicated that the easy 
access to investment would no longer exist. Management were advised that they 
would normally have to accomplish improvements within their existing resources. 
This in turn stimulated the Production Director to seek improvements via reduct­
ions in the level of wastage in the plant and wholesale stocks. Although most of 
these improvements were expected to come from wastage reduction, he still 
anticipated productivity improvements via work study from better line balancing. 
An example of this was work study and engineering working closely together to 
improve pressurization times, so that an additional pressure load per shift could 
be achieved with the same manning levels.
6.523 Reducing the level of wastage
The ceramic process is characterised by process yield losses. These occur 
through variability in the shrinkage rate and through inconsistent distortion of the 
'green' ceramic when fired in the kiln. The amount of distortion was often 
significantly influenced by the block (called a stagger) on which the ceramic was
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placed during firing and on the conditions of the furnace. When yields were 
good, over production occurred but when the yield levels were worse than expect­
ed, both losses and delays were high. The delays frequently led to late delivery 
and extra expenditure as small 'corrective' batches were urged through the plant, 
causing knock-on delays to other products in the system.
Two improvements illustrate the type of work being undertaken. Firstly, 
there was a reduction in wastage. This was initially identified in the fortnightly 
scrap meeting, where they found that damage occurred to components when they 
were 'green', prior to firing. This was overcome by designing trays which held a 
set number of components each in its own foam lined section. Several materials 
were tried and eventually the Supervisors found the ideal material which virtually 
eliminated damage from the movement of material. The second improvement 
involved staff and supervision working together to identify why the reject rate 
from a particular kiln was high. It was found that the worn elements in the kiln 
were oxidizing and this affected the glazed finish of the product. This was 
overcome by replacing the kiln.
In the food processing case improvements were also triggered from regular 
meetings under its Production Director. The Work Study Engineer undertook a 
careful analysis of wastage levels by production lines and was able to show major 
differences in two areas. Firstly, the wastage losses from bent /  distorted cans 
were significantly different between product lines. The differences were traced 
to the handling devices used and these were changed. A second difference 
occurred between cans which were labelled later when a particular customer was 
found for them. The losses on labelling later (or relabelling when necessary) 
were much higher. This analysis led to reconsideration of the policy of relabell­
ing and to attempts to improve the secondary labelling process. Other small 
scale improvements were replacing the heating of sauces in vats, w ith heating 
them at the point of delivery by passing them through a heat exchanger in the
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piping as the sauce arrived at the cooking stage. A number of similar improve­
ments to energy consumption and material yield levels were achieved by the close 
working together of production management, work study and the Plant /  
Maintenance Engineer.
6.52<> The limits to improvement in the cases
The improvements discussed above were clearly of benefit. However, it was 
also evident that they were more limited in concept and in means of achievement 
than would be expected in a plant fully following the revised paradigm.
The detailed knowledge of the production processes gained by the Production 
Managers in the food processing case in particular might have been expected to 
produce an even higher rate of improvement than they accomplished. In consid­
ering why they did not achieve a more rapid rate of improvement and learning, I 
identified that they were not trained in, or aware of, the wide range of tools and 
techniques with which to structure the examination o f their daily phenomena. 
Without this structuring, the richness of their data was in practice an obstruction 
to identifying common patterns.
In considering how improvements /  learning took place, two different app­
roaches can be identified. A t one extreme is the highly quantitative school, 
which is performed by specialists using mathematics, statistics and increasingly 
simulation methods. A t the other extreme lies the simple techniques of work 
study and the methods used in quality circles. While I did not expect to find 
production management using much of the former, I did expect to find them using 
some of the latter approaches. The food processing case employed a very 
effective Work Study Engineer who spent considerable time on examining the 
process for inefficiencies and in producing informative reports on labour perform­
ance. His analyses were, however, limited to descriptive rather than analytical
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statistics. I was unable to find any use or even knowledge of the simple 'problem 
exposing' techniques used in quality circles, either in the staff groups or product­
ion management, in either case study. Taken in combination with the absence of 
a formal programme of improvement, the weaknesses in analysis tended to ensure 
that the firms did not advance to the full scale adoption of the revised paradigm 
of control.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE REVISED PARADIGM OF CONTROL
The foregoing analysis has shown that only one of the seven cases adopted any 
noticeable elements of the revised paradigm of control. However, looking at the 
wider evidence I showed that the paradigm is being adopted, at an empirical level, 
in companies seeking to achieve world class competitive standards in the perform­
ance of their production departments.
I showed that the failure to adopt the revised paradigm was fundamental. Not 
only did senior management in these cases fail to monitor the dimensions of 
performance that directly reflected their own stated OWC, they did not recognize 
the importance of monitoring the strategically important issues, such as complex­
ity, uncertainty and competence, which would indicate the likely state of control 
in the future.
At production management level the individuals did not perceive it to be a 
critical part of their function to reduce uncertainty and /  or enhance the compet­
ence to perform their roles. The cases lacked means of ensuring that systematic 
improvements were accomplished.
Athough I have demonstrated a series of illustrative control reports, shown as 
Appendix B, which could be used to guide senior and production management 
where improvements can be made, such controls are only tools. The critical
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dimensions that these tools require are the formation of a coherent strategy for 
the manufacturing function conjoined with the determination to bring about 
continuous incremental improvement within production.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
7.1 THE RELEVANCE OF THE TRADITIONAL PARADIGM OF CONTROL TO 
COMPETITIVE MANUFACTURING
The research showed that the traditional paradigm, developed in the classical 
POM literature and followed in the surveyed case studies, remains the dominant, 
if flawed, practice of control. I concluded that conceptually and practically the 
traditional paradigm leads to the separation of control and improvement. As a 
consequence production management fails to develop the incremental improve­
ments advocated in the revised paradigm. Traditionally controlled firms are 
therefore limited in their scope for increased competitiveness based on excellence 
in manufacturing. In its more severe forms, the traditional paradigm acts as a 
brake upon the development of competitiveness, because production managers 
seek to maintain stability in between the major revisions to the manufacturing 
technology and procedures, when they should be leading the introduction of 
incremental change. To meet the market's pressure for higher performance, both 
theory and practice promote introducing step changes in products, technology and 
procedures. Such changes are implemented by various specialist staff groups. 
When these changes are either introduced late or made inappropriately, they 
exacerbate the difficulty in maintaining control of production.
A further weakness of the traditional paradigm is that even when production 
managers seek to maintain stability, their attention is focused on a narrow sub-set 
of performance criteria, such as output levels and cost. Other vital criteria, 
such as delivery and quality, receive less attention. In its more acute forms, this 
leads to a loss of control and quite often to fire-fighting. In less serious inst­
ances, stability is maintained until the next staff based 'improvement' is brought 
into play to restore competitiveness.
Conclusion
The traditional concept of control is inconsistent with creating a distinct 
advantage based on production performing more difficult manufacturing 
tasks than competitors, while staying in control.
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7.11 Differing Basis for Controlling Uncertainty and Complexity
Both the traditional and revised paradigms considered uncertainty and comp­
lexity. The traditional paradigm of control used two inter-connecting bases for 
controlling these characteristics; bureaucracy and MIS. The revised paradigm 
also used two approaches; manufacturing strategy and simplicity.
The traditional paradigm is exemplified by Thompson's argument about the 
protection of the 'technical core' from the vagaries of the market. This protect­
ion incurs hidden costs; buffers (usually of inventory), expensive systems of MIS 
with corresponding high overheads in staff salaries and a failure to adequately 
exploit improvements in production. The magnitude of these hidden costs has 
been shown by Abegglen & Stalk.
The revised paradigm reduces uncertainty and complexity with a combination 
of manufacturing strategy and systematically developed simplicity as in the 
Japanese manufacturing techniques. Information, as distinct from MIS, plays a 
vital role. Whereas the MIS approach is staff led and tends to treat adverse 
variances between average results and standards as 'mistakes', the revised 
information approach looks at the variation within the overall data and treats it 
as a source of learning. An important change also occurs in the nature of the 
information captured. The new form of control information seeks to identify 
trends in uncertainty, complexity (and competence) so that production manage­
ment can identify where it can make further improvements in systematic reduct­
ion of undesirable variations and complexity.
7.12 The Promotion of Learning and Improvement.
Managers and workforce in the traditional paradigm lacked adequate problem 
solving skills. More significantly they did not see problem solving as part of their
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role. They ran the system; it was for staff to design a better one.
I showed that unless a large cadre of staff was employed, the detailed inform­
ation needed for such improvements was only available in the production depart­
ments. The revised paradigm showed that combining this information with 
manager /  worker problem solving, which was consistent with the plant's goals, 
into a formal improvement programme can lead to the integration of control and 
improvement processes in ways which enhance competitiveness.
The implications of reliance on the traditional paradigm in the case studies 
was recognized to be serious. If, as appears likely, similar findings occur in the 
wider population of British manufacturing companies, it would help to explain why 
many sections of UK industry are less competitive than necessary.
Long run manufacturing competitiveness is dependent on maintaining a state 
of control, while producing satisfactory performances which competitors cannot 
adequately match. Seeking to attain and then maintain such a position involves a 
major dilemma. The stronger the competition, the nearer the firm will be pushed 
towards the knife edge between high performance and loss of control. The 
fundamental flaw of the traditional paradigm of control is that it is at this 
'moment of truth' that the approach is weakest.
7.2 OVERCOMING WEAKNESSES IN SENIOR MANAGEMENTS' CONTROL OF 
PRODUCTION
I showed that the traditional paradigm resulted in senior managers adopting a 
limited view of the potential of production as a means of increased competitive­
ness. This was reflected in four waysi
(a) the absence of strategies for manufacturing
(b) restricting the monitoring of performance to a narrow set of issues
(c) the lack of improvement programmes involving production managers 
and / or workers as active agents for change
(d) not providing production workers /  managers with the tools of analysis 
or problem solving skills needed to control and improve performance.
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The revised paradigm outlined in section 6, and supported with Appendix B, 
demonstrates a dynamic alternative to the reactive approaches shown in sections 
<* and 5 above. It offers a means of using the control process as a way of increas­
ing the competitiveness of firms, as opposed to the exercise of control as a 
restrictive mechanism to attain compliance.
Conclusion
The research shows that when senior managers' practice of control is 
based on the traditional paradigm, their firms are deprived of a major 
source of improvement and thus fail to achieve the potential competitive­
ness available to them.
7.21 The Need of Strategic Direction from Senior Management
Since the case for manufacturing strategy has been well made elsewhere and 
does not need repeating here, I therefore limit my observations to the following. 
Miller & Graham's call for an integration between operations (production) control 
and a firm's competitive strategy has been shown to be necessary. The revised 
paradigm has shown the basic steps in making this link. It has shown that a 
manufacturing strategy is essential. It has also shown that building up the 
managerial /  worker competence and removing all avoidable complexity and 
uncertainty can lead to manufacturing being able to perform tasks which were 
previously impractical. Where such efforts are strategically directed, they can 
be built into a competitive advantage. Without such a strategic perspective, the 
complexity of the manufacturing task is likely to grow in ways which add diff­
iculty without financial benefit.
Conclusion
The absence of strategies for manufacturing leads to production being 
assigned tasks which are unneccessarily complex, which impairs their 
control of performance. It reinforces a reactive rather than proactive 
approach by production management.
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7.22 Restricted Monitoring of Performance
The lack of strategy and the low level of analysis of the available data by the 
staff groups were demonstrated in the aspects of performance that were and were 
not monitored. The weaknesses of commission were the over-emphasis of total 
output levels and cost control. The weaknesses of omission were two fold; the 
under-emphasis of the OWC /  KMTs of delivery and quality and the absence of 
intermediate measures reflecting uncertainty, complexity and competence.
It is evident that having established their strategies, senior managers must 
ensure that their implementation is systematically monitored. The gaps between 
the senior managers OWC /  KMTs and their control reports demonstrated in the 
cases must be eliminated or production w ill mistakenly conclude that in terms of 
delivery and quality it must avoid being caught out, rather than achieve excell­
ence. The non measurement of the intermediate dimensions will signal to prod­
uction that its role is compliance rather than improvement. In the absence of 
unambiguous messages to the contrary, production will react to the issues covered 
in the control reports, which usually emphasise the short term and effectively  
direct attention away from the longer term.
Despite the considerable overhead created by the large number of staff 
required to operate the staff based MIS approach, the evidence showed that the 
information provided was of little  value in resolving problems. The information 
arrived too late, was biased towards output and costs and hid rather than demon­
strated the cause of the lost performance. The revised paradigm overcomes 
these weaknesses.
Conclusion
Senior managements' control of production needs a strategic perspective 
of the potential for increasing corporate competitiveness. This perspect­
ive must be linked with the system of monitoring, particularly of delivery 
and quality. The monitoring must include dimensions such as uncertainty, 
complexity and competence.
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7.23 Involving Production Managers and Workers in Improvement
The manufacturing strategies developed must be based on a proactive role for 
production managers and workers. The revised paradigm showed that the devel­
opment of the ability to perform 'profitable', (as distinct from unnecessary), 
difficult tasks, depended on production reducing uncertainty and avoidable 
complexity and increasing competence. Improvements in these areas can be 
helped, but not achieved, by staff. Senior management must ensure that there is 
a formal programme for improvements and that the organisational structure 
encourages rather than inhibits such improvements.
Conclusion
Production will not replace its traditional reactive role and seek long term 
incremental improvements in the manufacturing system and procedures, 
unless there is a formal programme, supported by appropriate organisa­
tional structures.
7.2U Provision of Production Management /  Workers w ith Tools of Analysis by 
Senior Management
The reactive role occupied by production management in the traditional 
paradigm has meant that neither managers nor workforce are adequately trained 
in analysis or problem solving. The skills needed to eliminate problems are 
different from those of fire-fighting, yet it is in the latter rather than in the 
former that most production managers excel. The strenuous efforts of Product­
ion Managers in the brake case to control, via fire  fighting, was an example of 
great efforts mis-directed by a combination of the absence of strategy, inappro­
priate controls and the inability to eliminate recurring problems. All the cases 
reflected weaknesses in problem solving skills, even though this fact was largely 
hidden, in that most of the managers concerned did not expect to be involved in 
improvements, which they saw as staff roles. As I showed above, such mprove- 
ments were mainly limited to stepped changes in technology or procedures. The 
changes in production technology in the brake and food processing cases, changes 
in product range and design, in the clutch, pumps, medical and kitchen furniture 
cases, changes in systems, (PPC and SPC), in the clutch, pumps and ceramics
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cases, were all staff led. Senior management did not look to their production 
departments to proactively increase their competence to perform difficult tasks, 
and therefore they did not train them in problem solving skills considered to be 
unnecessary.
Conclusion
Incremental improvements need to be made by those working daily in the 
systems. Production managers and workers must be trained in the skills 
of problem solving, so that problems can be eliminated and fire-fighting 
avoided.
7.3 OVERCOMING WEAKNESSES IN PRODUCTION MANAGEMENTS’ CONTROL
The weaknesses of senior managements' approach to production set out a 
framework which makes it difficult for individual production managers to adopt 
radically different approaches. While it is impractical to expect production 
managers to make the necessary changes on their own, it is unlikely that simply 
changing the approach of senior management will on its own achieve the desired 
results.
I showed that many of the production managers in the cases accepted their 
role was primarily achieving output targets within budget. They also accepted 
that much of the technical element of their job was determined by functional 
specialists.
Two weaknesses were revealed:
(a) imbalance between the control reports and the Managing Directors' OWC.
(b) little  emphasis on improvement in performance and better control by
systematic learning.
7.31 Imbalanced Emphasis on Issues Covered by Control Reports
The emphasis by senior management on total output and costs was strongly 
reflected in the reports received and the practice of control by production
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managers. The lack of reports on delivery and quality resulted in comparatively 
less attention being given to these issues, which were limited to controlling the 
level of 'backorders' and controlling the cost of rejected /  reworked production.
I established that production managers operating according to the traditional 
paradigm did not seek 'intermediate measures' reflecting the conditions within 
production and which thus would indicate the likely future state of control. The 
emphasis was on meeting total output and cost targets, rather than reducing 
uncertainty and complexity or improving competence.
I showed that producing the necessary reports was neither expensive nor time 
consuming. I also showed that with only a small additional effort the information 
could be presented in ways which promoted attention to learning and improve­
ment. In addition I produced a number of illustrative reports which showed how 
the intermediate dimensions of performance could be monitored.
I concluded that until the production managers' control systems reflected the 
dimensions of performance identified as order qualifying and order winning 
criteria, they would continue to produce distorted approaches to the control of 
production performance. Further, that until production managers monitored the 
intermediate dimensions of performance, the manufacturing task would remain 
unnecessarily d ifficu lt to accomplish. This difficulty would in turn inhibit the 
scope for production to perform new tasks and thus increase the competitiveness 
of their firms.
Conclusion
The control reports received by production managers must be revised, so 
that they re flect a balanced perspective of the way production is expect­
ed to contribute to competitiveness.
7.32 Increasing Learning and improvement within Production
The traditional production manager's role of maintaining stability in product­
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ion was shown to be at variance with the revised role of leadership in introducing 
improvements to the manufacturing system and procedures. 1 showed that the 
production managers had only limited awareness of which issues should receive 
priority in making the plants more competitive. They lacked measures of perfor­
mance to guide them on whether the end results or the intermediate variables 
were performing satisfactorily. Finally, they were shown to lack training in the 
tools and techniques which were needed to bring about improvement.
The revised paradigm showed that such strategies, controls and techniques are 
available. It also showed that applied consistently, the cumulative effect is a 
major shift in the performance of the plant in terms of its ability to perform 
difficult manufacturing tasks and to stay in a state of control.
Conclusions
I concluded that production managers need formal training in the concepts 
of the revised paradigm and techniques of problem solving in order to 
enhance their firm's competitiveness.
7.4 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT
The thesis has important implications for teaching POM to potential senior 
managers and production specialists. It re-inforces the case put forward by 
Skinner, Hayes & Wheelwright and Hill that production has a major contribution to 
make to the creation of competitive advantage and must therefore be included as 
a vital component of corporate strategy. It has shown a link between control and 
strategy via the difficulty of the manufacturing task, which is not clearly reflect­
ed in previous work. This theme needs to be incorporated into the other elements 
of strategy teaching. It has been shown that senior managers do not clearly link 
the way they control with the way they wish to compete. It is therefore necess­
ary to increase their understanding of the consequence of the narrow measure­
ment of performance and to demonstrate the effect of the failure to develop the 
potential of production as a major source of small scale, but cumulatively large, 
improvements. The generally low status assigned to production management has
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been too readily reflected in omitting it from the training of potential senior 
managers. This must be overcome and a more commerically aware, proactive 
approach adopted.
The implications for teaching production managers are many. The traditional 
paradigm, separating control and improvement, must be eliminated. Production 
managers must be trained both psychologically and technically to adopt proactive 
approaches to their role. They must learn to seek the introduction of improve­
ments to the manufacturing system and procedures, which reinforce their com­
pany's competitive position.
For those of us who teach POM, the implications are important. We must 
strengthen the theoretical underpinnings of the subject to create a more unified 
perspective of POM and translate the emergent theory into concrete proposals, 
which will help senior corporate and production management to compete more 
effectively.
7.5 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The open ended nature of the design of this research inevitably means that it 
leaves many questions unanswered and raises yet other questions. These quest­
ions can be grouped into the following areas.
7.51 Further Development of the Revised Measures of Performance
Although the research involved ten sites (seven in detail), not one of them  
adequately followed the revised paradigm. The sites were characterised by their 
normality rather than their excellence. Further research is needed, in advanced 
UK firms, to develop the measures of performance outlined in this thesis. Such 
measures would provide measures of complexity, uncertainty and competence
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which could be used in making comparisons between firms.
7.52 Development of Improvement Programmes
The research showed that there is little  known about the design of systematic 
incremental improvement programmes. It is evident that the Japanese use such 
programmes, although little  is known about how they are developed, by whom etc. 
It is equally clear that without such programmes the level of improvement and its 
direction will be inadequate. I therefore suggest that a further topic for 
research is the link between manufacturing strategy and improvement pro­
grammes.
7.53 Developing Production Management /  Worker Skills
The effective implementation of the revised paradigm is dependent on prod­
uction management and workers being able to solve problems. While an outline of 
these skills is suggested in the material on Quality Circles and Small Improvement 
Croups, this would appear to only afford a limited part of the solution. A 
challenge is the way in which the production managers of tomorrow are prepared 
for this change in role. Further research is needed into both the content and 
means of teaching these managers. Such research should not constrain itself 
within the assumption that the Universities are the best vehicle; they have in 
many instances signally failed in the past to teach POM in its competitive and 
strategic context, and they may continue to fall short in the future.
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APPENDIX A - DETAILED METHOD OF STUDY 
A. 1 INTRODUCTION
The research was conducted in two phases reflecting developments in my 
understanding over time. These developments led to changes in some of the data 
collected and in its analysis. In particular they enabled me to simplify the 
identification of the critical issues to control by substituting OQC and OWC for 
KMTs. This change in turn made it possible to eliminate the collection of some 
of the detailed data on manufacturing policy. In part two an increased emphasis 
was placed on examining the factors influencing the complexity and uncertainty 
of the manufacturing task as well as on production managements' and workforces' 
competence to perform their tasks effectively.
The part one methodology was used in the study of the clutch, brake and pump 
cases. The part two methodology relates to the ceramics, food processing, 
kitchen furniture and medical case studies.
A .2 THE P A R T  ONE R E S E A R C H  M ETHO O O LO G Y
The part one method of study adopted a wide perspective in an attempt to 
identify the primary factors influencing the control of production. The clutch 
case acted as a pilot study and I progressively revised the method of study in the 
brake and pump cases. Thus by part two of the study I was able to use a simpler, 
uniform approach to the investigation.
A.21 How the Firms Competed
The way in which each of the firms studied competed was identified with the 
aid of five strands of analysis, which need to be evaluated as a whole. These 
werei
(a) the strengths and weaknesses of key competitors
(b) interviews with the Managing Directors on a series of manufacturing
policy issues
(c) examination of the Managing Directors' expectation of the contri
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bution to competitiveness from their various functions
(d) an examination of the ranking of the KMTs
(e) preparation of a statement of key manufacturing tasks.
A .211 The strengths and weaknesses of competitors
Each Managing Director and /  or, as appropriate, Marketing Manager was 
asked to identify his company's major competitors. I conducted semi-structured 
interviews based on a proforma, shown as Attachment 1. In the interviews the 
Managing Directors /  Marketing Managers were asked to describe the strengths 
and weakenesses of their major competitors.
A .212 Identification of key manufacturing policy issues which might affect 
competitiveness
The literature suggested that in a number of instances managing directors had 
limited awareness of the concept of manufacturing policy. Assuming such a lack 
of awareness might arise in some of the cases, I adopted an indirect approach to 
identifying any manufacturing policies and their influence on corporate competit­
iveness.
I identified the Managing Directors' perspectives about manufacturing policy 
issues in a two part semi-structured interview. Part one involved a list of issues 
drawn from the literature. I initially used a 5 point Likert type scale covering 
six issues and subsequently revised it to a 7 point scale and the wider set of issues 
shown in Attachment 2. The scale scored 7 as 'essential* and l as 'not 
important'.
I followed up the Managing Directors' scoring on the 'policies' with discussions 
of how the policies contributed (or not) to competitiveness. The issues were 
grouped into four sets to facilitate logical discussion; the design of products and 
physical systems of manufacture, the interaction between the plant and its 
facilities with marketing etc., the management system and finally, the main 
operational sub-systems of production.
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A.213 The contribution to competitiveness from the key departments within the 
case studies
I identified from the Managing Directors the competitive contribution from the  
various functions. The assessments were made for both the current period and 
for 3-3 years ahead, using a Likert type scale in a semi-structured interview. 
The original 3 point scale again proved too limited and was revised to a 7 point 
system, which is shown below as Attachment 3. I compared the current and 
expected contributions and in the subsequent semi-structured interview sought to 
establish«
(a) the type of contribution made by each function
(b) the reason for any changes in the expected contribution to competit­
iveness
A .2I0 Statements of key manufacturing tasks
I sought statements of the key manufacturing tasks; where they did not exist I 
extended the investigation to establish those implicitly adopted in the cases. 
(N.B. I argued in section 3 that, regardless of whether these KMTs were well 
chosen or not, they represented the priorities in existence and any evaluation of 
the control system /  approach should be gauged against such priorities or KMTs.)
The Managing Directors were asked to identify their plants' competitive 
priorities. To establish these priorities I asked the following five questions as 
part of a semi-structured interview:
(a) "Is there a written statement of the competitive features that the 
manufacturing plant has to achieve to enable the company to be competi­
tive?"
(b) "If such a document exists, what areas does it cover?"
(c) "What is the process of drawing it up and which functions in the 
company and plant are involved?"
(d) "If there is not a written statement of your KMTs, how do you identify 
what is required of manufacturing?"
(e) "What is required of the "X X X XX X X" plant to make it a successful
unit?"
To facilitate the discussion I prepared a list of typical KMTs based on issues 
raised in the literature. These were discussed with the Managing Directors using
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a modified version of a technique outlined by Wheelwright (1978), see Attachment 
9. As a cross check the Managing Directors were asked whether the list omitted 
any priorities applicable in their plants.







(g) A N other
Each Managing Director was requested to allocate 100 points to the total of 
current performance. He was then invited to divide the 100 points between the 
KMTs, in proportion to the individual KMT's relative importance in competitive­
ness. The exercise was repeated for different major product groups. The 
Managing Directors were then asked to repeat the exercise, this time allocating 
their 100 points to the required, as distinct from current, performance.
Based on the above data, (conducted a semi-structured interview in which the 
Managing Directors were asked:
(a) "Which of these performance criteria do you consider will be the most 
difficult to achieve over the next 3-5 years?”
(b) "Overcoming which difficulty will bring about the greatest benefit to 
the company?”
(c) "Are there any written standards for these performance priorities'”'
(d) "To what extent is the company (marketing, stockholding, finance etc.,) 
aware of what achieving the performance criteria means in relation to the 
things manufacturing can not achieve at the same time?"
(e) "Is there any mechanism for evaluating the trade-offs that have to be 
made between these criteria , (i.e. the recognition that improved perform­
ance in one or more dimensions of competition will result in decreased 
performance in another aspect of competitiveness) and is there any means 
of measuring these effects?"
From a review of the overall data I drafted a statement of the Key Manufact­
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uring Tasks in each of the case studies. I discussed these KMTs with the respect* 
ive Managing Directors, modifying the statements as necessary until an agreed 
statement was achieved.
A.22 The Organisation Structure and Manning Levels in the Case Studies
Linked with the earlier identification of the Managing Directors' expectations 
from their departments to their plants' current and future competitiveness, I 
obtained copies of the organisational structure in the firms.
The data was obtained from the personnel departments. This was confirmed 
with the Managing Directors and cross checked by showing it to the Heads of 
Departments when I interviewed them on other issues.
A.221 Ratio of total employees to direct operatives
I investigated the ratio of total employees to direct production workers to 
check the proportion of employees performing 'controlling' activities in the cases 
and to establish any differences in the ratios. Data on the number of employees 
on the sites was obtained from personnel records, or other suitable sources, 
depending on the company's systems, (i.e. in one company the data was found in
the work study department). I identified the following:
(a) Total number of employees on the site, (less any performing corporate 
activities).
(b) Number of direct production operatives (by department).
(c) Number of indirect operatives (by department).
(d) Number of staff employees (by function).
(e) Number of managers (by role).
The data on numbers of employees was confirmed in the interviews with the 
heads of production departments and staff functions.
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A.222 Ages, service and educational attainments of the managers
I examined the age, length of service and qualifications of the top management 
team. These qualifications were examined for both technical and managerial 
subjects. Thus a designer might have engineering as his technical subject, whilst 
an accountant, finance etc. as his subject.
Data was obtained from the personnel departments with the aid of a proforma 
shown as Attachment 5. I distinguished between educational qualifications, B.A. 
Hons. (History) and work qualifications, HNC Production Engineering . To enable 
this analysis to be performed the personnel department was requested to provide 
information on the nature of the qualification, as well as its level.
A.23 The Managing Directors' Control Information
I decided to identify the routine reports received by Managing Directors and 
how they used them for control. The Managing Directors' control information 
was identified by the following three methods:
(a) the Managing Directors' Secretaries were asked, with permission, to 
intercept and record the routine control documents received by their 
managers.
In most instances these reports were filed by the Managing Directors' Secret­
aries. They were asked to record a list of these reports and to provide me with 
copies. The list of reports was recorded using a log, showing:
the title  of the report 
its frequency
its broad subject or issue covered
(b) the Heads of Department were asked to identify the reports they sent 
to their Managing Directors.
(c) A copy of the completed list of reports was shown to the Managing 
Directors, who were asked to verify whether it contained a complete 
record of their routine reports.
From the copies of the reports I prepared questions for a subsequent meeting 
with the Managing Directors. A copy of the proforma used to prepare the 
questions and record the data is shown as Attachment 6.
The Managing Directors' information was identified and classified in terms of 
its frequency, i.e. daily, weekly, monthly etc. and by its content, i.e. physical 
output qualities, plant utilization etc., see Figure 21 below.
Figure 21 The Classification of Reports by Topic and Frequency












The Managing Directors were interviewed using a semi-structured interview in 
which I sought answers to the following questions:
(a) how the information was used
(b) was the information for regular decision making or normally for 
background guidance
(c) was there a particular part of the report that was important
(d) were standards available to gauge performance
(e) was the FREQUENCY of the information right for the decisions that 
had to be undertaken
(f) was the CONTENT covering the desired issues
(g) was the FORMAT or presentation suitable for their use
(h) did the TIMING of the presentation match their points of decision 
making
(i) did their subordinates receive the same information and upon which 
aspects of performance did they want them to concentrate
(j) what figures/trends/ratios caused them to highlight the need for 
improvement
On completion of the first stage of the interview, (dealing with the known 
formal reports), the Managing Directors were asked two open-ended questions:
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firstly to identify their priorities of control and secondly to establish whether 
there were any major approaches to monitoring /  controlling production perform­
ance, which were not shown by the questions relating to the formal reports 
received.
The Managing Directors were asked:
"What is the most important information for your control of the plant?"
This was followed up by asking:
"In what other ways do you attempt to maintain control over the product­
ion function?"
A.2<> The Production Management Team's Information
Data was collected on the routine information received by the Production 
Managers and their subordinates. The methods used were similar to those for 
Managing Directors in section A.23 above, the only difference being an additional 
question on their superior's receipt of similar information.
"Does your immediate superior directly receive any of these reports? If so, 
which and are there any figures /  ratios which you would expect to trigger his 
taking action?"
Where the Production Manager had a Secretary, she was asked to collect a 
specimen set of his control reports, while where one did not exist, the Managers 
were asked to select their own documents. In both situations, cross references 
were made with the heads of other departments to check whether other docu­
ments were prepared and had been inadvertently omitted by the recipients. The 
Managers were questioned on their use of the reports, using the same questions as 
for the Managing Directors, see Attachment 6.
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A.23 The Use of Production Meetings in the Control Process
To identify the role of the production meetings in the control process, record­
ings of their timings, frequency and content was made.
The routine production meetings, (at Production Manager and Superintendent 
level), were established. This was accomplished by:
(a) Asking the Production Managers' Secretaries, (where these existed), 
to list all their Managers' meetings.
(b) The Managers were themselves asked to confirm their attendance at 
these meetings and to add /  delete any meeting not covered.
The frequency of the meetings was then summarized and their detailed conduct 
was also examined. I did this by attending representative meetings and I ident­
ified the content by recording the topic of the meeting at one minute intervals. 
The results were then analysed to give the percentage of time devoted to the 
various topics in the meetings.
A.26 Investigations into Failures to Accomplish Control of Performance
I examined the records in the cases to identify whether the plants concerned 
were delivering the production on time, achieving their planned levels of output 
and meeting the quality standard, both as dispatched to customers and internally 
in terms of yield rates. I also cross checked whether production was within the 
planned budget levels. In most instances I was able to obtain at least one year's 
historical records for my analyses.
A.261 Delivery reliability
I checked delivery re liability  by examining dispatch records and comparing 
them with the promised delivery dates. Where the volume of data was particular­
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ly high, I sought cooperation from company staff to select sample data. I asked 
the Dispatch or Sales Office Managers to draw the sample from representative 
products and customers. I used this approach because the data so obtained was 
found to be more acceptable to senior managment in later discussion on reasons 
for any shortfall in performance.
I wrote a computer programme using the dBase II package to identify any 
products which had particularly high levels of lateness.
A.262 Quality and yield levels
Data on dispatched quality was primarily obtained from customers' warranty 
claims and finished goods' inspection records. Data on yield levels was obtained 
from inspection records and cross checked with production control records. In 
the latter records I examined the quantities released to production and compared 
them with the completed output levels. In some instances I undertook analyses of 
the rejects of first-off components offered to inspection and of the rate of 
rejects by patrol inspectors. Such studies were triggered by problems identified 
in the individual case studies.
I entered the above records in a computer programme which I wrote using the 
dBase II package. This was used to separate any differences in the level of 
rejects by product type.
A. 263 Cost control
I established whether costs were under control by inspection of the cost 
records. My primary concern was the issues controllable by production, so I did 
not investigate adverse overhead variances or material price variances. I 
concentrated on material usage and labour performance and the levels of WIP in
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the plant. In most of the cases the plants used standard costing systems which 
made the records about individual product variances subject to usage and rate 
variations. Where this occurred I concentrated on the time based variable as 
being more under the control of production management.
A.27 Identifying Production Managers' Preferred Sources of Information
I identified the Production Managers' preferred sources of information via a 
questionnaire, shown in Attachment 7. The questionnaire was administered to all 
Production Managers and Supervisors. The identification of the ranking of these 
sources of information was followed up with an examination of the actual pract­
ices of the Production Managers and Supervisors, particularly in terms of written 
reports, touring the plant and the use of meetings.
A .3 THE PART TWO RESEARCH PROCESS
The part two method of study reflected a number of lessons learnt in the part 
one investigation. These had led to a new understanding of the importance of the 
revised paradigm to the control of production. It became necessary to put aside 
a number of other interesting ideas in order to more fully concentrate on the 
above theme. I used the second stage of the study to modify the means of 
investigation. My principal aim was to simplify the identification of the way the 
plants were competing and to increase the c larity  with which production's role 
was specified. I was able to achieve part of this simplification by using a method 
of identifying order winning criteria developed at that time by Hill.
A .31 Identifying the Basis of Competing in the Case Studies
I modified the original list of issues to discuss with the Managing Directors, as 
shown above in section A .21, based on my use of the earlier investigations. The
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revised list was in five parts. The interviews used the semi-structured questionn­
aires shown as Attachment 8. This instrument covered the following:
(a) the plant's strategy and key tasks
(b) manufacturing's key tasks in supporting competitiveness
(c) competitive priorities for a range of products
(d) identifying the principal competitive goals for production
(e) the Managing Director's control information
The information was gathered from the Managing Directors in a series of 
meetings which I was able to tape record for more accurate review and analysis.
A. 311 The plants' strategic key tasks
The interview identified whether the plants possessed corporate planning 
systems and if  they did, whether these included specific written plans which 
harnessed manufacturing performance as a basis of competitiveness. I followed 
up the theme of 'written plans' with a series of questions aimed at establishing 
what the Managing Directors perceived as the key tasks of their manufacturing 
functions.
A .3I2 Establishing competitive priorities; identifying the OWC
Details of the semi-structured interview used in establishing the competitive 
priorities are shown below in Attachment 8. I used a modified version of Hill's 
order qualifying and order winning criteria technique. To assist the Managing 
Directors I provided them with a prompt list of possible OWC, as in Wheelwright's 
method (see part one above). They were invited to select 3-3 representative 
products and then to give their evaluations of the OWC for these products in the 
current and in two, self selected periods in the future.
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A.313 Achieving the competitive goals
Having established with the Managing Directors what they considered to be 
their plants' key competitive tasks, the interviews then examined these tasks for 
their levels of difficulty and the magnitude of the benefits they expected to 
receive from their successful accomplishment.
A .3 U  Identifying the managing directors' perspective of contribution to compet­
itiveness from functions.
I established the Managing Director's perspective of thestrategiccontribution 
to competitiveness from each of the main departments using the same methods as 
in part one, see Attachment 3. However, I modified the follow up questions to 
establish the link, if any, which they saw between the OQC /  OWC and the 
departmental contributions to competitiveness.
These interviews were also tape recorded to enable more accurate review. 
The process was repeated asking the Managing Directors what they anticipated 
the contributions to competitiveness from these functions would be in 3-5 years 
time. During this exercise the Managing Directors were asked whether their 
companies had corporate strategies and if there was a manufacturing component 
to such a strategy. Where this did not exist, they were asked to identify the 
major elements in manufacturing's role in the company's plans for competitive­
ness.
Based on the data received from the methods outlined above, I prepared a 
written statement of my interpretation of the key manufacturing tasks. This was 
shown to the respective Managing Directors and modified as necessary.
A. 32 Linking the Managing Directors' Control Information with their Coals
Having established the Managing Directors' perspective of their plants' maior
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competitive tasks, I subsequently used this information when evaluating the 
relevance of their control information.
The aim was to establish how the Managing Directors controlled their manu­
facturing functions. I included an examination of the balance they made between 
their own control efforts and those of the executive responsible for manufactur­
ing /  production.
I collected samples of all the information /  control reports they received. 
The only exceptions to this were:
(a) limited access to the full accounts
(b) " " " " monthly reports of the functional heads
I used the same method of collection and classification of the reports as in the 
part one study. In addition I added a series of questions, see Attachment 8, 
aimed at discovering whether they received sufficient analysis in these reports or 
whether they were primarily summaries of lower level data. Other questions 
sought to explore what they considered to be their most effective means of 
controlling production and what they considered to be their greatest difficulties 
in achieving control of production. My final area of investigation with the 
Managing Directors was to identify their views on the relative priority production 
managers should give to achieving compliance to standards compared, with making 
incremental improvements to the manufacturing system.
A.33 Establishing the Functional Heads' Perspectives of Order Qualifying / 
Winning Criteria
The examination was limited to the central providers of control information 
and / or those who would /  could contribute significantly to systematic improve­
ment of the plant's performance. This stemmed from the purpose of identifying 
whether those who have a major influence on controlling or improving production 
performance are working on a consistent set of priorities. The examination
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attempted to get these functional heads to differentiate between what their 
department's contributions should be, and what affects the plant as a whole.




The major sources of improvement came in general from:
Production Engineers / Process Engineers /  Ceramicists 
Work Study /  Industrial Engineers.
In some instances the Marketing Manager's perspectives on order qualifying / 
winning criteria were obtained. This was done where either the Managing 
Directors expressed doubt on the criteria , or where there were substantial 
differences in the perspectives of the Managing Directors and their respective 
Production Managers. The procedure used was the same as for the Managing 
Directors using re-titled versions of Attachment 8.
A .3*» Establishing how the Manufacturing Directors Controlled their Production 
Units
The purpose of this section was to establish the following:
(a) What they saw as their most important tools in controlling production 
performance
(b) What control information they received on a routine basis
(c) What, if any, exception reports they received
(d) How they used the information
(e) How they evaluated the information in terms of frequency, content, 
format and timing
(f) The level of duplication in the control information between superiors 
and subordinates
(g) How the Manufacturing Directors rated the written control inform­
ation compared with other sources of information
(h) How the Manufacturing Directors used meetings to control the plant
(i) What proportion of their time was devoted to routine meetings and an 
estimate of their time spent on non-planned meetings
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(j) The Manufacturing Directors' perspective of OQC/OWC
(k) How the Manufacturing Directors perceived the balance between 
control to standards and systematic incremental improvement
To establish answers to the above topics I used a series of semi-structured 
interviews with the most senior managers on site directly responsible for manu­
facturing, see Attachment 9.
A .35 The Production Managers' sources and use of control information
The purpose of this stage of the research was to establish the following:
(a) What control information did the production managers / supervisors 
receive on a routine basis
(b) What, if any, exception reports did they receive
(c) How did the production managers /  supervisors use the information
(d) How did they evaluate it in terms of frequency, content, format and 
timing
(e) What level of duplication was there in the control information 
between superiors and subordinates
(f) How did they rate the written control information compared with other 
sources of information
(g) How did they use meetings in the control of the plant
(h) What proportion of their time was devoted to routine meetings and 
un-planned meetings
(i) The production managers' perspectives of OQC and OWC
(j) How did they perceive the balance between control to standards and 
systematic incremental improvement
A .36 Evaluating the Cases' Adoption of the Dimensions of the Revised Paradigm
Four dimensions were identified as having significant effects on the degree to 
which the case studies adopted the revised paradigm. These dimensions were 
converted into the scales used in Figure 16. I developed the scales shown below 
and then classified the extent to which production management, in each of the 
case studies, adopted the styles of managing shown in them.
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A. 361 Strategic - tactical dimensions
1. Production management limits its attention to a narrow sub-set of 
performance criteria, which conflict with the priorities in the plant's 
corporate strategic goals.
2. Production management concentrates on a limited sub-set of the 
manufacturing based OWC /  OQC. Some major criteria are either omitted 
or significantly under-emphasised.
3. Production management attempts to do well on all its OWC /  OQC. It 
does not, however, d ifferentiate between the criteria in terms of its 
priorities and thus trade-offs.
<». Production management seeks high performance in all its OWC /  OQC, 
recognizing the impact of its trade-offs on each other and reflecting the 
company's corporate position in these trade-offs.
5. Production management provides the plant with a major competitive 
advantage through its ability to consistently accomplish more difficult 
manufacturing tasks.
A. 362 Integration - fragmentation dimensions
1. Individual functions consistently pursue their own functional goals 
which conflict with the plant's KMTs /  OWC. Major conflicts between 
the goals of the individual functions and production are common.
2. Individual functions tend to pursue their functional goals which are not 
closely matched to the KMTs /  OWC. Minor conflicts occur between the 
goals of the functions and with production management.
3. Individual functions work effectively to foster control and improvement 
of production performance. The individual functional priorities tend to 
deviate slightly from the KMTs /  OWC.
<t. No formal system exists to ensure integration of effort; however, all 
major functions informally cooperate with each other and production to 
achieve control and improvement in line with the KMTs /  O W C
5. The plant has a formal system designed to integrate the work of the 
functions with production management to obtain control and improvement 
of manufacturing performance in line with the KMTs /  OW C
A. 363 Intermittent -  continuous dimensions
1. No significant improvement projects directly involving production 
management have been completed in the past two years.
2. A t least one improvement project directly involving production manage­
ment has been completed in the last two years.
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3. A number of improvement projects directly involving production 
management have been undertaken in the last two years.
it. Regular improvements in production performance are expected and 
obtained directly from efforts made by production management. Suffic­
ient projects exist to ensure that there is always at least one active 
project in hand at any one time.
5. A major formal programme of continuous improvements in production 
performance, directly resulting from efforts made by production manage­
ment, has existed for two or more years.
A. 36<* Stepped - incremental dimensions
1. No identifiable incremental improvements could be traced to production 
management.
2. Small number of incremental improvements accomplished by production 
management in past two years. These improvements concentrate primar­
ily on labour savings. There is no identifiable link between the incre­
mental improvements and staff led changes. However, minor evidence of 
conflict between the two is detected.
3. Several incremental improvements to production performance have been 
accomplished in the past two years. The improvements concentrate 
primarily on costs, and are not strongly integrated with the KMTs /  OWC. 
There is no identifiable link between these improvements and staff led 
step changes to the manufacturing system.
<*. A wide range of incremental improvements has been made in production 
performance over the past two years. Several of these improvements are 
integrated with staff led step changes.
5. Production management's incremental improvement of the operating 
system is a critical part of the formal system for the control of product­
ion. The incremental improvements are coherent with the strategy for 
manufacturing and provide a basis for stepped changes introduced by 
staff.
A.37 Development of Ishikaw Diagrams of Order Winning Criteria
I identified the factors most likely to require effective control and /  or 
improvement in order to achieve the respective plant's order qualifying /  order 
winning criteria.
The aim as noted above was to ensure that the test of the link between control 
information and the OQC /  OWC was solidly founded on the real needs and 
problems facing each plant. The process used was to construct a theoretical 
Ishikaw diagram for the two largest production based OWC in each plant. The
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diagrams were based on the concepts of control, as covered in leading POM texts 
etc.
The completed diagrams were then presented to the Production Manager to 
check whether they covered the important practical factors affecting the aspects 
of the plant's performance needing control, if the OWC were to be met. This 
analysis was then extended and used as the basis of the checks on whether the 
company had:
(a) control measures /  exception reports on these dimensions of performance
(b) any programmes or actions to bring about improved performance.
The diagrams also provided a basis for the analysis of the physical perform­
ance of the 12 months prior to the fieldwork and acted as a cross check for the 
monthly reviews of control /  improvement in the 6 months of fieldwork.
A.38 Analysis of the Physical Performance of the Plant in the 12 Months Preced­
ing the Fieldwork
I examined the plants' records of physical /  cost performance related to 
achieving the two main, production based, OWC. Some plants did not have such 
records on these key themes or had not retained the records that they had initial­
ly made. These facts about the availability or not of information are incorpor­
ated in the review.
This investigation exposed the controlling /  improving activities of the Prod­
uction Managers. The intention was to identify what they sought to control / 
improve, why they concentrated on those aspects of performance, what means 
they used in attempting this control / improvement and to identify any factors 
which either facilitated or hindered their actions.
The review sought specific examples of the following:
(a) examples of more effective control
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(b) examples of improved performance, particularly due to changed means 
of obtaining the results
(c) examples of new /  additional /  refined sets of reports /  information, 
including any exception reports
(d) examples of new /  improved means of analysing the information 
available, which included both their own analysis and that provided by 
specialist staff
(e) examples of any trials or experiments, including unsuccessful trials, 
aimed at improving control /  performance
A.39 Analysis of the Knowledge /  Skills of POM Staff Compared with their Peers 
in the other Functions
The purpose of this section was twofold:
(a) to establish the comparative educational (general) and managerial 
(specialist) level of knowledge in the various functions, in order to compare 
that in POM with their peer levels.
(b) to identify where the POM staff got any updating knowledge /  skill 
related to their specialist activities.
My aim was to relate the effectiveness of the efforts to control /  improve to 
the level and quality of the knowledge of POM staff. The data was collected via 




The strengths and weaknesses of "............" as seen by
the Managing Director of the M..................." plant.
The strengths and weaknesses of "............" as seen by
the Pfcnaging Director of the "................... " plant.
(The questions were repeated to cover all the competitors identified by the 
Managing Directors and Marketing Managers)
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RANGE OF POSSIBLE ISSUES REQUIRING THE USE OF SPECIFIC 
MANUFACTURING POLICIES
Please tick in columns 1 to 7, as appropriate, your assessment of the 
contribution of the following issues to your plant's competitive performance.
ATTWTHNEtTT 2
DECREE OF IMPORTANCE
SUBJECT NOT SL’TLY MILDLY MOD LY FAIRLY VERY ESS'L
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
244
THE MANAGING DIRECTOR'S EXPECTATION OF CONTRIBUTION TO CURRENT 
COMPETITIVENESS FROM THE INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENTS
Please tick in the appropriate column your assessment of each of the following 
department's contributions to your plant's current competitiveness.
ATTflCHMJ/T 3
DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE












* A second questionnaire was then used, repeating the questions for the 
departments "expected contribution in 3-5 years time".
(N.B. On corpletion of each of the questionnaires, I asked the Managing 
Directors to describe the nature of the contribution to competitiveness made 




Please complete the following survey:
a. Check that the list of key manufacturing tasks represents the issues that 
are important to your plants' competitiveness. If it does not, please 
revise the list as necessary.
b. Starting with product group 1, allocate points to each of the items in 
the list of key manufacturing tasks in proportion to their current 
achievement in supporting competitiveness. The total of all the points 
should equal 100.
Please repeat the exercise, this time allocating the points according to 
the required level of achievement to achieve optimal competitive 
performance.
c. Please repeat the exercise for current achievement and required 
achievements for product group 2.
















TOTAL 100 100 100 100
2 4 6
Please complete the following proforma, using the notes at the bottom of 
the page for guidance.






















1. Age: please give each manager's current age (years only).
2. Service: please give the manager's total number of years service with the 
company. When service is over 2 years, please give years only, if less 
than two years, please give the number of months as well.
3. EUucational and technical attainments: please list each manager s 
educational and technical attainments with dates and identify any non­
qualification courses he has attended in the last two years. The list of 
attainments should identify the courses as follows: BSc. Hons. Chemistry, 
HNC Mechanical Engineering.
(N.B. The list of positions had been defined earlier from the organizational 
structure provided by personnel and cross checked with the Managing Director)
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SOMARY OF WRITTEN CONTROL INFORMATION EXHIBIT No
Received by ................... Issued b y ......................
Frequency (please tick) DAILY / WEEKLY / MONTHLY / OTHER (please specify)




Does the information in this report meet your requirements in respect of its 
CONTENT ? If not, what changes would you wish to make ?
Dees the information in this report meet your requirements in respect z i  its 
PCHMAT ? If not, what changes would you wish to make ?
Dees the information in this report meet your requirements in respect z i  .- .3  
TIMING ? If not, what changes would you wish to make ?
Dees the information in this report meet your requirements m  respect tf it3 
FREQUENCY ? If not, what changes would you wish to make ?
W hat f ig u r e s ,  i f  a n y , a re  l i k e l y  t o  t r i g g e r  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t io n  ? A re  th e re
a n y  s p e c i f i c  s ta n d a rd s  f o r  th e s e  t r i g g e r  p o in t s  ?
SUMMARY OF WRITTEN CONTROL INFORMATION EXHIBIT NO
Received by ...................  Issued by ......................
Frequency (please tick) DAILY / WEEKLY / MONTHLY / OTHER (please specify)
TYPE OF CONTROL INFORMATION
General description
USE OF INFORMATION
Does the information in this report meet your requirements in respect of its 
CONTENT ? If not, what changes would you wish to make ?
Dees the information in this report meet your requirements in respect of its 
FORMAT ? If not, what changes would you wish to make ?
Dce3 the information in this report meet your requirements in respect off its 
TIMING ? If not, what changes would you wish to maxe ?
Dees the information in this report meet your requirements in respect of it3 
FREQUENCY ? If not, what changes would you wish to make ?
W hat f ig u r e s ,  i f  a n y , a r e  l i k e l y  t o  t r i g g e r  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t io n  ? A re  th e r e
a n y  s p e c i f i c  s ta n d a rd s  f o r  th e s e  t r i g g e r  p o in t s  ?
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THE QUESTIONNAIRES ON LINE MANAGERS' VIEWS ON KEY ISSUES TO BE MONITORED
ATTACHhCNT 7
Please score the following questions in RANK ORDER with 1 as the most 
important source of information and 6 as the least important source. (The 
sixth category of a free choice is provided to enable you to add in any 
sources of information you consider important and which are not included in 
the formal questions.
THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR MONITORING MANUFACTURING PERFORMANCE
Source of information Rank
Written reports and information, 
from all sources
Information gathered from 
personal contacts you initiate 
within the firm
Information gathered from your 
physically touring the plant.
Information gathered at formal 
meetings chaired by production 
personnel.
Information gathered at formal 
meetings chaired by non­
production personnel.





The primary purpose of this interview is to establish the means by which 
manufacturing can most effectively contribute to your firm's competitiveness. 
The starting point is the way in which the firm qualifies for, and then goes 
on to win, orders. It then asks about the roles played by the functions in 
achieving competitiveness and finally about the educational / training levels 
of the senior functional management.
PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING THE PLANT'S KEY MANUFACTURING TASKS
1. Does your firm use a formal system of corporate planning ?
YES NO
2. If YES, can I see a copy of the plan as it relates to the goals required of 
production ?
3. If no plan exists, what are the main aims of your company over the next few 
years ?
4. What do you, as the senior Director responsible for the site, identify as 
the KEY MANUFACTURING TASKS?
In terms of this plant what are the major competitive priorities to which 
manufacturing has to address itself?
(a) Is there a written statement of the competitive features that the 
manufacturing plant has to achieve to enable the company to be 
competitive?
(b) If such a document exists, what areas does it cover?
(c) What l s  the process of drawing it up and which functions in the company 
and plant are involved?
(d) If there is not (a written KMT), how do you identify what ls required 
of manufacturing?
(e) What is required of the PLAMT to make it a successful unit?
5. Key manufacturing tasks
(a) Cost control
How much of the cost performance required for competitiveness can come 
from production management's meeting existing performance standards? 
Similarly, how much must come from bringing about changes in the systems, 
products and processes used?
(b) Availability / Delivery performance
How much of the delivery performance required for competitiveness can 
come from production management's meeting existing performance standards? 
Similarly, how much must come from bringing about new methods in the 
systems, products and processes used?
(c) Quality
How much of the quality performance required for competitiveness can come 
from production management's meeting existing performance standards? 
Similarly, how much must come from bringing about changes in the systems, 
products and processes used?
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Review of the "distinctive contributions to competitiveness"; i.e. what 
aspects of the summary provided earlier need revision, in the sense of 
the departments’ strategic contribution to the firm s competitiveness?
ESTABLISH IN3 CCWETITIVE PRIORITIES 
Ranking competitive priorities
6. Please identify 3-5 representative products and list their competitive
priorities. As your oompany may operate in several product markets, with 
differing market place priorities, please check that all significant 
markets are covered in the product selection. For each of these products 
I would like you to to assign your current weightings to these priorities, 
so that they total 100%. Next please identify how you see these 
priorities changing in the near future. Please specify two future time 
periods, related to the product life cycles of your business, and review 
the weightings.
In the first instance please do not use the 'prompt' list below. If you 
subsequently wish to, you can use the list as a cross check on the 
completeness of the answer. Does the list omit any priorities 








(g) A N other
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P r i o r i t y 1985
p e rc e n ta g e
198-
p e rc e n ta g e
1 9 -
p e rc e n ta g e
TOTAL 100 100 100
VOLUÆS







TOTAL 100 100 100
VOLUMES
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ACHIEVING THE COMPETITIVE GOALS
7. (a) Which of these performance criteria do you consider will be the most 
difficult to achieve over the next 3-5 years?
7. (b) Overcoming which difficulty will bring about the greatest benefit to 
the company?
7. (c) Are there any written standards for these performance priorities ?
7. (d) Please identify any areas where manufacturing has to provide order 
qualifying performance.
7. (e) Are there any aspects of the order <*ialifying criteria, which you
expect to change in the realizable lifetime of the product? If so, 
how are these likely to affect the type of manufacturing system 
needed?
7. ( f ) Do you consider there to be any order <*ialifying criteria, which 
could become order winning criteria? If so, what are the 
manufacturing implications?
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7.(g) Are there «my criteria which you consider might become order lasing 
criteria?
Summary of the KMTs
A written summary of the KWTs as interpreted by the researcher will be 
produced and subsequently reviewed and discussed with you.
LINKING CONTROL INFORMATION WITH THE COMPETITIVE PRIORITIES
8. Measuring manu factoring performance





In particular, what types of trend information do you keep?
9. Does anyone (manufacturing or finance etc.) provide an analysis from the 
information?
10. How do you control the manufacturing function? Please describe the way 
in which you do this, in terms of both routine and exceptional reports, 
meetings, informal contacts etc.
10.(a) What are the most important and effective tools at your disposal for 
controlling manufacturing?
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10. (b) Where do you find the greatest difficulty in achieving control? (What 
factors most frequently hinder your achieving the desired level of 
control)?
11. Within the specifically PRODUCTION function of manufacturing, where do 
you see the main efforts should be focused to make control contribute to 
the plant's carpet it iveness?
(i.e. What are the most difficult things, and the most important things, 
for production management to control?)
12. Taking the performance areas identified above, to what extent do you 
expects
(a) Production to concentrate on meeting specific performance 
standards - by concentrating on corrective action?
(b) Production to liaise with other functions in bringing about 
changes to the systerns/technology to get rid of (overcome) the 
problems leading to ineffective control?
i.e. changes in conplexity, uncertainty or similar concepts.
(c) Production to take a specific (proactive) role in bringing about 
small (incremental) changes to systems and processes, which push 
back the frontier of control or tackle the trade-off areas of 
higher quality and lower costs, better delivery and lower 
inventory?
Please give specific examples of both achievements in any of the above over 
the last 12 months and the way in which you make this occur!
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ATTACHMENT 9
gestions for Senior Production Managers
How do you control the manufacturing function? Please describe the way in 
which you do this in terms of reports, both routine and exception, meetings, 
patrols around the pi amt and informal contacts etc.
(a) What are the most important and effective tools at your disposal for 
controlling manufacturing?
(b) Where do you find the greatest difficulty in achieving control; (what 
factors most frequently hinder your achieving the desired level of control)?
Within the specifically PRODUCTION function of manufacturing, what are the 
main priorities? i.e. where should efforts be focused to make the 
control of production contribute to the plant's competitiveness?
What do you consider to be the most difficult things for production 
management to control?
Taking the performance areas identified in 2 above, to what extent do you 
expect:
(a) Production to concentrate on meeting specific performance standards - by 
concentrating on corrective action?
(b) Production to liaise with other functions in bringing about changes to 
the systems / technology to get rid of (overcome) the problems leading to 
ineffective control?
i.e. changes in complexity, uncertainty or similar concepts.
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(c) Production to take a specific (proactive) role in bringing about small 
(incremental) changes to systems and processes, which push back the frontiers 
of control or tackle the trade-off areas of higher quality and lower costs, 
better delivery and lower inventory?
Please give specific examples of both achievements in any of the above over 
the last 12 months and the way in which you make this occur!
How do you measure manufacturing performance?





In particular, what, if any, types of trend information do you keep?




How much of the cost performance required for competitiveness can come from 
production management's meeting existing performance standards?
Similarly, how much must come from bringing about changes in the systems, 
products and processes used?
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A v a i l a b i l i t yHow much o f  t h e  d e l i v e r y  p e r fo rm a n c e  r e q u ir e d  f o r  c o m p e ti t iv e n e s s  can  come 
fro m  p ro d u c tio n  m anag em ent's  m e e tin g  e x i s t i n g  p erfo rm a n c e  s ta n d a rd s ?
S i m i l a r l y ,  how much m u st come fro m  b r in g in g  a b o u t ch an g es  in  t h e  s y s te m s , 
p r o d u c t s  and p ro c e s s e s  u sed ?
Q u a l i ty
How much o f  t h e  q u a l i t y  p e r fo rm a n c e  r e q u ir e d  f o r  c o m p e t i t iv e n e s s  can  come fro m  
p ro d u c t io n  m anag em ent's  m e e tin g  e x i s t i n g  p e rfo rm a n c e  s ta n d a r d s ?
S i m i l a r l y ,  how much m u st com e fro m  b r in g in g  a b o u t  ch an g es  in  t h e  sy s te m s , 
p r o d u c t s  and p r o c e s s e s  u sed ?
I s  t h e r e  a s p e c i f i c  'im p ro v em en t p l a n '  f o r  p ro d u c tio n ?  I f  s o ,  w hat r o l e  d o  
y ou  e x p e c t  p ro d u c t io n  m anagem ent t o  p la y  in  i t ?  I s  t h e i r  r o l e  to  s u p p o r t  t h e  
s t a f f  e f f o r t s  t o  a c h ie v e  im p ro v e m e n ts  o r  d o  th e y  th e m s e lv e s  h av e  a s p e c i f i c  
' d i r e c t '  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  m ake? P le a s e  g iv e  c o n c r e te  i l l u s t r a t i o n s .
A re  t h e r e  any c h a n g e s  w h ich  y ou  w ould  l i k e  t o  make in  t h e  way i n  w hich  
p ro d u c t io n  m anagem ent s e e k s  t o  c o n t r o l?
C hanges i n t
In fo rm a tio n
R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  ( s t r u c t u r e )
T h e i r  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e i r  r o l e




I would be grateful for your help in completing this questionnaire. It 
is about identifying the most important aspects of production performance to 
control and improve. It also asks about your sources of information and how 
you use them control and / or improve production. The completed 
questionnaires will be treated in confidence and only be seen by myself and my 
research supervisor. The thesis will disguise the data so that neither the 
Company or you can be identified. Please complete all sections as fully as 
possible, if you have nothing to record, please enter "NO INFORMATION".
Biographical Data
Name .............................  Age .... Yrs .... Months
Job Title .........................  Date joined Company
Date appointed to current position. .. /../..
The an jar iteaeto control and i^oove
1. What are the most important aspects of the production department's work 
to control ? Please list in order of decreasing importance 







What are the most important aspects of the production department's work 




3. Please list any training or educational courses you have attended, in the 
past two years, related to either the technical or managerial aspects of your 
work. PLEASE include any in-company training sessions.
TITLE / OR DESCRIPTION OF COURSE WHERE LENGTH DATES






4. Do you have any qualifications, other than those outined above ? If so, 
please identify them below.
TITLE OF QUALIFICATION AWARDED BY DATE
(f).......................................................................
( 9 ) ..........................................................................................................................................................................
(h)...................................................................... .
5. Which, if any, of the above courses training sessions or qualifications 
has most helped you in performing well as a production manager/supervisor?
6. Do you attend any meeting of professional institutions, which provide 
ideas on how to manage production ? If yes please give details.
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7. Do you regularly receive any journals etc.which help you in your work ?
TITLE OF JOURNAL /  MAGAZINE HOW OFTEN WHO SE2CS
RECEIVED IT
SURVEY Page 3
8. Have you in the last two years, undertaken either on your own or with 
others, any trials or experiments, designed to either increase the level of 
control or improve production performance? Please give relevant details.
Training and Inf amotion changes
9. Are there imy types of course or subjects that you would like to learn 
about, which you consider likely to help you do your job more effectively ?
10. Are there any aspects of your job where you consider you would be likely 
to control better or improve production performance, if you received either 




11. Has the level of control you have achieved over production, been affected 
in the last two years, by changes in any of the following.
Please delete part that is 
not applicable, 
increase/decrease in variety 
of end products
increase /decrease number of parts 
tighter/ looser product specifications 
improved/declined worker skills 
improved/declined worker attendance 
inproved/worserved plant condition 
simpler/sohpisticated type of equipment 
steady/ variable scheduling of work load 
even /uneven product mix 









12. Which, if any, of the above changes have been introduced by production 
management, with the intention of achieving better control of production 
performance ?
13. What sources of information have been most helpful in making the changes 




14. What do you consider to be your most important sources of information to 
control and improve production performance? Please score control and 
improvement independently, ranking each in order of their own importance,
1 * highest, 6 lowest.
THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR MONITORING MANUFACTURING PERFORMANCE




Written reports and info­
rmation, from all sources
Information gathered from 
personal contacts you 
initiate within the firm
Information gathered from 
your physically touring 
the plant.
Information gathered at 
formal meetings chaired by 
production personnel.
Information gathered at 





APPENDIX B - ILLUSTRATIVE SETS OF CONTROL 
AND IMPROVEMENT REPORTS
B.I INTRODUCTION
Given the weaknesses in the control reports and the inadequate analysis in all 
the cases, I considered that it was necessary to provide a few examples of the 
type of alternative reports which could support greater learning and improvement, 
whilst controlling production performance.
The revised paradigm enables management to achieve a state of control in 
production while accomplishing more difficult manufacturing tasks, which in­
crease the firm 's competitiveness. This is achieved by controlling complexity 
while enhancing competence and reducing uncertainty. The first phase entails 
reducing uncertainty and improving manager /  worker competence. During this 
phase system complexity is limited or even reduced. When the benefits of 
uncertainty reduction and greater competence are felt, new and more complex 
tasks can be accommodated, without loss of control. All three elements, uncert­
ainty, complexity and competence require strategic direction so that, together, 
they enable production to achieve strategically important, but difficult, manu­
facturing tasks.
Schonberger ( 1986) encourages the measurement of customer or tented dimens­
ions of performance such as quality, cost, lead time and flexib ility. He is critical 
of the over emphasis on efficiency in most internal reporting systems. However, 
he indirectly points to other measures which reflect the level of variability 
(uncertainty) in the manufacturing system. Widening Schonberger's argument, 
new measures can be developed indicating the plant's likely future competitive­
ness by examining trends in competence, complexity, uncertainty etc. The 
illustrative reports which follow reflect both OWC and the intermediate 'levers of 
control'. It is important to recognize that the control information generated in 
them should be interpreted as a whole and in the context of each case's strategic 
manufacturing aims. If one or more measures were pursued without due regard to 
the overall strategic goals, the effect could be an imbalanced state of control.
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Although my research has shown the need for better information to help 
formulate strategy, I limit my review to routine control of strategic issues to 
avoid deviating into the formulation of manufacturing strategy. While the issues 
I consider below are strategic, it is necessary to recognize that my emphasis is its 
execution, not its formulation. In some instances I was unable to use data from 
the case studies because the firms did not collect key data. In these instances I 
provide forms without data, but with headings, to indicate what should have been 
produced.
The need for better monitoring of performance on OWC issues has been 
emphasised many times in recent years. Despite this recognition, both my own 
and the research of others has shown that these issues still receive inadequate 
attention. For the sake of brevity I limit the reports to those not dealt with by 
conventional techniques of monitoring, particularly labour, as these are well 
covered in conventional POM literature. (I remind the reader of the application I 
made of CUSUM techniques to labour performance in the brakes case.)
If the changes in the information suggested below were produced by staff 
functions, they would probably be too expensive. However, the following sugges­
tions are based on the data being collected and examined by production manage­
ment and workers, as part of a programme for systematic improvement. Unless 
those who have to take the corrective actions in production are involved in the 
process of collection and analysis, the full potential of the improvement pro­
gramme is unlikely to be achieved.
B.2 MEASURING DELIVERY PERFORMANCE
Delivery reliability was shown to be an important OWC in all cases, and yet, as 
New it Meyers found, only )0% of firms in a large scale self-reporting study
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claimed that it was measured. My study, which asked for evidence of such 
measurements, was unable to find a single example in which delivery was directly 
monitored. A t its best delivery was monitored via back-order reports or cust­
omer complaints of lateness.
A second dimension of delivery, applicable to 'make to order' production, is 
the lead time. Even where making to stock is possible, because of the standard­
ized nature of the product, some firms will for cost reasons wish to make to order. 
The impact of modern manufacturing techniques, both FMS and JIT, has led to 
significantly reduced lead times. Thus, making to order with rapid delivery is 
now practical for some firms. Although in some ways a measure of delivery, I 
deal with lead time measurement under the sub-section on flexibility. It is thus 
clear that delivery performance is both important and largely unmeasured. 
Unless this weakness is overcome, firms cannot reasonably expect to be fully 'in 
control', let alone competitive as suggested in the revised paradigm.
B.21 Measuring Delivery to the Customer
I noted above that 'on time' delivery was a largely unmeasured OWC. In a 
number of the cases it would have been easy to comprehensively monitor delivery 
by modifying the order entry systems. Senior management could have then been 
provided with reports showing the proportion of products delivered early, on-time, 
late etc. More subtle analyses such as the percentage of items, rather than 
orders, and differences in the delivery achievements between product lines, could 
also have been produced. While computers would help in making such analyses, 
manual methods were still practical. Tables 28 and 29 below demonstrate the 
type of information produced, in the kitchen furniture case, using samples of the 
orders processed per month. They give a clear, if not complete, view of perform-
ance.
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Table 28 Example of Delivery Performance Analysis 
(Data drawn from records by Sales Office Manager)
Summary of despatch records 
(sample of 5*3 orders)
MONTH NUMBER OF ORDERS 













OCT.8* 9 36 16 36 136 23
NOV. 8* 6 33 18 26 108 2*
DEC.8* l 16 9 7 i*8 26
JAN.85 5 32 16 26 117 22
FEB.85 7 0* 16 7* 209 33
MAR.85 11 *2 26 112 218 31
APR.85 12 *3 28 58 175 33
MAY 85 18 5* 33 138 239 58
3UN.85 12 *3 28 63 139 *5
.11 L.8 5 13 *3 30 6* 120 53
AUG.85 19 30 38 131 2*3 62
SEP.83 31 83 37 238 383 67
Summary of key results
Total orders * 3*3
Number supplied ex-stock * 399 
Number not supplied ex-stock ■ I * *
Note i. A total of 728 deliveries was made to fill 3*3 orders, giving an excess 
deliveries rate of 3*%.
Note 2. The largest selling range had a worse delivery performance than the other 
items in the company's range, with 27.2% of orders being part delivered. This 
compares with 23.6% of the other product lines.
Note 3. The average size of order delivered complete contained 2.9 items. The 
average size of order not delivered complete contained 7 items.







No. OF LARGEST 
RANGE NOT DELIV­
ERED EX-STOCK
, 2** 229 13 5
2 58 *6 12 8
3 29 21 8 7
* 38 25 13 8
3 25 1* 11 9
6 19 7 12 7
7 26 9 17 12
8 2* 10 1* 8
9 17 9 8 *
10 7 3 2 1
I t  4 36 23 33 13
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The above reports provide important information about delivery. While the 
ultimate objective is delivery to the customers, it is also necessary to monitor the 
steps leading to this final stage. A way of achieving this aim, which also reveals 
the degree of uncertainty within the production system, is shown below.
B.22 Measuring Internal Delivery Reliability
A number of the cases demonstrated high levels of internal inconsistency in 
delivering production between sequential operations. This was reflected eventu­
ally in late deliveries to customers, although, as discussed above, this was not 
effectively measured. It was also reflected in the level of WIP, which was only 
measured in aggregate terms. This made it difficult to gauge the effect on the 
smooth running of production.
I showed above that output in the brakes case was particularly prone to 
erratic variations, associated with month end storming of output targets. This 
inconsistency was partly shown by the report which showed the percentage of the 
monthly schedule achieved each week. This measure, however, was too limited 
and not sufficiently focused on showing management the level of inconsistency. 
The CLIP scoring system developed by Mullard would have been of value in this 
context. The initial parameters of good delivery could have been set widely and 
subsequently narrowed both in their tolerances and frequency.
Figure 22 The CLIP System Applied to the Production 
(Data taken from brake case for 0 weekly periods)
PRODUCTS DATES
Wks 0 5/8 Wks 09/52 Wks 1/0 Wks 5/8 Wks 9/12 Wks 13/17
OT. Sc. OT. Sc. OT. Sc. OT.Sc. OT. Sc. OT. Sc.
A 90* 0 8 3 *  0 ¿2* Ö TVSTi 8 8 *  0 81* 0
B 90% 0 8 Î *  0 6 0 *  0 97% 1 96% 1 85* 0
C 92% 0 9 0 *  0 76% 0 8 6 * 0 87% 0 101* 1
D 6 1 * 0 77% 0 JJ* 0 95% 1 75% 0 6 5 *  0
E 8 0* 0 2 2 *  0 1 15* 0 60% 0 60% 0 9 2 * 0
Total CLIP 0 0 0 00% 20% 20%
CODE OT. = Output as percentage of schedule.
Sc. ■ Clip score either 0, if outside schedule limit or 1, if inside limits.
2 7 0
Interpreting the above data, we can see that only in weeks 5 to 8 were any of 
the products within the range -5 *  to ♦1 0 * of the planned production rate. Thus, 
given the general pattern of shortfalls with occasional excesses, it was unlikely 
that the production schedule would be achieved. I f  CLIP scores were used 
between all key departments the inter-departmental delivery performance could 
have been monitored and stimulated efforts to improve. When performance was 
sufficiently high, the interval between reviews could have been reduced to 
weekly and possibly eventually to daily. Under this system the major part of the 
level of variability and thus uncertainty would have been reduced and so they 
could have improved cost performance by dismantling the costly buffer stocks 
between processes. Both sections B .2I and B.22 have thus shown that simple 
inexpensive measures are available to monitor delivery performance. Further 
sophistication is also often easily available, but the critical issue appears to be 
the recognition of the necessity to monitor at all.
B.3 MONITORING QUALITY
The Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) study showed that above average 
quality is important for increased market share. Recent production management 
literature. Price (1980), Crosby (1979) has shown that high quality can lead to 
lower costs of manufacture. Additionally, as discussed above, good quality in 
internal activities reduces the uncertainty within plants and thus increases the 
scope for improved control. To attain these benefits, changes in information are 
necessary. Thus, for many reasons, quality needs to be recognized as a strategic 
issue and not simply a matter of cost saving. At the managing director level two 
issues are central; the quality received by customers and the total cost of achiev­
ing quality as a proportion of sales turnover. Both issues need to be monitored to 
show their changes over time and if possible, at appropriate intervals, to compare 
them with competitors. I assume in the reports below that the aim is zero 
defects sent to the customer and the lowest total cost system of meeting that
aim.
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B.31 Measuring the Cost of Quality
Improved quality was widely identified as an OWQ yet, although in most 
cases dispatched quality was measured, neither it, nor more strategic information, 
was regularly sent to senior management. In addition other important tactical 
issues, such as the level of internal scrap /  rejects, were not reported to senior 
management. The effect of these omissions was that performance on quality was 
not systematically reviewed and improvement plans were not implemented in line 
with the OWC. One of the central reasons for the underemphasis on quality at 
senior management level was the systematic understating of its costs. The few 
reports available only considered some of the costs of failure, not their full costs, 
nor indeed the costs of prevention and appraisal. It has been estimated by 
quality professionals that the total cost of quality, (i.e. not satisfying the custo­
mer first time), is in the order of 20% of sales turnover. Crosby claims to have 
reduced ITT's cost of quality to 5% of sales, by careful control and improvement.
The Managing Directors in the pump and clutch cases received good warranty 
claims analysis information, while the kitchen furniture case Managing Director 
had recently started to receive data on customer complaints. However, such 
information falls short of that needed to help senior management make the 
necessary strategic decisions to position their companies in terms of quality and 
its costs. In most of the case studies the data needed to produce these reports 
was available, but was dispersed into various sub-systems. With the type of data 
shown in Figure 23, a Manufacturing Director could monitor his plant's improve­
ment programmes to ensure that they made adequate progress on the critical
issues.
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Cost of salaries of quality control and inspection 
Indirect costs (National Insurance etc.)
Cost of space
Cost of inspection equipment P.A.
Cost of rejects
Cost of re-worked products
Cost of warranty claims
Cost of items delayed waiting inspection
Cost of changes to correct errors (engineering
changes, tools changes, software corrections)
Any other costs of errors











Total cost of Quality x,xxx
Neither trends nor the inter-firm comparisons need frequent monitoring when 
they are working well. Under such conditions three monthly intervals will be 
sufficient, but when a firm is seeking rapid changes in its performance much more 
frequent monitoring is required to check progress and to ensure that appropriate 
pressures are sustained. When longer time periods occur between monitoring it is 
essential that small changes in trends are rapidly identified. This can be accomp­
lished by adopting a modified version of the CUSUM programme which tracks 
progress in controlling against a specified target level of improvements.
As well as monitoring the cost and level of quality reaching the customers, it 
is also desirable to monitor the uncertainty within production which arises from 
variation of production and purchased quality.
B.32 Measuring Internal Quality Levels
I showed above that quality to customers and internal rejection rates were not 
reported to senior managers. I also showed that the rejection rate  in some 
processes was variable. In the brake and ceramics cases this variability caused 
delays and /  or over-production to compensate for the expected levels of reject­
ion. I showed in the brake case that even this correction factor was significantly 
incorrect, at 2% compared with an actual 7%.
273
Were the cases to improve their control in this aspect of performance, it  
would be likely that they would adopt a programme of error prevention, such as 
TQC, rather than the more limited Statistical Process Control (SPC) approach 
adopted in some cases.
Figure 26 Summary of Internal Quality Data Affecting Uncertainty
(Data taken from brake case)
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of final
rejects WIP setups failing assemblies first offs
7 26 0.19 to 35
The above data could be recorded by department and trends monitored. In 
addition data on the level of customer returns and the total cost of administering
the quality control system, plus the value of rejects and reworks, could be calcu­
lated and shown as a percentage of sales turnover.
In the brake case, where the ratio of inspectors to production directs was well 
known, and at 25% compared with a target of 17%, the trend was not reviewed, 
either as a proportion of costs or turnover. The brake case showed other data 
which provided important information at supervisory level. In addition to the 
rejection of components, there was considerable rejection by inspection of the 
'first-offs' offered to them and a stopping of the process because it was outside 
the SPC control limits. The data dealing with the above issues for a period is 
shown below as Figure 25.
Figure 25 Rejection of 'First-offs' and 'Process Stops' 













Wickman 12 6 50 N/A N/A
Gnutti 18 1 >1 107 17
L SA 9 2 22 210 63
Schutti 6 3 50 N/A N/A
Wavis 20 3 15 31 7
Millwalkee 5 1 20 113 3
Plunge Grinder 1 0 - 76 36
P tid tih ti’n_____ h ______i___ ______u _____ _____222_____ ____L2Z_______
2 70
The data shows that some processes were not being set up correctly firs t time 
and that some processes were frequently found to be outside the SPC control 
limits. By monitoring such data it is reasonable to expect it to stimulate action 
to improve these sources of uncertainty, affecting both quality and the time 
required to produce the output.
&.<* THE NEED TO MEASURE FLEXIBILITY Sc COMPLEXITY
I have shown that the complexity of the manufacturing task results from 
decisions about the product range, processes and systems. Production needs to 
be able to match the level of flexibility to the complexity of the manufacturing 
task. Flexibility is essentially the ability to economically and effectively adjust 
output levels, products made and /  or introduce new products, in line with the 
demands of the market rather than of the manufacturing system. Many manu­
facturing systems can be adjusted, but at unacceptable costs in terms of reduced 
capacity or costs of production. The development of JIT and TQC systems has 
enabled a number of firms to reduce the costs of flexibility to acceptable levels. 
However, because the aim of flexibility has received limited attention, Shingo 
(1981), Schonberger (1982) and Slack (1983), few means of measuring flexibility  
exist.
The turbulent market faced by many manufacturers gives rise to the complex­
ity which in turn requires them to achieve high flexibility. Yet, as I have shown, 
the traditional paradigm of control neither measures it nor encourages its devel­
opment. It is therefore important that the internal measures of the revised 
paradigm monitor progress in increasing this characteristic, so that there is a 
reduced conflict between what is required in the market and achievable by 
production. Three forms of flexibility tend to a ttract attention» the ability to 
smoothly introduce new products, to change designs /  modify existing designs and 
finally to increase /  decrease volumes. The critical skill is to make these 
changes without disruption to the operation of production. It can be argued that
2 7 5
by measuring flexibility we have, in effect, measured the competence of workers 
and the system to perform effective changes.
B.<» 1 Means of Measuring Flexibility
Reduced lead time and greater flexibility were only recognized by senior 
management in one case (ceramics) as a critical element in competitiveness. 
Similarly, in only one other case (medical products) was the lead time of product 
introduction recognized and, in this instance, measured. In none of the cases 
were the production lead times measured, although several used stock turn 
figures which gave limited guidance to lead times and some indication of flexibil­
ity.
I showed that senior management in the pump and clutch cases developed 
simple measures showing the variety per month on their plants. While their 
purpose was used to reduce variety, it indirectly demonstrated means of looking 
at the plant's flexibility.
Because of the two phase nature of the approach to complexity, (initial 
reduction until a state of control is achieved and gradual increase to achieve 
advantageous but complex tasks when uncertainty and competence are growing), 
the measures used must be capable of accommodating the different character­
istics involved. Thus in the clutch case, where variety had contributed to the 
loss of control in production, the product expansion programme should have been 
limited until progress on improving the manufacturing system had been accomp­
lished. Yet in the pump case where the level of control was much higher, the 
product range expansion should have proceeded in line with increased efforts on 
reduced uncertainty and increased competence of production management and its 
work force.
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One means of measuring overall flexibility is to compare the market's require­
ments in a period with production's output. Such a measure need only be used at 
say annual intervals to check the long term progress towards greater flexibility. 
Figure 26 below demonstrates a measure which matches both the variety of types 
produced and the output quantities. These are turned into scores which are 
multiplied to give an index of flexibility.
Figure 26 A Corporate Measure of Flexibility
Product















TOTAL 6 568 6350
(Illustrative data only)
Figure 26 shows that only three out of ten products were produced in the 
period and considerable over production occurred on these lines. The three lines 
produced totalled 6350 against their demand of 1622. This gave an index 
1622/63 50 * 0.226, when multiplied by the index (0.3) of lines produced against 
lines sold, with the resulting score being 0.067. This could be called a flexibility 
score of 6.7%. Clearly it does not reflect the cost of flexibility which must be 
set against the score.
B.62 Improved Flexibility with Quick Changeovers
One way of reducing the cost of flexibiity is to quickly changeover between 
products. The two automotive replacement part cases were particular examples 
where the product range had to be wide and response times fast. V et with strong
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price competition both needed to achieve these wide ranges and good deliveries 
with the minimum of inventories. The ability to achieve this combination of aims 
was dependent on improving the setup times so that they were substantially 
reduced. The following Figure demonstrates the type of information that was 
needed to review the rate of progress on setup time reductions.
Figure 27 Monitoring Improvements in Changeover Times
IMPROVEMENTS OVER OVER
No. of Improvements in set up times 
January to March
75* 9 0 *
April to June 10 5
July to September 17 9
October to December 9 15
(Illustrative data only)
Figure 27 demonstrates the type of report which could be used to show how 
many setups had been improved in a period. It shows how many of the improve­
ments had reduced setup times by 7 5 *  and 9 0 * . As I showed above in Figure 25, 
in the brake case the level of setups rejected by first-off inspectors demonstrated 
one cause of the long time taken in changing over from one product to another. 
This information would need to be considered along with the more obvious meas­
ures of flexibility, if the management were to seek improved control and 
performance.
B.5 MEASURING STRATEGIC COSTS
I showed that senior management in all seven cases was provided with compre­
hensive cost data. Such data, despite its importance, has been considered to be 
outside the scope of this thesis. However, one important aspect of strategic cost 
data has shown itself necessary for inclusion. This is the use of overhead rates 
and their application to production cost performance. In the pump case one of 
the major product groups was considered very uncompetitive. An internal 
re-allocation of overheads, with no physical change in the system, led to a
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reduction from I 100% to 630%. The product group was then considered to be the 
second cheapest in the market place! My study showed overheads were particul­
arly affected by two elements in the manufacturing system; the number of 
clerical transactions and the level of inventory. In none of the cases were these 
costs directly related to the specific product groups and their processes. Rather 
they were averaged plant wide and allocated on the basis of direct labour hours. 
Although changes to more flow like processes would have reduced these costs 
significantly, there were no attempts either to make such changes or to reflect 
the overheads appropriately, when they existed in the plant. To some extent the 
same applied to the difference between large and small batches where the number 
of transactions were the same regardless of batch size, but the proportion of 
costs incurred was different. Similarly, the batch sizes for items with low 
demand levels were proportionally much larger than for items with large demand 
levels. Yet these additional costs were never reflected in strategic decisions 
about product range.
B.6 MEASURES REFLECTING REDUCTIONS IN UNCERTAINTY
As demonstrated above the traditional approach to controlling production 
normally accepts a high degree of uncertainty within manufacturing. This 
uncertainty occurs in the delivery of materials to the plant, the internal flow 
rate» between work stations, variable quality, inconsistent machine availabilities 
and worker attendance patterns. These and other uncertainties make economic 
control difficult because the low level of predictability involved makes it necess­
ary to protect the system with various forms of buffer. Yet these buffers have 
become so common in the traditionally controlled plant that they are rarely 
challenged. They have become accepted as part of the normal life of production. 
This acceptance has meant that they are not given much priority in terms of 
monitoring, particularly as managers do not expect them to change or be particul­
arly changeable.
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B. 7 R EDUCED UNCERTAINTY IN MACHINE /  PLANT AVAILABILITY
The impact of plant maintenance on product quality and delivery reliability 
has been known for many years. Generally, attention to maintenance has been 
when either quality falls below a nominal level or capacity is reduced. As such, 
the few measures that are made are essentially tactical in nature. However, 
renewed attention has been given to maintenance in recent years as leading 
producers have sought to achieve dramatic improvements in quality and lead 
times. These goals, unlike the previous goals, are strategic. They are required 
to be supported by monitoring systems which reveal the impact of any lost produc* 
tion time or reduction in performance. Such controls must be capable of analysis, 
so that revised practices of maintenance can be developed as necessary.
B.8 ENSURING THAT THE MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE ARE USED TO 
ACHIEVE CONTROL AND IMPROVEMENT
I noted above that it was essential that the development of more sophisticated 
measures of performance does not lead to subtle forms of mis-direction. Neither 
must the cost of developing such measures be allowed to consume the savings 
produced by the information provided.
The revised paradigm has been premised on the view that production perform­
ance has,in many companies,a significant impact on corporate competitiveness. 
Therefore, the control system strategy must directly and economically reflect the 
ways in which production needs to support competitiveness. Given that the OQC 
/  OWC or the KMTs have been correctly established, it is then necessary to link 
the control reports to them. While this ensures that the direction is correct, it 
does not deal with the often under emphasised issue of the rate of improvement 
that needs to be achieved in order to be competitive. It is therefore necessary 
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